{"title":"独立于协议的保密","authors":"J. Millen, H. Ruess","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848449","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Inductive proofs of secrecy invariants for cryptographic protocols can be facilitated by separating the protocol dependent part from the protocol-independent part. Our secrecy theorem encapsulates the use of induction so that the discharge of protocol-specific proof obligations is reduced to first-order reasoning. Also, the verification conditions are modularly associated with the protocol messages. Secrecy proofs for Otway-Rees (1987) and the corrected Needham-Schroeder protocol are given.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2000-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"42","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Protocol-independent secrecy\",\"authors\":\"J. Millen, H. Ruess\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848449\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Inductive proofs of secrecy invariants for cryptographic protocols can be facilitated by separating the protocol dependent part from the protocol-independent part. Our secrecy theorem encapsulates the use of induction so that the discharge of protocol-specific proof obligations is reduced to first-order reasoning. Also, the verification conditions are modularly associated with the protocol messages. Secrecy proofs for Otway-Rees (1987) and the corrected Needham-Schroeder protocol are given.\",\"PeriodicalId\":373624,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2000-05-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"42\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848449\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848449","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Inductive proofs of secrecy invariants for cryptographic protocols can be facilitated by separating the protocol dependent part from the protocol-independent part. Our secrecy theorem encapsulates the use of induction so that the discharge of protocol-specific proof obligations is reduced to first-order reasoning. Also, the verification conditions are modularly associated with the protocol messages. Secrecy proofs for Otway-Rees (1987) and the corrected Needham-Schroeder protocol are given.
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