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Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics最新文献

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Carbon Offsets and Concerns about Shifting Harms: A Reply to Mintz-Woo 碳抵消和对转移危害的担忧：对 Mintz-Woo 的答复
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-28 DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.882
Luke Elson
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引用次数: 0
Review of Stephen Engelmann’s Economic Rationality: What is Political Economy? Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2022, 144 pages. 评斯蒂芬-恩格尔曼的《经济理性》：政治经济学是什么？英国剑桥：Polity，2022 年，144 页。
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.883
Mark McAdam, Jan Robin Kleiner
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引用次数: 0
Editorial Note 编辑说明
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.881
Annalisa Costella, Benjamin Mullins
{"title":"Editorial Note","authors":"Annalisa Costella, Benjamin Mullins","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.881","url":null,"abstract":"Oftentimes many individual acts lead to a significantly (dis-)valuable outcome though the performance of each act makes no valuative difference to that outcome. Such cases give rise to a dilemma. For it seemingly doesn’t matter whether one performs an act (or not) if it doesn’t make a difference. Yet it matters a great deal when many of these acts are performed, provided they bring about a significant outcome. One might think, therefore, that at least some reason favours the performance of such acts. But in the absence of a valuative difference, it is difficult to say what that reason is, exactly.\u0000The above dilemma arises in both intrapersonal and interpersonal cases. For instance, in the intrapersonal case, it seemingly makes little difference to my goal of running the marathon whether I skip a single workout. Yet it makes a significant difference to my goal of running the marathon if I skip all of my workouts. And, in the interpersonal case, it seemingly makes no difference to the bad effects of climate change if I choose to be a vegan or not. Yet it makes a significant difference to the bad effects of climate change if we all choose to be vegans. This dilemma has generated a substantial body of literature in both ethics and rational choice. Surprisingly, however, there has been little crossover between the two fields of study. The motivation for the special issue was to offer an avenue to explore new solutions or perspectives on the dilemma through the lens of one, or both of these fields.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141815218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Review of Thomas Nagel’s Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2023, v + 70 pp. 评托马斯-纳格尔的《道德情感、道德现实与道德进步》。纽约州纽约市：牛津大学出版社，2023 年，v + 70 页。
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.880
J. R. De Vries
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引用次数: 0
Intergenerational Cooperation and Justice between Age Groups 年龄组之间的代际合作与公正
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.764
Greg Bognar
{"title":"Intergenerational Cooperation and Justice between Age Groups","authors":"Greg Bognar","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.764","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I bring together the problems of justice between age groups and intergenerational cooperation in light of real-life demographic trends. I begin by presenting a simple model of intergenerational cooperation based on indirect reciprocity and show how cooperation can break down due to exogenous factors, including demographic change. I use the model to make the argument that principles for justice between age groups must be sensitive to the stability of intergenerational cooperation. I illustrate my thesis by considering the debate between distributive and relational egalitarians on justice between age groups.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141822901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Self-Control and Planning: A Reply to Williamson 自控与规划：答复威廉姆森
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.877
Chrisoula Andreou
{"title":"Self-Control and Planning: A Reply to Williamson","authors":"Chrisoula Andreou","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.877","url":null,"abstract":"In Timothy Luke Williamson’s commentary on my article “Micromanagement and Poor Self-Control,” Williamson casts my focus on managerial failures in certain cases of poor self-control “as an especially fruitful tool for addressing problems of poor self-control”; but he suggests that the cases of poor self-control that I view as cases of managerial failure also involve control by a foreign force, in accordance with the “foreign force paradigm,” which I claim is off base in the cases on which I focus. Although I cannot get into Williamson’s entire interesting and elaborate argument, I here question The Weak Planning Perspective, which plays a key role in Williamson’s critical response, with the aim of addressing the issues he raises and shedding some light on why and how our views diverge.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141656978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Hardness of the Practical Might 实际威力的硬度
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.797
Sergio Tenenbaum
{"title":"The Hardness of the Practical Might","authors":"Sergio Tenenbaum","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.797","url":null,"abstract":"Incommensurability is often introduced with the small improvement argument. Options A and B are shown to be incommensurable when it is neither the case that A is preferred to (or better than) B nor that B is preferred to (or better than) A, but a slightly improved version of A (A+) is still not preferred to B. Since A+ is preferred to A, but not to B, we must also conclude that it is also true that A and B are not indifferent (or equally good). Such incommensurable options seem incompatible with orthodox decision theory (and various forms of value theory) but options that obey the pattern described by this argument seem ubiquitous: my choice between lemon tarts and eclairs at my favourite pastry shop might exhibit this pattern, but so could my choice between jobs or careers. In trying to accommodate incommensurable options within various frameworks, philosophers have argued that we must preserve certain central features of the phenomenon. Among them is the supposed “hardness” of at least some incommensurable options: even if perhaps one would need to be a rather anxious gourmet to describe the choice between lemon tarts and eclairs as hard, the choice among careers could potentially be agonizing. However, it is not clear in which way choices among incommensurable options are “hard,” nor how and whether such hardness poses problems for the various accounts of incommensurable choices. To complicate matters, the deontic verdicts for choices between incommensurable options seem to be relatively straightforward: one appealing view is that in such circumstances I am rationally permitted to choose any option that is not worse than another option. This paper aims to provide a sharper formulation of at least a version of the hardness problem, to argue that various theories of incommensurability fail to account for the hardness of some incommensurable choices, and to propose that the theory of instrumental rationality I develop in Rational Powers in Action, aided by a Kantian insight, promises to provide an adequate explanation of the hardness of choice among incommensurable options.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141657228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Hard Things about Hard Choices? A Reply to Chang 艰难抉择的艰难之处？答复张
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.876
Sergio Tenenbaum
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引用次数: 0
What’s so Hard about Hard Choices? 艰难抉择有什么难的？
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.872
Ruth Chang
{"title":"What’s so Hard about Hard Choices?","authors":"Ruth Chang","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.872","url":null,"abstract":"What, exactly, is so hard about hard choices? I suggest that what is distinctively hard about hard choices is that they present us with the volitional difficulty of putting ourselves behind an alternative and thereby making it true of ourselves that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. Making it true through your commitments that, for instance, you have most reason to be a philosopher rather than a lawyer makes the choice between the careers hard. This answer is in contrast to that of Sergio Tenenbaum, who understands the hardness of a hard choice as a deliberative difficulty in specifying our alternatives and ends in ways that conform with certain proposed constraints of rationality. For Tenenbaum, the hardness of hard choices is not distinctive to such choices but is a general difficulty rational agents face when they need to further specify their alternatives and ends, even if the choice is easy.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141656319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Liberalism’s Difficult Relationship with the Welfare State 自由主义与福利国家的艰难关系
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.778
Harald Borgebund
{"title":"Liberalism’s Difficult Relationship with the Welfare State","authors":"Harald Borgebund","doi":"10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.778","url":null,"abstract":"This paper makes two related points. First, as liberals have started to realize that the welfare state is unable to deliver on egalitarian theories of justice, they have increasingly tried to dissociate their theories from the welfare state. Second, dissociating from the welfare state type of thinking is difficult for some liberal egalitarian theories such as John Rawls's theory of justice as his theory shares some of the same underlying thinking as found in the welfare state. For example, Rawls's understanding of universal citizenship and the difference principle resembles some of the aspects of the welfare state on how social equality and citizenship are tied to productivity and society as a venture of mutual cooperation. Consequently, liberals are caught in a difficult relationship where they can only partially move beyond the welfare state. Because of this affinity liberals should move beyond a Rawlsian framework, as Rawls's theory is difficult to completely dissociate from the welfare state.","PeriodicalId":37914,"journal":{"name":"Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141664271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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