ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Competition Based on Merit and Predatory Practices in Dominant Positions (on the Analysis of Costs of the Dominant Undertaking and Predatory Practices)","authors":"E. Sanjuan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3542846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3542846","url":null,"abstract":"The EUJS of 30 January 2020 ( České dráhy a.s. v. European Commission. Joined Cases C-538/18 P and C-539/18 P- ), has again dealt with the relationship between costs and prices in predatory practices when a dominant position is held. Taking into account all the cases already decided by the Court, it is concluded that there are two different methods of analysis to verify whether an undertaking has practiced predatory pricing:<br><br>- Firstly, prices below average variable costs must always be considered abusive. In such a case, it is inconceivable that there should be any economic objective other than the elimination of a competitor, since every unit produced and sold represents a loss for the undertaking. <br><br>- Secondly, prices which are lower than the average total costs but higher than the average variable costs can be considered abusive only if it can be shown that there is a plan to eliminate a competitor.<br><br>However, exceptions to this are based on the availability of data, comparison with other sectors, consideration of the objective pursued or the opportunity to recover losses. Elements summarized in this paper. <br>","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133090936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Data Protection Compliance Challenges for Self-Sovereign Identity","authors":"A. Giannopoulou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3671523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3671523","url":null,"abstract":"Various identity management solutions are emerging in different jurisdictions, with the goal of creating a unified and privacy-preserving identity management system bridging the offline with the online. Within this trend, the concept of self-sovereign identity has re-emerged. It is a concept attached to expressions of both individual autonomy and individual control (sovereignty) — an aspiration in direct relation to what block-chain is promised to bring in contemporary discourse. The paper will provide an overview of the current self-sovereign identity paradigm solutions within the technological environment that involves decentralized networks and it will trace some of the challenges it faces within the European Union especially with regards to the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR).","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134048536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe","authors":"Mark Koyama, Desiree A. Desierto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3537889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3537889","url":null,"abstract":"Sumptuary laws that regulated clothing based on social status were an important part of the political economy of premodern states. We introduce a model that rationalizes the use of sumptuary laws by elites to regulate status competition from below. Our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of income - sumptuary legislation initially increases with income, but then falls as income increases further. The initial rise is more likely for states with less extractive institutions, whose ruling elites face greater status threat from the rising commercial class. We test these predictions using a newly collected dataset of country and city-level sumptuary laws.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129082588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Consumer Inertia and Competition-Sensitive Data Governance: The Case of Open Banking","authors":"O. Borgogno, G. Colangelo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3513514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3513514","url":null,"abstract":"The issue of consumer disengagement has troubled regulators and policy makers for years, since it undermines the functioning of sound competitive markets by allowing incumbents to enjoy economic supracompetive returns to the detriment of innovation and consumer welfare. The market investigation into the banking industry launched by the UK Competition and Market Authority (CMA) represents an original attempt to tackle the problem through antitrust enforcement. By building on the access-to-account rule enshrined within the European regulatory framework of the revised Payment Service Directive and the most recent developments of FinTech innovation, the CMA has designed a set of measures aimed at addressing some of the structural features causing adverse effects on competition in the retail markets, ultimately paving the way towards Open Banking. The paper highlights the rationales, benefits and potential drawbacks of the UK Open Banking plan, investigating if this regulatory intervention can act as a blueprint for harnessing the competitive potential of data-driven innovation of the financial industry and the digital economy as a whole.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129357740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The PEPP Regulation (PEPPR): Pepper for the Capital Markets Union?","authors":"H. V. Meerten, An Wouters","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3465097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3465097","url":null,"abstract":"This article will concentrate on how the PEPPR presents an added value for both PEPP savers and providers. Therefore we explore the following: the legislative history of PEPPR, the reasons of PEPPR, the definition of a PEPP and its savers and providers. Furthermore attention will be drawn to the investment options and the matter of consumer protection and the so-called ‘fee cap of 1%’.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116142150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Role and Involvement of the State in the Insurance Market – The Insurance Market in a European and National Context","authors":"Otilia Manta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3437081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3437081","url":null,"abstract":"The emergence of insurance is related to the need for people to help each other in the case of the ever increasing damages, and of the reinsurance to support among them those who manage the insurance funds and activities. In the context of the market economy, of the current challenges at global level (such as climate change), insurance is a segment of services, having multiple valences. Their fundamental role is to protect goods and people against different risks. The man has always been concerned about the future, and the fear combined with caution has led him to create insurance since ancient times. The insurance market is the organizational and methodological framework in which the insurance operations are carried out. In this market are met: the insurance request, which comes from the natural and legal insurable persons, as beneficiaries of the insurance and who choose to conclude various types of insurance and the insurance offer, supported by specialized organizations, authorized to operate in this field and capable under financial report to carry out such activity. Moreover, given that insurance is one of the financial instruments supporting the safety and security of the individual and of businesses at a global level.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116028090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is There a Gender Wage Gap in Online Labor Markets? Evidence from Over 250,000 Projects and 2.5 Million Wage Bill Proposals","authors":"Estrella Gomez-Herrera, Frank Mueller‐Langer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3427012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3427012","url":null,"abstract":"We explore whether there is a gender wage gap in one of the largest EU online labor markets, PeoplePerHour. Our unique dataset consists of 257,111 digitally tradeable tasks of 55,824 hiring employers from 188 countries and 65,010 workers from 173 countries that made more than 2.5 million wage bill proposals in the competition for contracts. Our data allows us to track the complete hiring process from the employers' design of proposed contracts to the competition among workers and the final agreement between employers and successful candidates. Using Heckman and OLS estimation methods we provide empirical evidence for a statistically significant 4% gender wage gap among workers, at the project level. We also find that female workers propose lower wage bills and are more likely to win the competition for contracts. Once we include workers’ wage bill proposals in the regressions, the gender wage gap virtually disappears, i.e., it is statistically insignificant and very small in magnitude (0.3%). Our results also suggest that female workers’ higher winning probabilities associated with lower wage bill proposals lead to higher expected revenues overall. We provide empirical evidence for heterogeneity of the gender wage gap in some of the job categories, all job difficulty levels and some of the worker countries. Finally, for some subsamples we find a statistically significant but very small “reverse” gender wage gap.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122470098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Digital Conglomerates and EU Competition Policy","authors":"M. Bourreau, Alexandre de Streel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3350512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3350512","url":null,"abstract":"The paper analyses firms’ motivations and the competitive effects of digital conglomerates with the relevant industrial organisation and strategic management literature. On that basis, it makes recommendations to improve the methodologies and modes of operation of EU competition policy in the digital sector. The paper first shows that some of the characteristics of the digital economy may explain digital conglomerates. On the supply-side, those include the important economies of scope in product development as product innovation and development are often modular and based on shared inputs (such as data, hardware and software). On the demand-side, those include the consumer synergies generated by product ecosystems. \u0000 \u0000The paper then shows that the pro- and anti-competitive effects of conglomerates are amplified in the digital economy. Regarding the anti-competitive effects, bundling may allow big platforms to envelop their smaller competitors in adjacent markets, raise entry barriers for innovating entrants or soften competition by increasing differentiation. The control of key sharable inputs may increase the incentives to refuse access or decrease the costs of an anti-competitive product proliferation strategy. Those effects are even stronger when the digital conglomerate has achieved the position of gatekeeper for access to customers or to specific products. Those anti-competitive effects should always be balanced with the positive welfare effects of digital conglomerates that are equally amplified. Moreover, conglomerate acquisitions of innovative start-ups may in some circumstances lead to a decrease in innovation, which is detrimental to welfare. \u0000 \u0000The paper finally recommends some improvements in the enforcement of EU competition policy in digital markets. (i) Dynamic efficiency should be prioritised over static efficiencies; (ii) Market power should be assessed dynamically by focusing more on potential competition and by defining markets for sharable inputs and innovation capabilities; (iii) The theories of harms should be adapted to the firms’ incentives in the digital economy, in particular the anti-competitive bundling theories need to be extended, the threshold to impose access under the essential facilities doctrine needs to be adapted to the characteristics of data and the effects of a merger on innovation need to be directly taken into account; (iv) Antitrust intervention should be quicker and more agile and the standard of proof should not only take into account the risk of type I and type II errors but also the cost of those errors.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"398 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123374903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sustainable Supply Chains and Regulatory Policy","authors":"Nicole Darnall, E. Welch, Seongkyung Cho","doi":"10.4337/9781786434272.00034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786434272.00034","url":null,"abstract":"Increasing concern about global sustainability has ushered in a diverse set of regulatory policies that aim to encourage sustainable practices and outcomes. This chapter sheds light on how these regulatory policies affect multiple aspects of companies’ sustainable supply chain practices. It begins by describing sustainable supply chain strategies more generally, focusing especially on firms’ efforts to reduce their environmental harms. It then discusses how different types of regulation are related to firms’ efforts to make their supply chains more sustainable. Three general regulatory policies are considered: (1) command-and-control regulation; (2) market-based policies; and (3) non-regulatory approaches.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115077609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Out of Tune or Well Tempered? How Competition Agencies Direct the Orchestrating State","authors":"H. Lelieveldt","doi":"10.1111/REGO.12223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/REGO.12223","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the impact competition agencies have on the orchestrating role of states in domestic private regulation. I argue that these agencies can significantly affect interactions in the governance triangle through the way they apply a “logic of the market” to evaluate agreements between firms. The regulatory framework of European Union competition law has increasingly constrained the ability of firms to take into account broader interests when making agreements to foster social objectives. This logic of the market clashes with the ever‐increasing emphasis governments place on enabling firms to enter into such agreements. I analyze this tension through a case study of a pact of Dutch retailers to collectively introduce higher animal welfare standards for poultry. Using regulatory network analysis I trace the governance interactions between the governance triangle on the one hand (government, non‐governmental organizations, and firms), and the Dutch competition authority, Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM) and the European Commission on the other hand. Attempts by the Dutch government to instruct the ACM to be more lenient toward private regulation were blocked twice by the European Commission. As a result, the Dutch government abandoned private regulation as the preferred mode and proposed a bottom‐up process that would generate public regulation as a way to avoid conflict with competition policy. I argue that paradoxically enough the intervention of these non‐majoritarian competition agencies against the “will” of the governance triangle has potentially increased the effectiveness and legitimacy of orchestration processes.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127243888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}