{"title":"Costs and Benefits of Internet Gambling for Society (Evidence from the United Kingdom)","authors":"Artur Chalaguine","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3242987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3242987","url":null,"abstract":"This study is trying to quantify the costs and benefits of Internet gambling as well as calculate the net effect for the United Kingdom. Therefore, the research aim is to see whether Internet gambling should be a concern in the UK right now. The costs and benefits are calculated by using generally accepted measures and concepts of Welfare Economics, which should create consensus regarding a justified framework in the gambling literature, especially in regards to the calculation of social costs. The results show that the net effect of online gambling in the UK ranges from £643168031 to £2774780478 if addicted gamblers are considered rational, while it ranges from £418791001 to £2550403448 if addicted gamblers are considered irrational. Therefore, the total value of the benefits will depend on whether gambling is seen as a rational action or not. Furthermore, the total value of the costs will mainly depend on how the emotional costs of gambling are treated.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128931558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Regulatory Sandbox for Robo Advice","authors":"W. Ringe, Christopher Ruof","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3188828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3188828","url":null,"abstract":"Robo advice, the automated provision of financial advice without human intervention, holds the promise of cheap, convenient and fast investment services for consumers – freed from human error or bias. However, retail investors have limited capacity to assess the soundness of the advice, and are prone to make hasty, unverified investment decisions. Moreover, financial advice based on rough and broad classifications may fail to take into account the individual preferences and needs of the investor. On a more general scale, robo advice may be a source of new systemic risk. At this stage, the existing EU regulatory framework is of little help. Instead, this paper proposes a regulatory \"sandbox\" – an experimentation space – as a step towards a regulatory environment where such new business models can thrive. A sandbox would allow market participants to test robo advice services in the real market, with real consumers, but under close scrutiny of the supervisor. The benefit of such an approach is that it fuels the development of new business practices and reduces the \"time to market\" cycle of financial innovation while simultaneously safeguarding consumer protection. At the same time, a sandbox allows for mutual learning in a field concerning a little-known phenomenon, both for firms and for the regulator. This would help reducing the prevalent regulatory uncertainty for all market participants. In the particular EU legal framework with various layers of legal instruments, the implementation of such a sandbox is not straightforward. In this paper, we propose a \"guided sandbox\", operated by the EU Member States, but with endorsement, support, and monitoring by EU institutions. This innovative approach would be somewhat unchartered territory for the EU, and thereby also contribute to the future development of EU financial market governance.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130351951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private Equity Buyouts: Anti- or Pro-Competitive?","authors":"Pehr‐Johan Norbäck, L. Persson, Joacim Tåg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3128858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3128858","url":null,"abstract":"Private equity firms have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. Antitrust authorities therefore intervene in mergers and acquisitions involving PE firms. In this article, we discuss the antitrust implications of an active PE market and whether there are any special characteristics of PE ownership that are important for antitrust regulation and enforcement. To gain some perspective, we approach the question from three pillars of industrial organization: (i) identifying and blocking mergers that create substantial market power; (ii) detecting and preventing predatory behavior; and (iii) detecting and preventing collusive behavior.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127907626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private Road Supply in Networks with Heterogeneous Users","authors":"Xinying Fu, E. Verhoef, Vincent A.C. van den Berg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2920424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2920424","url":null,"abstract":"We study different mixes of private and public supply of roads in a network with bottleneck congestion and heterogeneous users. There are two parallel links for one origin and destination pair and two groups of travellers, where the group with the higher value of time also has higher schedule delay values. Previous scholars argued that as users become more heterogeneous, they benefit more from product differentiation, making private supply of roads more efficient. However, we find that local monopoly power might also increase if there is a ‘separating equilibrium’, which is an equilibrium where at least one group only uses one private road due to the different combinations of toll and congestion of the two roads. The private road can thus increase its toll without worrying about the competition from the other road for this group: it has a local monopoly over them. This lowers the efficiency of private supply. The problem is especially severe with flat tolls, which are constant over the peak. With fine tolls – which vary continuously over the day – there tends to be a pooling equilibrium – where both types use both roads – and competition remains intense. Flat tolling is also worse for users than fine tolling, as it has higher generalized prices.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124617003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"'Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces in the Marketing and Cultivation of GMOs in the EU'","authors":"N. de Sadeleer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3020059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3020059","url":null,"abstract":"Directive 2001/18/EC was amended by Directive 2015/412 with a view of granting the Member States the right to prohibit or to limit the cultivation of GMOs in accordance with a harmonised authorisation procedure. This chapter explains the rationale for this reform, which might at first sight appear to be somewhat disconcerting from the viewpoint of the proper functioning of the internal market.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122826308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Behavioural Aspects of Benchmark Quotation – The WIBOR Case","authors":"Piotr Mielus","doi":"10.18778/0208-6018.335.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6018.335.13","url":null,"abstract":"In the post‑crisis environment, market indices are one of elements of the financial market which have to be reformed. The EU Regulation on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments reflects a need for the reform of benchmark determination in order to make indices transparent, representative and resistant to manipulation. The reform changes the conduct of rate contributors (the so‑called panellists). The article analyses behavioural reactions of WIBOR panellists by indicating sources of the growth of inertia and the drop of dispersion of published benchmarks. Those reactions decrease the risk of banks and, at the same time, increase the divergence between an index and the actual cost of funds, which may threaten the stability of the financial market.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116546587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Comparative Analysis of the Secondary Liability of Online Service Providers","authors":"Graeme Dinwoodie","doi":"10.1007/978-3-319-55030-5_1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55030-5_1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115734988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Big Data and Competition Policy: Market Power, Personalised Pricing and Advertising","authors":"M. Bourreau, Alexandre de Streel, Inge Graef","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2920301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2920301","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies three specific issues around the application of competition policy to big data. The first issue relates to market power assessment and analyses the power given by data control in the big data value chain. The second and third issues relate to abuse of dominance assessment and analyse the use of data to personalise prices and to target advertising. To deal with those three issues, we recommend an analytical and governance framework for competition agencies.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131902026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L. Doukakis, Konstantinos Kapellas, Georgia Siougle
{"title":"The Effect of IFRS on Investment Decisions: European Evidence during Crisis and Non Crisis Economic Conditions","authors":"L. Doukakis, Konstantinos Kapellas, Georgia Siougle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3020094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3020094","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the effect of a change in financial reporting regulation, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), on investment decisions in Europe. It further investigates whether capital investment decisions were influenced by the adverse macroeconomic conditions that took place during the crisis period in the Eurozone in years 2008-2010. Moreover, we control for the fact that the impact of the IFRS adoption may differ depending on a) the timing of the adoption i.e. voluntary versus mandatory adopters and b) the legal enforcement and corruption levels. We provide evidence that financial reporting practices of mandatory versus voluntary adopters cause significant differences in (a) the cost of equity capital, (b) the level of capital investments and (c) the return on invested capital. Our evidence suggest that mandatory adopters improved the level of capital investments and the return on invested capital in the post IFRS period and that the cost of equity capital was reduced. These evidence are more pronounced under the strong legal enforcement environment. For the group of voluntary adopters, we verify also a significant reduction in the cost of equity capital in the post IFRS adoption period. Regarding their investment practices, we document higher level of capital investment relative to mandatory adopters in both the pre and post IFRS period and even after controlling for the legal enforcement environment. We provide evidence that during the crisis period the cost of equity capital was increased for both groups. Nevertheless, our results suggest that both groups keep their investment policy unchanged by not reducing the level of capital investments.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126782711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To Rebate or Not to Rebate: Fuel Economy Standards vs. Feebates","authors":"Isis Durrmeyer, M. Samano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2870917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2870917","url":null,"abstract":"We compare the welfare effects in equilibrium of two environmental regulations that aim at increasing the new cars fleet’s average fuel efficiency: the fuel economy standards and the feebate policies. Maintaining the same environmental benefit and tax revenue, we simulate the implementation of each policy in France and the United States. Standard-type policies have larger negative welfare effects, up to 3.2 times those from the feebate. Effects on manufacturers are heterogeneous: some are better off under the standard regulation. The addition of a market to trade levels of fuel efficiency dominates the simple standard regulation but not always the feebate. We also consider the attribute-based standard, technological improvements, and the equivalence with fuel taxes as extensions.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116413885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}