The Hardness of the Practical Might

Q2 Arts and Humanities
Sergio Tenenbaum
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Incommensurability is often introduced with the small improvement argument. Options A and B are shown to be incommensurable when it is neither the case that A is preferred to (or better than) B nor that B is preferred to (or better than) A, but a slightly improved version of A (A+) is still not preferred to B. Since A+ is preferred to A, but not to B, we must also conclude that it is also true that A and B are not indifferent (or equally good). Such incommensurable options seem incompatible with orthodox decision theory (and various forms of value theory) but options that obey the pattern described by this argument seem ubiquitous: my choice between lemon tarts and eclairs at my favourite pastry shop might exhibit this pattern, but so could my choice between jobs or careers. In trying to accommodate incommensurable options within various frameworks, philosophers have argued that we must preserve certain central features of the phenomenon. Among them is the supposed “hardness” of at least some incommensurable options: even if perhaps one would need to be a rather anxious gourmet to describe the choice between lemon tarts and eclairs as hard, the choice among careers could potentially be agonizing. However, it is not clear in which way choices among incommensurable options are “hard,” nor how and whether such hardness poses problems for the various accounts of incommensurable choices. To complicate matters, the deontic verdicts for choices between incommensurable options seem to be relatively straightforward: one appealing view is that in such circumstances I am rationally permitted to choose any option that is not worse than another option. This paper aims to provide a sharper formulation of at least a version of the hardness problem, to argue that various theories of incommensurability fail to account for the hardness of some incommensurable choices, and to propose that the theory of instrumental rationality I develop in Rational Powers in Action, aided by a Kantian insight, promises to provide an adequate explanation of the hardness of choice among incommensurable options.
实际威力的硬度
不可通约性通常是通过小改进论证引入的。当 A 既不优于(或好于)B,B 也不优于(或好于)A,但 A 的微小改进版本(A+)仍不优于 B 时,选项 A 和 B 就被证明是不可通约的。这种不可通约的选择似乎与正统的决策理论(以及各种形式的价值理论)格格不入,但符合这一论证所描述的模式的选择似乎无处不在:我在我最喜欢的糕点店中选择柠檬馅饼和杏仁饼时可能就会表现出这种模式,但我在选择工作或职业时也可能表现出这种模式。哲学家们试图在各种框架内容纳不可通约的选择,他们认为我们必须保留这种现象的某些核心特征。其中包括至少某些不可通约选择的所谓 "艰难性":即使一个人可能需要是一个相当焦虑的美食家,才能把在柠檬馅饼和杏仁蛋糕之间的选择描述为艰难,但在职业之间的选择也可能是痛苦的。然而,我们并不清楚在不可通约的选择中如何选择才是 "艰难的",也不清楚这种艰难性如何以及是否会给不可通约选择的各种论述带来问题。使问题更加复杂的是,在不可通约的选项之间做出选择的道义判断似乎相对简单:一种吸引人的观点是,在这种情况下,我被理性地允许选择任何不比另一个选项更糟的选项。本文旨在为至少一个版本的硬度问题提供更清晰的表述,论证各种不可通约性理论无法解释某些不可通约选择的硬度问题,并提出我在《行动中的理性力量》一书中提出的工具理性理论,在康德洞察力的帮助下,有望为不可通约选择之间的选择硬度问题提供充分的解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
26
期刊介绍: The Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics (EJPE) is a peer-reviewed bi-annual academic journal supported by the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics at the Erasmus School of Philosophy of Erasmus University Rotterdam. EJPE publishes research on the methodology, history, ethics, and interdisciplinary relations of economics, and welcomes contributions from all scholars with an interest in any of its research domains. EJPE is an Open Access Journal: all the content is permanently available online without subscription or payment. EJPE aims to... -Publish high quality original research on the intersection of philosophy and economics. -Support the inter-disciplinary development of the field with critical survey papers covering ongoing debates and information about relevant publications. -Provide a forum that is friendly to young scholars, and supported by an authoritative, efficient, and constructive review process.
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