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Multi-sided platform analysis and competition law enforcement practice in BRICS countries 金砖国家多边平台分析与竞争执法实践
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2021-11-09 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB027
G. Svetlana, P. Eduardo
{"title":"Multi-sided platform analysis and competition law enforcement practice in BRICS countries","authors":"G. Svetlana, P. Eduardo","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB027","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127138238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Horizontal Directors Revisited 重新审视横向董事
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2021-10-20 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB024
Yaron Nili
{"title":"Horizontal Directors Revisited","authors":"Yaron Nili","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115024169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Leniency and Damage Liability for Cartel Members in Brazil 巴西卡特尔成员的宽大处理和损害责任
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2021-04-21 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB005
L. Pinha, M. Braga
{"title":"Leniency and Damage Liability for Cartel Members in Brazil","authors":"L. Pinha, M. Braga","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB005","url":null,"abstract":"A recent debate on leniency policies is the interplay between the public and the private competition law enforcement. The lack of a well-established set of rules regarding damage claims may be harming the effectiveness of the Brazilian Leniency Program, either by discouraging the wrongdoers from applying for leniency in already formed cartels or by not being threatening enough to deter the cartel formation. The paper objective is to analyze the best policies for leniency applicants regarding the damage liability in Brazil. We conclude that the optimal policy is providing immunity to the leniency applicant, and after that the damage claim lawsuits can be encouraged with no undesirable effects. Extensions confirm the following: the immunity is even more effective when there is risk of betrayal; the immunity is the best policy in the case of ex-","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129993711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Tracking The Price of Almonds in Spain 追踪西班牙杏仁价格
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2021-03-29 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB002
F. Martínez-Sánchez
{"title":"Tracking The Price of Almonds in Spain","authors":"F. Martínez-Sánchez","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAB002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I look for signs of manipulation of the price of almonds in the markets of Albacete, Murcia, and Reus in Spain. To that end, I use Benford’s Law to analyze the distribution of the second and third digits of the price of almonds. I find that prices in the Albacete and Reus markets deviate from Benford’s Law, especially for the third digit, and those in the Murcia market deviate from Benford’s Law for the second digit but not for the third digit. I therefore find signs that the price of almonds in the Spain’s main markets is being manipulated.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131652186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Attitudes Toward Collusion in Chile 智利对共谋的态度
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2021-03-10 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhaa022
Umut Aydın
{"title":"Attitudes Toward Collusion in Chile","authors":"Umut Aydın","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhaa022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the last two decades, competition agencies around the world have increasingly directed their attention to enforcement against cartels. With the encouragement of the antitrust authorities of the United States, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, various countries have introduced leniency programs, and sanctions for individuals found guilty of colluding. Critics are concerned, however, that these measures are not backed by broad public support, which could jeopardize their enforcement. This paper explores public attitudes toward cartels in Chile, an emerging economy that introduced a leniency program in 2009 and criminal sanctions in 2016, by presenting the results of a public opinion survey conducted in this country in August–September 2019. The results of the survey show high awareness of cartels and the harm they cause, and high public disapproval of cartel conduct among the Chilean respondents. In particular, up to 70 percent of the respondents support prison sentences against individuals found guilty of colluding. Such strong public support for anti-cartel measures could be considered positive from the perspective of enforcement. The results also emphasize the importance of continued competition advocacy directed at the society to explain and gain public support for the anti-cartel agenda.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126694442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Preempting the Entry of Near Perfect Substitutes 阻止接近完全替代品的进入
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2021-03-10 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhaa023
V. Lipatov, D. Neven, Georges Siotis
{"title":"Preempting the Entry of Near Perfect Substitutes","authors":"V. Lipatov, D. Neven, Georges Siotis","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhaa023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When firms compete on price and quality-enhancing promotion in a market for differentiated products, entry of a nearly perfect substitute to one of such products, for example, a generic version of a pharmaceutical drug, intensifies price competition but softens quality competition. We show that consumers are likely to gain from entry when quality is relatively unimportant for them, when business stealing generated by promotion is substantial, and when products are poor substitutes. We also show that entry may be more attractive for consumers in less concentrated markets, as a smaller number of firms and asymmetric market shares may be associated with higher quality.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130116256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Indirect Purchaser Rule and Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Reassessment 间接购买者规则与反垄断法的私人执行:再评估
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2021-02-25 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAA035
Spencer Douglas Smith
{"title":"The Indirect Purchaser Rule and Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Reassessment","authors":"Spencer Douglas Smith","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAA035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAA035","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Despite broad statutory language authorizing “any person” injured by an antitrust law violation to sue for damages, the Supreme Court of the United States has construed that language to bar antitrust damages claims by indirect purchasers, such as consumers two or more steps removed from antitrust violators. The Court and some scholars have justified the indirect purchaser rule on the ground that assigning direct purchasers exclusive rights to recover antitrust damages increases the likelihood of suit. But this article presents new evidence that the rule reduced private antitrust litigation by twenty percent. It argues that the rule should be abandoned, consistent with the statutory text.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130972738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
PUBLIC ATTITUDE IN THE NETHERLANDS TOWARDS CARTELS IN COMPARISON TO OTHER ECONOMIC INFRINGEMENTS‡ 与其他经济侵权行为相比，荷兰公众对卡特尔的态度
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2021-02-13 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAA036
Peter T. Dijkstra, L. van Stekelenburg
{"title":"PUBLIC ATTITUDE IN THE NETHERLANDS TOWARDS CARTELS IN COMPARISON TO OTHER ECONOMIC INFRINGEMENTS‡","authors":"Peter T. Dijkstra, L. van Stekelenburg","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAA036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHAA036","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We investigate the public attitude towards cartels in the Netherlands in comparison with other economic infringements. We examine this in a survey on several types of economic infringements. We find that cartels are considered serious offenses in the Netherlands. People generally think that cartels are not allowed, consider them immoral, and have negative consequences for society. However, on average, most other infringements are considered more serious, are less allowed, more immoral, and have more negative consequences for society than cartel behavior. Furthermore, we find that the considered seriousness of an infringement is explained by people’s personal norms, followed by the infringement’s consequences, whether people think the infringement is allowed and to what extent it has direct impact on people.\u0000 JEL: L41","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132524596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Simple Economics of Wholesale Price-Parity Agreements: The Case of the Airline Tickets Distribution Industry* 批发价格平价协议的简单经济学:以机票分销行业为例*
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-30 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhaa028
Jorge Padilla, S. Piccolo, N. Watson
{"title":"The Simple Economics of Wholesale Price-Parity Agreements: The Case of the Airline Tickets Distribution Industry*","authors":"Jorge Padilla, S. Piccolo, N. Watson","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhaa028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper clarifies the differences between retail and wholesale price-parity agreements in vertical industries. In contrast to traditional wide and narrow retail price-parity arrangements, the competitive effects of wholesale price-parity depend on the complexity of the vertical supply chain, the business model operated by sellers and distributors, and the strength of competition between direct and indirect distribution channels. While retail price-parity agreements are almost always anticompetitive, wholesale price-parity agreements may positively affect consumer welfare when direct and indirect distribution channels are close substitutes. To demonstrate the relevance of our analysis for competition policy, we illustrate our findings by referring to an industry that has recently attracted policy and regulatory interest on both sides of the Atlantic: the airline ticket distribution industry. We find that, in this industry, while wholesale price-parity agreements always harm airlines, Global Distribution Systems (GDSs) have preferences more aligned with consumers: when consumers benefit from these provisions, GDSs benefit too.\u0000 JEL: K21, L13, L40","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132541772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
European Commission Merger Control Under Council Regulation No. 139/2004: Mapping The Most Expansive Acquirers In Merger And Acquisition Transactions In 2004–2015 根据理事会第139/2004号条例，欧盟委员会合并管制:绘制2004-2015年并购交易中最广泛的收购方
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-18 DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhaa026
Dzmitry Bartalevich
{"title":"European Commission Merger Control Under Council Regulation No. 139/2004: Mapping The Most Expansive Acquirers In Merger And Acquisition Transactions In 2004–2015","authors":"Dzmitry Bartalevich","doi":"10.1093/joclec/nhaa026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa026","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In EU merger control, the European Commission is empowered by Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 to regulate changes in market structure by deciding whether two or more firms may merge, combine, or consolidate their businesses into one. These decisions affect various market players, including major EU and non-EU businesses, as well as vast product and geographic markets. Offering a network perspective on the cleared merger and acquisition transactions in Phase I decisions under Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (20 January 2004–01 July 2015), this article aims to investigate the overall composition of mergers and acquisitions in terms of their industry sectors and domiciles and to identify the types of firms that acquire more targets than other firms (that is, more expansive firms). The analysis is conducted by using data from the European Commission (601 transactions) and Bureau van Dijk (992 transactions).","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"153 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123599102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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