{"title":"Critical Note","authors":"T. Schlicht","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.11","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This commentary addresses the following points: (1) The compatibility of the predictive processing framework with 4E approaches, in particular by considering the distinction between radical enactivism and more conservative representational 4E approaches. (2) The possible constraints phenomenological characterizations of cognitive phenomena put on modeling and experimentation, illustrated by the debate on social cognition. Froese’s call for interactionist methodology to investigate intersubjectivity and interactive and dynamic mechanisms is assessed. (3) The putative replacement of the classical representationalist approach to cognition by a dynamic and embodied approach. The attempt to explain social understanding only in terms of interaction is doomed to fail since coupling and coordinated interaction must be actively achieved. (4) The contrast between brain-bound and extended or cognitively integrated cognitive systems. It is argued that the investigation of cognitive phenomena calls for a well-defined cognitive system that can actively extend its cognitive capacities, for example, by way of integrating tools.","PeriodicalId":395651,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.11","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This commentary addresses the following points: (1) The compatibility of the predictive processing framework with 4E approaches, in particular by considering the distinction between radical enactivism and more conservative representational 4E approaches. (2) The possible constraints phenomenological characterizations of cognitive phenomena put on modeling and experimentation, illustrated by the debate on social cognition. Froese’s call for interactionist methodology to investigate intersubjectivity and interactive and dynamic mechanisms is assessed. (3) The putative replacement of the classical representationalist approach to cognition by a dynamic and embodied approach. The attempt to explain social understanding only in terms of interaction is doomed to fail since coupling and coordinated interaction must be actively achieved. (4) The contrast between brain-bound and extended or cognitively integrated cognitive systems. It is argued that the investigation of cognitive phenomena calls for a well-defined cognitive system that can actively extend its cognitive capacities, for example, by way of integrating tools.