First Amendment Studies最新文献_第4页

Contesting the place of protest in migrant caravans 在移民大篷车中争夺抗议地点

First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1837648

Margaret Franz

引用次数: 1

Locating freedom of speech in an era of global white nationalism 在全球白人民族主义时代定位言论自由

First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1838843

A. Vats, M. Dutta

引用次数: 3

Hindu nationalism and media violence in news discourses in India 印度教民族主义与印度新闻话语中的媒体暴力

First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1838846

Ashwini Falnikar

{"title":"Hindu nationalism and media violence in news discourses in India","authors":"Ashwini Falnikar","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2020.1838846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2020.1838846","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The mainstream media and communication discourses in India in the present times engender ‘media violence’ embedded in the dominant productions of ‘Hinduism’ together with aspirations for neoliberal development. The media violence engenders indigenous forms of racism and colonialism. This article attempts to examine the nature of these productions through critical theories of postcoloniality and decolonial approaches put into conversation with theories of journalism. Through the examination of the instances of selective silencing of journalistic voices, and erasures embedded within the journalistic practices, this article argues for critical theories of press freedom. The productions of racial superiority and internal colonialism in India only begin to make sense when read together with the interplays of religion, class, caste, and global reach of the privileged sections of Indian society, namely the civil society. Against the backdrop of the historical role of the press in India in freedom struggle against colonial rule, the history of press censorship after independence, the civil society voices that are amplified in the neoliberal restructuring of news media, and the Dalit movements that expose the Brahminical dominance in the imaginary of the ‘Indian culture’, the meanings of race and coloniality in India unfold.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2020.1838846","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44611438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Using think-alouds to understand how students balance free speech and inclusion 通过大声思考来理解学生如何平衡言论自由和包容

First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-02-06 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2021.1884113

J. Bernstein, Cameron W. Armstrong

引用次数: 0

Circumventing the “true threat” and “viewpoint” protection tests to deal with persistent campus hate speech 规避“真实威胁”和“观点”保护测试，应对持续存在的校园仇恨言论

First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1742759

C. Smith

{"title":"Circumventing the “true threat” and “viewpoint” protection tests to deal with persistent campus hate speech","authors":"C. Smith","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2020.1742759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2020.1742759","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay suggests using harassment law as a mechanism for remedying defects in “true threat” and “viewpoint protection” language which places an undue burden of proof on those trying to quell hate speech on campuses. The essay reviews noted failures and their causes in “true threat” and “viewpoint protection” rulings. Currently, the First Amendment of the Constitution protects freedom of expression unless it presents “a clear and present danger,” is treasonous, obscene, libelous or slanderous. The initial “clear and present danger” standard laid out by Justice Holmes in the Schenck decision has been refined in several cases to create an even heavier burden of proof. Currently, based particularly on the Brandenburg v. Ohio and Virginia v. Black rulings, to be prosecutable, speech must be a “true threat,” which means person-specific, imminent, and possible. However, the Supreme Court has also protected hate speech by defining it as “viewpoint” in such case as Indiana v. Hess, Snyder v. Phelps, and Matal v. Tam. This essay concludes by exploring ways to circumvent the “true threat” and “viewpoint” standards by relying on harassment rulings and extending these precedents from the workplace to campus learning environments.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2020.1742759","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41961690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Perspective by incongruity: Law and rhetoric in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 不协调视角:杰作蛋糕店诉科罗拉多州民权委员会案中的法律与修辞

First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1728357

M. Eisenstadt

{"title":"Perspective by incongruity: Law and rhetoric in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission","authors":"M. Eisenstadt","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2020.1728357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2020.1728357","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Supreme Court’s ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was decided on the narrow ground that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause because of hostility toward the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop. This decision failed to answer a cardinal question of constitutional law, whether or not the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause could undermine nondiscrimination law. In Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion, he seized on one particular comment made by a Commissioner about religious freedom that justified ruling against the Commission for its use of discriminatory rhetoric. According to Justice Kennedy, the Commission violated the Free Exercise Clause by describing religious expression as despicable and as merely rhetorical. In this report, I argue that Justice Kennedy’s opinion demands heightened attention for two reasons. First, to describe religious freedom as a justification for prejudice as merely rhetorical is a gross underestimation of the power of rhetoric and provides moral encouragement to anti-LGBTQ+ activists using the legal system to advance a heteronormative agenda. Second, Justice Kennedy’s claim that rhetoric is insubstantial and insincere calls into question the role of the Court, the meaning of the law, and the relationship between the law and rhetoric.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2020.1728357","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43183595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Sovereignty and First Amendment rights of higher education institutions: An affirmative and institutional approach 高等教育机构的主权和第一修正案权利：一种肯定和制度的方法

First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1743197

M. Park

引用次数: 2

is (not) a whistleblower: Ideographs, whistleblower protections, and restrictions of speech 是（不是）告密者：象形文字、告密者保护和言论限制

First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1742761

Joshua Guitar

{"title":"is (not) a whistleblower: Ideographs, whistleblower protections, and restrictions of speech","authors":"Joshua Guitar","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2020.1742761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2020.1742761","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Edward Snowden’s revelations ignited public discourse on whistleblowing and whistleblower protection legislation. Given the polemics over whistleblower distinctions throughout mediated exchanges between US officials and the press, this manuscript constitutes a synchronic ideographic analysis of pertinent, recognized ideographs as they were operationalized in relation to whistleblowing within the Snowden discourse. While news media and the public agreed that Snowden operated as a whistleblower, the US government adamantly denied this classification. Instead, US officials manufactured a media trial, and in three distinct phases, purged whistleblowing from the public forum, rhetorically criminalized Snowden as a threat to national , and utilized whistleblowing as a means to propagate the war on and defend covert surveillance. These processes afforded US officials the ability to funnel whistleblowers through private channels, effectively neutralizing the public power of whistleblowers. It is argued that removing whistleblowers from the public forum, while packaged as a protective measure for whistleblowers, operates as a defensive measure for state officials and authoritarianism writ large as it disarms a democratic populace of a foundational tool of free speech and dissent.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2020.1742761","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46992533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Is it too heavy of a constitutional cross to bear? Making sense of the decision in American Legion v. American Humanist Association 宪法十字架是不是太重了？理解美国退伍军人协会诉美国人文主义协会案的判决

First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1742762

Adrienne E. Hacker-Daniels

引用次数: 1

The First Amendment v. reproductive rights: Crisis pregnancy centers, commercial speech, and marketplaces of misinformation 第一修正案诉生殖权利:危机怀孕中心、商业言论和错误信息市场

First Amendment Studies Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1742763

Bradley Queen

{"title":"The First Amendment v. reproductive rights: Crisis pregnancy centers, commercial speech, and marketplaces of misinformation","authors":"Bradley Queen","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2020.1742763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2020.1742763","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay responds to the holding in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra (2018), arguing that the signal contribution of the majority opinion is its attempt to move commercial speech further into the absolute realm of protected public discourse. In finding the California FACT Act to be unconstitutional, the 5–4 majority uses a fractured commercial speech standard to define NIFLA’s marketplace communications as protected ideological speech. In so doing, Justice Thomas, author of the majority opinion, considers only the state’s speech – its compelled disclosures – and does not assess the rhetorical properties of NIFLA’s commercial communications. But the majority concludes nevertheless that NIFLA’s speech is impervious to publicly interested legislation, despite well-documented evidence of misleading and harmful advertising. Ultimately, it is argued that the question of whether NIFLA’s right to free speech has been violated cannot be squarely addressed if the speech with which the state’s disclosures dialogue remains nebulous. NIFLA seems to undermine the longstanding conception of commercial speech as a form that legitimates both the interests of speakers and the informational interests of publics, with the latter sustained when necessary by governmental initiatives that enable informed choice-making by regulating deceptive information in commercial marketplaces.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2020.1742763","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42275616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0