优势竞争与掠夺性竞争(基于优势企业与掠夺性行为的成本分析)

E. Sanjuan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

2020年1月30日欧盟委员会(České dráhy a.s.诉欧盟委员会)。合并案例c -538/ 18p和c -539/ 18p -),再次处理了当占有主导地位时掠夺性行为中成本和价格之间的关系。考虑到法院已经判决的所有案件,结论是有两种不同的分析方法来核实企业是否实行掠夺性定价:-第一,低于平均可变成本的价格必须始终被视为滥用。在这种情况下,除了消灭竞争对手之外,不可能有任何经济目标,因为生产和销售的每一单位都代表企业的损失。-其次,低于平均总成本但高于平均可变成本的价格,只有在可以证明存在消除竞争对手的计划时才能被认为是滥用。但是,这方面的例外情况是基于数据的可得性、与其他部门的比较、所追求的目标或追回损失的机会的考虑。本文对要点进行了总结。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Competition Based on Merit and Predatory Practices in Dominant Positions (on the Analysis of Costs of the Dominant Undertaking and Predatory Practices)
The EUJS of 30 January 2020 ( České dráhy a.s. v. European Commission. Joined Cases C-538/18 P and C-539/18 P- ), has again dealt with the relationship between costs and prices in predatory practices when a dominant position is held. Taking into account all the cases already decided by the Court, it is concluded that there are two different methods of analysis to verify whether an undertaking has practiced predatory pricing:

- Firstly, prices below average variable costs must always be considered abusive. In such a case, it is inconceivable that there should be any economic objective other than the elimination of a competitor, since every unit produced and sold represents a loss for the undertaking.

- Secondly, prices which are lower than the average total costs but higher than the average variable costs can be considered abusive only if it can be shown that there is a plan to eliminate a competitor.

However, exceptions to this are based on the availability of data, comparison with other sectors, consideration of the objective pursued or the opportunity to recover losses. Elements summarized in this paper.
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