{"title":"Scaffolding Intuitive Rationality","authors":"Cameron Buckner","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.44","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, I articulate a category of rational intuitive inference that stands between the simplest forms of association and the most complex forms of deductive reasoning. I focus especially on how intuitive inferences can be scaffolded up through successive levels of abstraction to more stimulus-independent forms of judgment that look (from the outside, at least) like paradigm instances of reasoning. Such abstraction can, I argue, lead to thoughts that are “unsaturated” in the Fregean sense, with abstract “slots” into which individuals must be fit for the thought to be complete. Finally, I consider whether such abstraction can achieve the formal, validity-preserving forms of inference familiar from symbolic logic, arguing that the psychology of intuitive judgment should respect older Fregean lessons about the border between psychology and logic.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127905974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Going Radical","authors":"Daniel D. Hutto, E. Myin","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.5","url":null,"abstract":"E-approaches to cognition—enactive, embodied, ecological—conceive of minds as fundamentally relational and interactive. They are often heralded as offering a new paradigm for thinking about the mental. Yet only the most radical versions of E-approaches—those that seek not to complement but to replace traditional cognitivist accounts of mind—have any prospect of ushering in a truly revolutionary rethink of the nature of cognition. This chapter considers whether such a conceptual revolution might really be in the cards. It identities the major options proposed by E-theorists, rating each in terms of degree of radicality. It reminds readers of the hard problem of content and reviews the range of options for handling it. It argues that “going radical” is one of the most attractive ways of dealing with the hard problem of content and that it is worth exploring the positive research program that going radical opens up.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126597173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bringing things to mind","authors":"L. Malafouris","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.40","url":null,"abstract":"Human intelligence and its evolution have always been inextricably linked with the material forms people make. Archaeology and anthropology may well testify that human beings are not merely embedded in a rich and changing universe of things; rather, human cognitive and social life is a process genuinely mediated and often constituted by them. The specific details, varieties, and forms of that process are not well understood and demand a cross-disciplinary approach. This chapter argues for the need to add a strong material culture dimension of research in the area of 4E (embodied–embedded–extended–enactive) cognition. Material engagement theory (MET) is proposed as a framework suitable for bridging the analytical gap between 4E cognition and the study of material culture. The notion of “thing-ing” is used to draw attention to the modes of cognitive life instantiated in acts of thinking and feeling with, through, and about things.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131847315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Critical Note","authors":"T. Schlicht","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.11","url":null,"abstract":"This commentary addresses the following points: (1) The compatibility of the predictive processing framework with 4E approaches, in particular by considering the distinction between radical enactivism and more conservative representational 4E approaches. (2) The possible constraints phenomenological characterizations of cognitive phenomena put on modeling and experimentation, illustrated by the debate on social cognition. Froese’s call for interactionist methodology to investigate intersubjectivity and interactive and dynamic mechanisms is assessed. (3) The putative replacement of the classical representationalist approach to cognition by a dynamic and embodied approach. The attempt to explain social understanding only in terms of interaction is doomed to fail since coupling and coordinated interaction must be actively achieved. (4) The contrast between brain-bound and extended or cognitively integrated cognitive systems. It is argued that the investigation of cognitive phenomena calls for a well-defined cognitive system that can actively extend its cognitive capacities, for example, by way of integrating tools.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115292323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Critical Note","authors":"S. Walter","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.16","url":null,"abstract":"I offer some critical thoughts on some philosophical issues touched upon in the four papers in the section on Cognition, Action, and Perception. I highlight these issues because, apart from revealing some problematic aspects of the arguments presented therein, they illustrate a general concern about some prominent debates in the context of 4E approaches to cognition: that at some times we are so excited that we can bring philosophy in close touch with empirical results that we forget our core business as philosophers—the argument—while at other times we can’t stop overdoing it with our philosophical concept-mongery and thereby fail to see important lessons empirical results have to teach us. In addition, I want to draw attention to a topic that one might have expected to be covered in a handbook on 4E cognition, in particular in the section on Cognition, Action, and Perception, but that isn’t addressed: the topic of self-control.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114471027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Embodied Aesthetics","authors":"B. Montero","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.48","url":null,"abstract":"Although great art frequently revers the body, bodily experience itself is traditionally excluded from the aesthetic realm. This tradition, however, is in tension with the experience of expert dancers who find intense aesthetic pleasure in the experience of their own bodily movements. How to resolve this tension is the goal of this chapter. More specifically, in contrast to the traditional view that denigrates the bodily even while elevating the body, I aim to make sense of dancers’ embodied aesthetic experience of their own movements, as well as observers’ embodied aesthetic experience of seeing bodies move.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"165 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122495980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Embodied Resonance","authors":"V. Gallese, C. Sinigaglia","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.22","url":null,"abstract":"Mental simulation was claimed to provide a distinctive way of gaining knowledge about others’ actions and thoughts since the late 1980s. A decade later, the discovery of mirror neurons in macaque monkeys and the evidence of mirror brain areas in humans presented a new angle on this claim, suggesting also an embodied approach to simulation. The aim of the present chapter is to introduce and discuss this embodied approach and its role in basic social cognition. In doing this, we shall start by characterizing the distinctive features of embodied simulation (ES), especially in relation to its its motor aspects. Then, we shall provide evidence for the claim that ES may be critically involved in understanding others’ actions. Finally, we shall explore the conjecture that ES might involve a common ground for action execution and observation not only at the functional but also at the phenomenological level.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129401825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Critical Note","authors":"Arne M. Weber, G. Vosgerau","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.21","url":null,"abstract":"While Gallagher, Pacherie, Rowlands, and de Vignemont focus on various aspects of a coupling between brain, body, and environment, they want to explain different cognitive and especially perceptual phenomena. Subsequently, we ask in detail for their explanatory aims regarding the specific explananda and the plausibility of each explanans. Thereby, a comparison of given accounts requires a closer evaluation concerning the possible scope of influential factors, theoretical backgrounds of interpretation and, last but not least, if the arguments are conclusive. Sometimes the requirements for the conclusions seem controversial, maybe unwarranted, or the overall explanatory aim is unclear. With each contribution, we get insightful examples for and revealing views into diverse perceptual phenomena with reference to a coupling between brain, body, and environment. After all, our purpose is to suggest a general framework to integrate and understand different approaches to explain cognitive outcomes.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114322951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Building a stronger concept of embodiment","authors":"S. Gallagher","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780198735410.013.18","url":null,"abstract":"After reviewing some disagreements and worries about embodied cognition (EC) as a research field, I focus on the distinction between weak EC, which focuses on brain-based, body-related representations, and strong EC, which takes the extraneural body and environment to be more central to cognition. An important aspect of weak EC is its reliance on the neural reuse hypothesis. I argue that an adequate understanding of neural reuse actually points in the direction of a stronger conception of embodied cognition where extraneural factors play an essential role in evolutionary and developmental time frames. Both body and the environment (including physical, social, and cultural factors) place important constraints on how reuse works.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"2872 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127447858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Critical Note","authors":"K. Aizawa","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.6","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides a brief review and commentary on the account of cognition offered in Di Paolo and Kiverstein. It notes that Rietveld, Denys, and van Westen do not say much about cognition per se. Instead, they are concerned with skilled action. Finally, it notes how Hutto and Myin apparently pursue the view that cognition is behavior, though decline to provide reasons for the view.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123286836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}