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Operational Risk Projects Management (Gestión De Proyectos De Riesgo Operacional: Justificando Un Cambio Integral De Procesos Internos En Entidades Financieras) (Spanish) 运营风险项目管理(运营风险项目管理:证明金融机构内部流程的整体变化)(英语)
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2009-09-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1478066
P. Cervera
{"title":"Operational Risk Projects Management (Gestión De Proyectos De Riesgo Operacional: Justificando Un Cambio Integral De Procesos Internos En Entidades Financieras) (Spanish)","authors":"P. Cervera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1478066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1478066","url":null,"abstract":"Operational risk can be defined as risk of unexpected losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. Its management is a young discipline in the financial sector, and so is its project management framework, without a specific methodology and with a short implementation experience. This paper will present the state of the art of these type of projects and will propose methodology improvement and changes in its organizational perspective.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114913288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Outline of a Darwinian Theory of Money 达尔文的货币理论大纲
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2009-09-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1468118
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath
{"title":"Outline of a Darwinian Theory of Money","authors":"Carsten Herrmann-Pillath","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1468118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1468118","url":null,"abstract":"Building on Lea and Webley’s drug theory of money, the paper connects different theoretical resources to develop a Darwinian theory of money. The central empirical observation is the neuroeconomic result of the independent role of money as a reinforcer, which matches with a series of other insights into strong emotional impact of money use. Lea and Webley proposed that money piggybacks on a generalized instinct for social exchange. I put this into the more universal framework of the Darwinian concept of signal selection and Aunger’s theory of neuromemes. This can be related to Searle’s theory of institutions, especially with regard to his notion of neurophysiological dispositions as a basis for rule-following. Thus, neuroeconomics and institutional theory can be put into one coherent framework of Generalized Darwinism, taking money and its emergence as a case study.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116048390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 31
Dancing with the Wolf: Institutional Changes and Industrial Development of China’s Automobile Sector after WTO Accession (2001-2008) 与狼共舞:加入WTO后中国汽车产业的制度变迁与产业发展(2001-2008)
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2009-09-02 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1466722
Ying Lin
{"title":"Dancing with the Wolf: Institutional Changes and Industrial Development of China’s Automobile Sector after WTO Accession (2001-2008)","authors":"Ying Lin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1466722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1466722","url":null,"abstract":"With a special focus on China’s passenger car sector, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the complex process of institutional changes in China’s automobile industry in the post-WTO era (2001-2008), and in particular to understand the interactions of international commitment and domestic reform as well as politics behind the new institutional changes domestically.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131922197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Organizational Design and Environmental Volatility 组织设计与环境波动
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2009-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1292107
Heikki Rantakari
{"title":"Organizational Design and Environmental Volatility","authors":"Heikki Rantakari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1292107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1292107","url":null,"abstract":"I investigate the link between a firm's operating environment and its preferred organizational structure, as determined by the allocation of decision rights, the compensation structure of its managers, and the underlying configuration of its productive assets. The results are broadly consistent with the received wisdom regarding this fit. Firms operating in volatile environments are characterized by loosely integrated operations, decentralized decision making, and a pay structure that reflects primarily division-level performance, whereas firms operating in stable environments are characterized by tightly integrated operations, typically centralized decision making, and a pay structure that is closely tied to firm-level performance. The results also provide some new insights and predictions. In particular, the results show how decreases in the cost of information increase the preference for decentralization and less integrated operations and highlight the importance of accounting for the interdependencies among the design parameters themselves in maximizing organizational performance. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116942288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 65
Open R&D and Open Innovation: Exploring the Phenomenon 开放式研发与开放式创新:现象探索
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2009-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00570.x
Ellen Enkel, O. Gassmann, H. Chesbrough
{"title":"Open R&D and Open Innovation: Exploring the Phenomenon","authors":"Ellen Enkel, O. Gassmann, H. Chesbrough","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00570.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00570.x","url":null,"abstract":"There is currently a broad awareness of open innovation and its relevance to corporate R&D. The implications and trends that underpin open innovation are actively discussed in terms of strategic, organizational, behavioral, knowledge, legal and business perspectives, and its economic implications. This special issue aims to advance the R&D, innovation, and technology management perspective by building on past and present studies in the field and providing future directions. Recent research, including the papers in this special issue, demonstrates an increasing range of situations where the concept is regarded as applicable. Most research to date has followed the outside-in process of open innovation, while the inside-out process remains less explored. A third coupled process of open innovation is also attracting significant research attention. These different processes show why it is necessary to have a full understanding of how and where open innovation can add value in knowledge-intensive processes. There may be a need for a creative interpretation and adaptation of the value propositions, or business models, in each situation. In other words, there are important implications for new and emerging methods of R&D management.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129519737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1826
Determinants and Archetype Users of Open Innovation 开放式创新的决定因素和原型用户
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2009-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00563.x
Marcus M. Keupp, O. Gassmann
{"title":"Determinants and Archetype Users of Open Innovation","authors":"Marcus M. Keupp, O. Gassmann","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00563.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00563.x","url":null,"abstract":"Extant research on open innovation (OI) offers no systematic insight of how and why firms differ regarding the extent to which they conduct OI activities. Whereas past theoretical contributions have focused on explaining the externalisation of R&D activities as a result of firm-external factors, we focus on explaining this externalisation as a result of firm-internal weaknesses, specifically, impediments to innovation. Using the exploration–exploitation dichotomy as our theoretical framework, we develop hypotheses on how impediments to innovation influence the breadth and depth of OI. We then test these hypotheses by using an exceptionally large and detailed data set to estimate population-averaged panel models. Our results provide support for most of the hypothesised relationships. Further, they allow to identify four ‘archetypes’ of firms that differ significantly regarding the breadth and depth of OI and the importance of impediments. Finally, we discuss the significance of these findings for both academics and managers.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125367882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 367
The More the Merrier? Number of Bidders, Information Dispersion, Renegotiation and Winner's Curse in Toll Road Concessions 人越多越好?收费公路特许经营中的投标人数量、信息分散、再谈判与赢家的诅咒
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2009-08-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1269630
Laure Athias, Antonio Núñez
{"title":"The More the Merrier? Number of Bidders, Information Dispersion, Renegotiation and Winner's Curse in Toll Road Concessions","authors":"Laure Athias, Antonio Núñez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1269630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1269630","url":null,"abstract":"We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we investigate the overall winner’s curse effects on bidding behaviour. Second, we account for differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate whether the possibility of renegotiation affects the winner’s curse effect. Using a unique dataset of 49 concessions, we show that the winner’s curse effect is particularly strong, i.e. bidders bid less aggressively when they expect more competition. In addition, we observe that this effect is larger for projects where the common uncertainty is greater, and is dampened in weaker institutional frameworks, in which renegotiations are easier.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125196899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 30
Migration and Institutional Development 移民与体制发展
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2009-08-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1442982
Baochun Peng
{"title":"Migration and Institutional Development","authors":"Baochun Peng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1442982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1442982","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that migration could trigger institutional development in the sending country. It is shown that the existence of rent-seeking institutions not only hinders the adoption of a more efficient technology, it also reinforces itself; while the possibility of migrating to a more advanced economy could trigger both institutional change and adoption of the more efficient technology in the sending country. Moreover, the institution-enhancement effect of migration becomes more likely as the difference in the rewards to productive activities in the two economies becomes greater. Some preliminary historical evidences are also presented.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133004826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Impossibility and Impracticability 不可能和不实际
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2009-07-27 DOI: 10.4337/9781849806640.00017
D. J. Smythe
{"title":"Impossibility and Impracticability","authors":"D. J. Smythe","doi":"10.4337/9781849806640.00017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849806640.00017","url":null,"abstract":"This unique and timely book offers an up-to-date, clear and comprehensive review of the economic literature on contract law.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122423662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Club-in-The-Club: Reform Under Unanimity 俱乐部中的俱乐部:一致同意下的改革
New Institutional Economics Pub Date : 2009-07-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.953799
Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart, G. Friebel, Elena S. Paltseva
{"title":"Club-in-The-Club: Reform Under Unanimity","authors":"Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart, G. Friebel, Elena S. Paltseva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.953799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.953799","url":null,"abstract":"In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity giving each member veto power. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogenous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on the entire organization. The threat of forming an “inner organization” can undermine the veto power of the less efficient members and coerce them to exert more effort. We also identify the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is executed. Finally, we show that majority rules effectively prevent the emergence of inner organizations.","PeriodicalId":383948,"journal":{"name":"New Institutional Economics","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120850629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
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