{"title":"Searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity","authors":"T. Froese","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.9","url":null,"abstract":"Enactivists are searching for the conditions of genuine intersubjectivity. Theory of mind approaches to social cognition have come a long way from folk psychological theorizing by paying more attention to neuroscientific evidence and phenomenological insights. This has led to hybrid accounts that incorporate automatic processing and allow an instrumental role for perception and interaction. However, two foundational assumptions remain unquestioned. First, the cognitive unconscious: explanations assume there is a privileged domain of subpersonal mechanisms that operate in terms of representational personal-level concepts (belief, desire, inference, pretense, etc.), albeit unconsciously. Second, methodological individualism: explanations of social capacities are limited to mechanisms contained within the individual. The enactive approach breaks free from these representationalist-internalist constraints by integrating personal-level phenomenology with multi-scale dynamics occurring within and between subjects. This formal and empirical research on social interaction supports the possibility of genuine intersubjectivity: we can directly participate in the unfolding of each other’s experience.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115353291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Communication as Fundamental Paradigm for Psychopathology","authors":"K. Vogeley","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.43","url":null,"abstract":"Theoretical positions in cognitive sciences either emphasize the role of internal representations within the cognitive system of the person or focus on the person’s interaction with the environment. The latter position has been recently explicated in different ways under the formula of 4E cognition (extended, embodied, enactive, embedded). Focusing on the aspect of socially embedded cognition, the dyad of two interaction partners in a social encounter is proposed as the fundamental unit of analysis. This interactive approach centered around the concept of communication is also of relevance for the understanding of psychopathological norm deviations. Despite a rich tradition that reconstructs different psychopathological syndromes as disorders of communication, this account of psychopathology has not been fully acknowledged. It is the aim of this chapter to present the core ideas of this perspective and to stimulate the discussion that has potentially substantial influence on various research topics in psychopathology and psychiatry.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114789434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Embodiment of emotion and its situated nature","authors":"Evan W. Carr, A. Kever, P. Winkielman","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.30","url":null,"abstract":"Social functioning requires emotion. We must be able to recognize, interpret, and generate emotions across a variety of social contexts. But how are emotions conceptually represented in the mind? Embodiment (or grounded cognition) theories propose that processing of emotional concepts is partly based in one’s own perceptual, motor, and somatosensory systems. We review evidence for this account across a variety of domains, including facial expression perception, interpretation of emotional language, somatic involvement in affective processing, and “mirroring” of others’ actions. We also contrast embodiment theories with more traditional “amodal” frameworks, which represent emotional information as abstract language-like symbols in cognitive networks. Overall, we argue that a comprehensive account of emotion concepts requires considering their embodiment. Simultaneously, we highlight that embodiment is flexible and dynamic, especially within the social environment. This means that when and how emotion concepts are embodied critically depends on situational cues and current representational needs.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127657629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Embodiment of Concepts","authors":"M. Elk, H. Bekkering","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.34","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize theories of conceptual representation as embodied, disembodied, or hybrid according to their stance on a number of different dimensions: the nature of concepts, the relation between language and concepts, the function of concepts, the acquisition of concepts, the representation of concepts, and the role of context. We propose to extend an embodied view of concepts, by taking into account the importance of multimodal associations and predictive processing. We argue that concepts are dynamically acquired and updated, based on recurrent processing of prediction error signals in a hierarchically structured network. Concepts are thus used as prior models to generate multimodal expectations, thereby reducing surprise and enabling greater precision in the perception of exemplars. This view places embodied theories of concepts in a novel predictive processing framework, by highlighting the importance of concepts for prediction, learning and shaping categories on the basis of prediction errors.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126134920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"4E Cognition and the Humanities","authors":"Amy L. Cook","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.47","url":null,"abstract":"The arts and humanities move us and change our minds—not just metaphorically but literally. This chapter provides a snapshot of some of the work that has occurred at the intersection of cognitive science and theater and literature. I provide a description and analysis of a theatrical experience that staged a challenge to traditional theories of cognition, demonstrating how artists are responding to and prodding work being done across the disciplines. If thinking is “world-making,” rather than processing stimuli into meaning, then the hermeneutic tradition of literary and art scholarship must adapt. If thinking means using objects in our environment in order to make changes to our own extended ecosystem, then an interaction with a work of art can be aesthetic, poetic, and autopoetic. Contemporary art, literature, and performance may suggest a new language—and a richer perspective on old language—for 4E cognition.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"98 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120977001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interpersonal judgments, embodied reasoning, and juridical legitimacy","authors":"S. Varga","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.46","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.46","url":null,"abstract":"A particular branch of the embodied cognition (EC) research program explicates abstract concepts and metaphors as grounded in particular domains of bodily experience. This chapter explores conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) and some recent behavioral and neuroscientific research that appears to offer some support for it. While this research indicates that bodily states exert non-negligible influence on cognition and behavior, the influences appear to occur in a way that is insensitive to reflectively endorsed norms. Assuming that the experimental findings extend to real-life situations, the findings raise a number of questions. The chapter offers reflections on particular questions and concerns in the legal realm and explores whether the findings present potential challenges to juridical legitimacy.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123907980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Embodiment of Language","authors":"Mark Johnson","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.33","url":null,"abstract":"Analytic philosophy of language was originally based on a fundamentally disembodied view of meaning and language. In contrast, research in cognitive linguistics and neuroscience emphasizes the central role of the body and brain in shaping meaning, concepts, and thought. Meaning is not, in the first instance, linguistic. Instead, language depends on and recruits prior sensory, motor, and affective processes. This article surveys some of the more important embodied structures and processes of meaning-making that give rise to the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of natural languages. This includes body-part projections, perceptual concepts, image schemas, emotions, body-based grammatical constructions, and conceptual metaphors, as those are understood from the perspective of simulation semantics, embodied construction grammar, and the neural theory of language. In addition to the four Es of cognition—embodied, embedded, enactive, extended—we need to add three more Es—emotional, evolutionary, and exaptative.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133757327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Culture and the Extended Phenotype","authors":"K. Sterelny","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.41","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter takes up the links between Dawkins’s concept of the extended phenotype and that of the extended mind. More specifically, it has three aims: (1) it argues that the extended mind effects are a special case of niche construction; (2) it identifies the cognitive foundations that made it possible for hominins to amplify their cognitive powers with material supports; in particular, the chapter suggests that our reliance on cognitive tools depends on a tripod of (a) human hyper-plasticity, (b) highly structured and enriched learning environments, and (c) family support for skill acquisition long into adolescence; and (3) it situates the extended mind and related phenomena in their evolutionary context, in the deep history of human evolution. Specifically, the material record suggests an increasing footprint of these phenomena in the later Pleistocene. Distributed cognition, the material scaffolding of skill acquisition, and improved learning strategies collectively produced accelerating change, beginning about 250,000 years ago.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130046870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interacting in the Open","authors":"M. Lamb, A. Chemero","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.8","url":null,"abstract":"Dynamical systems theories describe a wide range of theoretical orientations in cognitive science. In this chapter we focus on a particular formulation of dynamical systems theory that provides a strong theoretical basis for some of the claims made by 4E approaches to cognition. In particular, the target dynamical systems approaches depend on two hypotheses. First, the interaction hypothesis states that the states and behaviors of any entity in a cognitive system are highly dependent on the states and behaviors of some other entity or set of entities. Second, the openness hypothesis states that cognitive systems only persist in the context of other systems. Taken together, these hypotheses entail that the boundaries of cognitive systems should not be taken for granted, and that there are both metrics and reasons for empirically investigating how cognitive systems may be bounded and how those boundaries might change.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115767921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Predictive Processing Hypothesis","authors":"J. Hohwy","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.7","url":null,"abstract":"Prediction may be a central concept for understanding perceptual and cognitive processing. Contemporary theoretical neuroscience formalizes the role of prediction in terms of probabilistic inference. Perception, action, attention, and learning may then be unified as aspects of predictive processing in the brain. This chapter first explains the sense in which predictive processing is inferential and representational. Then follows an exploration of how the predictive processing framework relates to a series of considerations in favor of enactive, embedded, embodied, and extended cognition (4E cognition). The initial impression may be that predictive processing is too representational and inferential to fit well to 4E cognition. But, in fact, predictive processing encompasses many phenomena prevalent in 4E approaches, while remaining both inferential and representational.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132258755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}