{"title":"LOMAC: Low Water-Mark integrity protection for COTS environments","authors":"T. Fraser","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848460","url":null,"abstract":"We hypothesize that a form of kernel-resident access control based integrity protection can gain widespread acceptance in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) environments, provided that it couples some useful protection with a high degree of compatibility with existing software, configurations, and practices. To test this hypothesis, we have developed a highly compatible free open-source prototype called LOMAC, and released it on the Internet. LOMAC is a dynamically loadable extension for COTS Linux kernels that provides integrity protection based on Low Water-Mark access control. We present a classification of existing access control models with regard to compatibility, concluding that models similar to Low Water-Mark are especially well suited to high-compatibility solutions. We also describe our practical strategies for dealing with the pathological cases in the Low Water-Mark model's behavior which include a small extension of the model, and an unusual application of its concepts.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125562727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A practically implementable and tractable delegation logic","authors":"Ninghui Li, Benjamin N. Grosof, J. Feigenbaum","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848444","url":null,"abstract":"We address the goal of making Delegation Logic (DL) into a practically implementable and tractable trust management system. DL (N. Li et al., 1999) is a logic based knowledge representation (i.e., language) for authorization in large scale, open, distributed systems. DL inferencing is computationally intractable and highly impractical to implement. We introduce a new version of Delegation Logic that remedies these difficulties. To achieve this, we impose a syntactic restriction and redefine the semantics somewhat. We show that, for this revised version of DL, inferencing is computationally tractable under the same commonly met restrictions for which Ordinary Logic Programs (OLP) inferencing is tractable (e.g., Datalog and bounded number of logical variables per rule). We give an implementation architecture for this version of DL; it uses a delegation compiler from DL to OLP and can modularly exploit a variety of existing OLP inference engines. As proof of concept, we have implemented a large expressive subset of this version of DL, using this architecture.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132272732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sanjeev Setia, Samir Koussih, S. Jajodia, E. Harder
{"title":"Kronos: a scalable group re-keying approach for secure multicast","authors":"Sanjeev Setia, Samir Koussih, S. Jajodia, E. Harder","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848459","url":null,"abstract":"The authors describe a novel approach to scalable group re-keying for secure multicast. Our approach, which we call Kronos, is based upon the idea of periodic group re-keying. We first motivate our approach by showing that if a group is re-keyed on each membership change, as the size of the group increases and/or the rate at which members leave and join the group increases, the frequency of rekeying becomes the primary bottle neck for scalable group re-keying. In contrast, Kronos can scale to handle large and dynamic groups because the frequency of re-keying is independent of the size and membership dynamics of the group. Next, we describe how Kronos can be used in conjunction with distributed key management frameworks such as IGKMP (T. Hardjono et al., 1998) that use a single group-wide session key for encrypting communications between members of the group. Using a detailed simulation, we compare the performance tradeoffs between Kronos and other key management protocols.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"138 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125366776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Practical techniques for searches on encrypted data","authors":"D. Song, D. Wagner, A. Perrig","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848445","url":null,"abstract":"It is desirable to store data on data storage servers such as mail servers and file servers in encrypted form to reduce security and privacy risks. But this usually implies that one has to sacrifice functionality for security. For example, if a client wishes to retrieve only documents containing certain words, it was not previously known how to let the data storage server perform the search and answer the query, without loss of data confidentiality. We describe our cryptographic schemes for the problem of searching on encrypted data and provide proofs of security for the resulting crypto systems. Our techniques have a number of crucial advantages. They are provably secure: they provide provable secrecy for encryption, in the sense that the untrusted server cannot learn anything about the plaintext when only given the ciphertext; they provide query isolation for searches, meaning that the untrusted server cannot learn anything more about the plaintext than the search result; they provide controlled searching, so that the untrusted server cannot search for an arbitrary word without the user's authorization; they also support hidden queries, so that the user may ask the untrusted server to search for a secret word without revealing the word to the server. The algorithms presented are simple, fast (for a document of length n, the encryption and search algorithms only need O(n) stream cipher and block cipher operations), and introduce almost no space and communication overhead, and hence are practical to use today.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130383925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Protocol-independent secrecy","authors":"J. Millen, H. Ruess","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848449","url":null,"abstract":"Inductive proofs of secrecy invariants for cryptographic protocols can be facilitated by separating the protocol dependent part from the protocol-independent part. Our secrecy theorem encapsulates the use of induction so that the discharge of protocol-specific proof obligations is reduced to first-order reasoning. Also, the verification conditions are modularly associated with the protocol messages. Secrecy proofs for Otway-Rees (1987) and the corrected Needham-Schroeder protocol are given.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125097815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Efficient authentication and signing of multicast streams over lossy channels","authors":"A. Perrig, R. Canetti, J. D. Tygar, D. Song","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848446","url":null,"abstract":"Multicast stream authentication and signing is an important and challenging problem. Applications include the continuous authentication of radio and TV Internet broadcasts, and authenticated data distribution by satellite. The main challenges are fourfold. First, authenticity must be guaranteed even when only the sender of the data is trusted. Second, the scheme needs to scale to potentially millions of receivers. Third, streamed media distribution can have high packet loss. Finally the system needs to be efficient to support fast packet rates. We propose two efficient schemes, TESLA and EMSS, for secure lossy multicast streams. TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication), offers sender authentication, strong loss robustness, high scalability and minimal overhead at the cost of loose initial time synchronization and slightly delayed authentication. EMSS (Efficient Multi-chained Stream Signature), provides nonrepudiation of origin, high loss resistance, and low overhead, at the cost of slightly delayed verification.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133206298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Open source in security: visiting the bizarre","authors":"F. Schneider","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848477","url":null,"abstract":"Although open-source software development has virtues, there is reason to believe that the approach would not have a significant effect on the security of today's systems. The lion's share of vulnerabilities caused by software bugs is easily dealt with by means other than source code inspections. The tenets of open-source development are inhospitable to business models whose success depends on promoting secure systems.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123931463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Logic induction of valid behavior specifications for intrusion detection","authors":"C. Ko","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848452","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces an automated technique for constructing valid behavior specifications of programs (at the system call level) that are independent of system vulnerabilities and are highly effective in identifying intrusions. The technique employs a machine learning method, inductive logic programming (ILP), for synthesizing first order logic formulas that describe the valid operations of a program from the normal runs of the program. ILP backed by theories and techniques extended from computational logic, allows the use of complex domain-specific background knowledge in the learning process to produce sound and consistent knowledge. A specification induction engine has been developed by extending an existing ILP tool and has been used to construct specifications for several (>10) privileged programs in Unix. Coupling with rich background knowledge in systems and security, the prototype induction engine generates human understandable and analytable specifications that are as good as those specified by a human. Preliminary experiments with existing attacks show that the generated specifications are highly effective in detecting attacks that subvert privileged programs to gain unauthorized accesses to resources.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"27 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113978242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A security infrastructure for distributed Java applications","authors":"D. Balfanz, Drew Dean, M. Spreitzer","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848443","url":null,"abstract":"We describe the design and implementation of a security infrastructure for a distributed Java application. This work is inspired by SDSI/SPKI, but has a few twists of its own. We define a logic for access control, such that access is granted iff a proof that it should be granted is derivable in the logic. Our logic supports linked local name spaces, privilege delegation across administrative domains, and attribute certificates. We use SSL to establish secure channels through which principals can \"speak\", and have implemented our access control system in Java. While we implemented our infrastructure for the Placeless Documents System, our design is applicable to other applications as well. We discuss general issues related to building secure, distributed Java applications that we discovered.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115907298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Privacy technology lessons from healthcare","authors":"Ross J. Anderson","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848466","url":null,"abstract":"The probability that information will be abused depends both on its value and on the number of people, who have access. The modern trend to ever larger databases increases both of these risk factors at the same time. Compartmented security policies can solve many of the technical issues, and there are applications such as healthcare where they have been developed in some detail. But the big problem isn't technical; it is legal and regulatory. Insurers, employers and governments won't adopt compartmented systems, or will allow them to be adopted only in places such as hospitals which are not where the real threats lie.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116316881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}