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Journal of Competition Law and Economics最新文献

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NET NEUTRALITY: ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 网络中立性:市场发展的经济评估
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-09-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV019
T. Tardiff
{"title":"NET NEUTRALITY: ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF MARKET DEVELOPMENTS","authors":"T. Tardiff","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV019","url":null,"abstract":"On February 26, 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued new regulations for the Internet. A significant stated motivation for these regulations was the protection and promotion of the quality of Internet service. This article provides information about the evolution of the quality of Internet service, providing context for this central stated motivation of Internet regulation, including the merits of rules restricting payments by content providers for priority treatment of certain Internet traffic. The history of the FCC's Internet regulations (or lack thereof) is reviewed, the main arguments for and against imposing ex ante price regulation on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are outlined, and data on industry performance, particularly subscribership levels in general and at substantially increasing speeds, are described. This experience indicates that apparent insufficiencies in competitive alternatives at the fastest available speeds have been ameliorated in fairly short order by new offerings by multiple ISPs. These findings strongly suggest that basing new restrictions on a putative dearth of competition for recently available service levels and transmission speeds is likely to be overtaken by technological and market developments, rendering such ex ante rules at best superfluous and at worst counterproductive to competition and innovation.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127050919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
CARTELS AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPACT OF CARTELS ON PRODUCTIVITY IN THE NETHERLANDS 卡特尔与生产率增长:荷兰卡特尔对生产率影响的实证研究
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV015
L. Petit, R. Kemp, J. Sinderen
{"title":"CARTELS AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPACT OF CARTELS ON PRODUCTIVITY IN THE NETHERLANDS","authors":"L. Petit, R. Kemp, J. Sinderen","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV015","url":null,"abstract":"Currently, there are only a few empirical studies that have studied the possible consequences of cartels on productivity growth. Empirical insights about cartels would be critical for competition authorities to examine and legitimize their own policies. Until 1998, the Netherlands had a permissive attitude towards cartels—cartels were required to register. The Netherlands' cartel register provides an opportunity to study the effects of cartelization on productivity growth. By using cartel and industry data on productivity growth, we estimate the impact of cartel formation, cartel presence, and cartel termination on the total productivity growth in the Netherlands between 1982 and 1998. Our research results suggest that cartel presence, indicated by registration status in the cartel register, indeed curbs productivity growth.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120850271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
ARE RESTRICTIONS OF COMPETITION BY SPORTS ASSOCIATIONS HORIZONTAL OR VERTICAL IN NATURE 体育协会对比赛的限制是横向的还是纵向的
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV010
Oliver Budzinski, Stefan Szymanski
{"title":"ARE RESTRICTIONS OF COMPETITION BY SPORTS ASSOCIATIONS HORIZONTAL OR VERTICAL IN NATURE","authors":"Oliver Budzinski, Stefan Szymanski","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV010","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we discuss from an economic perspective two alternative views of restrictions of competition by sports associations. The horizontal approach views such restrictions as an agreement among the participants of a sports league with the sports association merely representing an organization executing the horizontal cooperation. In contrast, the vertical approach views the sports association as being a dominant upstream firm enjoying a monopoly position on the market stage for competition organizing services, an important input for the actual product – the sports game. Taking the recent financial fair play (FFP) initiative by UEFA (the Union of European Football Associations) as an example, we demonstrate that the different views lead to different assessments of restrictive effects and, thus, matter for competition policy decisions. The economic story of the potential restrictive effect of FFP on players’ and player agents’ income may fit more plausibly to the horizontal approach, whereas the potentially anticompetitive foreclosure and deterrence effects of FFP may be economically more soundly reasoned by taking the vertical view.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"287 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131693303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 64
ANTITRUST FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 负责任医疗机构的反垄断
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV002
L. Baker, M. Bundorf, Daniel P. Kessler
{"title":"ANTITRUST FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS","authors":"L. Baker, M. Bundorf, Daniel P. Kessler","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV002","url":null,"abstract":"We simulated how the decision of a hypothetical hospital to form an Accountable Care Organization through the purchase of physicians in a hypothetical county would translate into changes in prices and spending. Our simulation was based on regression estimates of the effects of hospital ownership of physicians on hospital and physician prices and spending on hospital, physician, and all health services (including prescription drugs and outpatient diagnostic tests). Although the simulation does not evaluate a transaction that actually occurred in the real world, it illustrates whether and under what circumstances a stylized merger would have important effects on markets for health care. We found that such mergers can lead to statistically significant and economically meaningful increases in prices and spending. We also show that these mergers can affect patients differently depending on their local hospital market conditions. We conclude that policymakers should consider modifying the current approach to antitrust policy toward Accountable Care Organizations.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130698933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
A NOTE ON THE ECONOMICS OF PASS-THROUGH WITH TWO-PART TARIFF PRICING 关于两部分关税定价传递的经济学注释
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV014
D. Rothman
{"title":"A NOTE ON THE ECONOMICS OF PASS-THROUGH WITH TWO-PART TARIFF PRICING","authors":"D. Rothman","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV014","url":null,"abstract":"When a firm sells a product together with another product, it may rely on a two-part tariff. I explain that when a firm uses a two-part tariff, a cost increase may or may not be passed through to final consumers. Depending on the characteristics of final consumers’ demand, a cost increase could result in no increase in the price of either product, an increase in the price of both products, or an increase in the price of one product and a decrease in the price of the other product.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"20 23","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113984567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Sticky rebates: Loyalty rebates impede rational switching of consumers 粘性返利:忠诚度返利阻碍了消费者的理性转换
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV009
Alexander Morell, A. Glöckner, E. Towfigh
{"title":"Sticky rebates: Loyalty rebates impede rational switching of consumers","authors":"Alexander Morell, A. Glöckner, E. Towfigh","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV009","url":null,"abstract":"Competition policy often relies on the assumption of a rational consumer, although other models may better account for people's decision-making behavior. In three experiments, we investigate the influence of loyalty rebates on consumers based on the alternative Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). CPT predicts that loyalty rebates could harm consumers by impeding rational switching from an incumbent to an outside option (for example, a market entrant). In a repeated trading task, participants decided whether or not to enter a loyalty rebate scheme and to continue buying within that scheme. Meeting the condition triggering the rebate was uncertain. Loyalty rebates considerably reduced the likelihood that participants switched to a higher-payoff outside option later. We conclude that loyalty rebates may inflict substantial harm on consumers and may have an underestimated potential to foreclose consumer markets. Our findings therefore provide additional arguments why a dominant firm using target rebates may monopolize a market or abuse its market power. They also provide arguments why target rebates may raise consumer protection concerns.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126353795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
MARKET STRUCTURE AND INTENSITY OF PRICE COMPETITION IN EU BANKING 欧盟银行业的市场结构与价格竞争强度
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV007
Giovanni A. Tabacco
{"title":"MARKET STRUCTURE AND INTENSITY OF PRICE COMPETITION IN EU BANKING","authors":"Giovanni A. Tabacco","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV007","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes both determinants of market structure and the intensity of price competition in the European Union (EU) banking industry. For this purpose, the first part of the article applies John Sutton's framework for empirically measuring the relationship between market size and market concentration. Next, the analysis turns to assessing the degree of price competition by applying a method of measuring banking competition that I have recently developed. Results suggest that there is a null relationship between market size and concentration, and that the estimated lower bound to concentration is well above zero. These two pieces of empirical evidence support Sutton's endogenous sunk costs model. Moreover, empirical estimates of a measure of competition—distance to the lower bound to concentration—suggest that the majority of EU national banking markets have low intensity of price competition. In contrast, Estonia, Netherlands, Finland, and Lithuania appear to have the most competitive banking industries.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121510755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling 谷歌是否通过捆绑和捆绑来撬动市场力量
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV016
Benjamin L. Edelman
{"title":"Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling","authors":"Benjamin L. Edelman","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV016","url":null,"abstract":"I examine Google's pattern and practice of tying to leverage its dominance into new sectors. In particular, I show how Google used these tactics to enter numerous markets, to compel usage of its services, and often to dominate competing offerings. I explore the technical and commercial implementations of these practices and identify their effects on competition. I conclude that Google's tying tactics are suspect under antitrust law.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126485733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 65
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE CASE OF RUSSIA 公共采购中的反垄断执法:以俄罗斯为例
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV013
Maria Ostrovnaya, E. Podkolzina
{"title":"ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE CASE OF RUSSIA","authors":"Maria Ostrovnaya, E. Podkolzina","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV013","url":null,"abstract":"Why do people violate the law? The Hobbesian outlook would be that people violate the law in the absence of appropriate punishment. John Stuart Mill would have attributed the violation to the lack of incentives to behave legally. In this paper, we combine these two factors to examine the effect of antitrust regulation on price competition. We examine the case of public drug procurement in St. Petersburg, Russia between 2008 and 2010. Our results highlight that the Russian Federal Antitrust Service was unable to enforce competitive bidding when the main regulators interpreted the competition law differently. The Committee for Public Health in St. Petersburg notably leveraged the loopholes in antitrust enforcement and successfully maintained illegal relationships with different economic agents. We use data on Russian drug procurement to illustrate these effects. Based on our estimates, we suggest policy implications regarding antitrust policy.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115503864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Econometric Evidence To Target Tacit Collusion In Oligopolistic Markets 针对寡头垄断市场隐性串谋的计量经济学证据
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Pub Date : 2015-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV011
Patrick Andreoli-Versbach, J. Franck
{"title":"Econometric Evidence To Target Tacit Collusion In Oligopolistic Markets","authors":"Patrick Andreoli-Versbach, J. Franck","doi":"10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOCLEC/NHV011","url":null,"abstract":"Tacit collusion may reduce welfare comparably to explicit collusion, but it remains mostly unaddressed by antitrust enforcement that greatly depends on evidence of explicit communication. We propose to target specific elements of firms' behavior that facilitate tacit collusion by providing quantitative evidence that links these actions to an anticompetitive market outcome. We apply our approach to incidents on the Italian gasoline market, where the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to a policy of sticky pricing and large price changes that facilitated price alignment and coordination of price changes. Antitrust policy must distinguish such active promotion of a collusive strategy from passive, best-response, alignment. Our results imply the necessity of stronger legal instruments that target unilateral conduct that aims at bringing about collusion.","PeriodicalId":399709,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Competition Law and Economics","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125594852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
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