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Rewards to Improving Governance in Rich and Poor Countries: Evidence from Sovereign Credit Ratings 改善富国和穷国治理的回报:来自主权信用评级的证据
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2008-05-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1139065
C. Depken, Courtney L. Lafountain
{"title":"Rewards to Improving Governance in Rich and Poor Countries: Evidence from Sovereign Credit Ratings","authors":"C. Depken, Courtney L. Lafountain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1139065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1139065","url":null,"abstract":"We measure the effect of governance on sovereign creditworthiness, as measured by sovereign credit ratings. Governance may affect the government's ability to raise tax revenue to service its debt, with poor enough governance leading to insolvency. Data for 1996-2005 indicate that countries with better governance have higher probabilities of getting top ratings and that improving governance increases the likelihood of a top rating more for lower income countries than for higher income countries. Governance thus plays a role in reducing the likelihood of default, thereby facilitating countries' access to international credit markets and their financial sector development.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124537279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
To Guide Or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance 引导还是不引导?停止季度盈利指引的原因和后果
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2008-05-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.875184
J. Houston, B. Lev, J. Tucker
{"title":"To Guide Or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance","authors":"J. Houston, B. Lev, J. Tucker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.875184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.875184","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, quarterly earnings guidance has been harshly criticized for inducing managerial short-termism and other ills. Managers are, therefore, urged by influential institutions to cease guidance. We examine empirically the causes of such guidance cessation and find that poor operating performance - decreased earnings, missing analyst forecasts, and lower anticipated profitability - is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance. After guidance cessation, we do not find an appreciable increase in long-term investment once managers free themselves from investors' myopia. Contrary to the claim that firms would provide more alternative, forward-looking disclosures in lieu of the guidance, we find that such disclosures are curtailed. We also find a deterioration in the information environment of guidance stoppers in the form of increased analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion and a decrease in analyst coverage. Taken together, our evidence indicates that guidance stoppers are primarily troubled firms and stopping guidance does not benefit either the stoppers or their investors.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122242074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 213
Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Is Voluntary Disclosure a Signal of Effective Self-Policing? 清洁和清理:自愿披露是有效自我监管的信号吗?
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2008-05-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1137915
M. Toffel, Jodi L. Short
{"title":"Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Is Voluntary Disclosure a Signal of Effective Self-Policing?","authors":"M. Toffel, Jodi L. Short","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1137915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1137915","url":null,"abstract":"As regulators increasingly embrace cooperative approaches to governance, voluntary public-private partnerships and self-regulation programs have proliferated. However, because few have been subjected to robust evaluation, little is known about whether these innovative approaches are achieving their objectives and enhancing regulatory effectiveness. In the context of a federal government program that encourages companies to voluntarily self-police and self-disclose regulatory violations, we examine how participation affects the behaviors of regulators and regulated facilities. We find that on average, facilities that committed to self-police experienced a decline in abnormal events resulting in toxic pollution, and that regulators reduced their scrutiny over self-policing facilities. Upon closer examination, we find strong evidence of these effects among facilities with clean past compliance records, but find no such evidence of among facilities with more problematic compliance histories. These findings support the theoretical promise of meaningful self-policing practices and suggest that voluntary disclosure can serve as a reliable signal of future compliance—but only among a subset of facilities.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126409784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Beliefs, Bias, and Regime Uncertainty after Hurricane Katrina 卡特里娜飓风后的信仰、偏见和政权不确定性
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2008-05-15 DOI: 10.1108/03068290810886939
Art Carden
{"title":"Beliefs, Bias, and Regime Uncertainty after Hurricane Katrina","authors":"Art Carden","doi":"10.1108/03068290810886939","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/03068290810886939","url":null,"abstract":"This essay explores the relationship between beliefs and economic policy in the context of gasoline prices after Hurricane Katrina. Evidence of \"anti-market bias\" is identified in polling data, press releases, and legislation, and it is argued that the uncertainty emanating from statutes restricting \"price gouging\" may reduce investment in the provision of \"necessary goods and services\" after natural disasters.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123470166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
The Selective Filter of Economic Environment: A Substitute for Bounded Rationality - An Institutionalist Approach 经济环境的选择性过滤:有限理性的替代品——一种制度主义方法
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2008-04-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1124886
Ion Pohoață, Andreea-Oana Iacobuță
{"title":"The Selective Filter of Economic Environment: A Substitute for Bounded Rationality - An Institutionalist Approach","authors":"Ion Pohoață, Andreea-Oana Iacobuță","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1124886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1124886","url":null,"abstract":"Launched on institutional channel by George Tintner and Armen Alchian, the principle according to which the competitive environment is the one which operates the selection forcing individuals to behave rationally was and remained a subject of methodological disputes. Once in the market, the economic agents have only one alternative: in order to manage and to make profit they must behave as if they knew everything about rationality and efficiency. This approach transformed Armen Alchian into a \"heretic\" in the field of institutionalism and \"converted\" Milton Friedman and Fritz Machlup to institutionalism.The current complex and very competitive economic environment moves the focus of thinking detached from this principle upstream. The \"myopic actors\" of Armen Alchian are threatened to disappear. His environment of selection based on accepted rules becomes one of continuous self-selection operable not passive but ex ante.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125159593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Institutional Considerations in Locating Norms of Consensus: A Cross-National Investigation 共识规范定位中的制度考量:一项跨国调查
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2008-04-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1161155
Rebecca D. Gill
{"title":"Institutional Considerations in Locating Norms of Consensus: A Cross-National Investigation","authors":"Rebecca D. Gill","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1161155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1161155","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is an investigation of the judicial norm of consensus in four national high courts: the High Court of Australia, the Supreme Court of Canada, the South African Supreme Court of Appeals (and Constitutional Court) and the House of Lords (Law Lords) in the United Kingdom. Research on consensual norms in the U.S. Supreme Court is outlined first. Then, after reviewing the methods of cointegration and suggesting an alternative to the Caldeira and Zorn (1998) procedure, this paper will explore the applicability of these methods to the location of consensual norms in different institutional contexts. Specifically, the importance of opinion-writing tradition and institutional legitimacy will be highlighted. Finally, aggregated opinion-writing data for each court will be analyzed. The results illustrate the importance of considering institutional variations when searching for evidence of consensual norms cross-nationally.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126587535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Public-Private Partnerships in Labour Markets 劳动力市场中的公私伙伴关系
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2008-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1264962
F. Arellano, F. Felgueroso, Pablo Vázquez, E. González
{"title":"Public-Private Partnerships in Labour Markets","authors":"F. Arellano, F. Felgueroso, Pablo Vázquez, E. González","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1264962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1264962","url":null,"abstract":"The paper investigates the role of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the labor market. A PPP is a form of collaboration between private agents and the public sector in order to achieve certain objectives. Public private partnerships abound in areas such as infrastructure, health and education, but not in the labor market. The paper is in three parts: economic analysis of PPP; evidence from major PPPs in various countries (with descriptions of successful examples); and recommendations. The economic analysis suggests that PPPs have an important role to play in labor affairs. Public sector intervention in the labor market is justified by market failures and society's demand for equality, which the private sector cannot guarantee; and yet it also has undesirable side-effects. PPP is therefore an effective instrument for solving market and management failures arising from public provision of services. The best way to explain how PPPs work in practice is to describe the different types of PPP and present interesting cases in large (developed) countries. The examples confirm the variety of PPPs, depending on each country's economic circumstances and institutional framework. Based on this combination of economic theory and practical examples, we make some recommendations as to how the human resources industry should use PPPs to meet the challenges of a creative and changing environment. Terms such as \"globalization\", \"flexicurity\" and \"personalisation\" should be high on the agenda of policymakers and the HR industry in their efforts to create successful PPPs.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134344747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Spend More, Get More? An Inquiry into English Local Government Performance 花得越多，赚得越多?英国地方政府绩效研究
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2008-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1152140
F. Revelli
{"title":"Spend More, Get More? An Inquiry into English Local Government Performance","authors":"F. Revelli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1152140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1152140","url":null,"abstract":"Based on a unique measure of performance of English local governments in the provision of public services (Comprehensive Performance Assessment, CPA), this paper uses panel data (2002--7) to identify the determinants of performance. In particular, by thoroughly exploiting the features of the British system of local government finance and the mandatory nature of decentralized public service provision, this paper aims at investigating the impact of government spending on public service outcomes. Due to the nature of CPA ratings--measured on a five category (poor to excellent) scale--the empirical work relies on an ordered response approach allowing for cross-sectional heterogeneity. The empirical evidence suggests that local public expenditures in excess of centrally set spending standards have a detrimental effect on performance. Copyright 2010 Oxford University Press 2009 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128085756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 43
Locating and Extending Livelihoods Research 定位和扩展生计研究
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2008-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1147573
M. Prowse
{"title":"Locating and Extending Livelihoods Research","authors":"M. Prowse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1147573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1147573","url":null,"abstract":"Much poverty and development research is not explicit about its methodology or philosophical foundations. Based on the extended case method of Burawoy and the epistemological standpoint of critical realism, this paper discusses a methodological approach for reflexive inductive livelihoods research that overcomes the unproductive social science dualism of positivism and social constructivism. The approach is linked to a conceptual framework and a menu of research methods that can be sequenced and iterated in light of research questions.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"199 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122873413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Uncertainty, Delegation and Incentives 不确定性、授权与激励
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2008-03-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.998339
Heikki Rantakari
{"title":"Uncertainty, Delegation and Incentives","authors":"Heikki Rantakari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.998339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.998339","url":null,"abstract":"How does imperfect contractibility of preferences influence the governance of a contractual relationship? We analyze a two-party decision-making problem where the optimal decision is unknown at the time of contracting. In consequence, instead of contracting on the decision directly, the parties need to design a contract that will induce good decision-making in the future. We examine how environmental uncertainty, quality of available performance measures and interim access to information influence the joint determination of the allocation of authority, use of performance pay and direct controls. We use the results from the model to cast light on (i) the conflicting empirical evidence on the risk-incentives tradeoff found in work on executive compensation and franchising, (ii) complementarities in organizational design and (iii) determinants of the choice to delegate.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123485613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
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