Antitrust Bulletin最新文献

{"title":"White Label: The Technological Illusion of Competition","authors":"Garry A. Gabison","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221126160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221126160","url":null,"abstract":"This article looks at the competition (or lack thereof) in the U.S. and EU financial service markets and how innovative companies have decided to enter the market. Over the years, many start-ups have ventured into financial services; however, they have faced heavy regulations. These regulations have led these companies to using a “white label” business model. This model has wide competition law implications: some good (e.g., more innovation at different levels of financial services) and some bad (e.g., innovative companies being bought out). These start-ups do not provide the competition first hoped while competition authorities and regulators often lag behind the technology to act and preserve competition before it is too late. This article makes some recommendations how the U.S. and EU competition authorities can learn from each other’s mistakes.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"642 - 662"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41672591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Missed Opportunity: The European Union’s New Powers over Digital Platforms","authors":"John Davies, Valentine Meunier, Gianmarco Calanchi, Angelos Stenimachitis","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221126128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221126128","url":null,"abstract":"The Digital Markets Act (DMA) in the European Union assumes that all large “core platform service” providers pose similar threats to competition and to fairness and thus imposes identical obligations on all of them. The alternative “New Competition Tool,” that would have allowed the European Commission (EC) to conduct fact-intensive investigations of markets to design bespoke remedies, has been largely abandoned. The approach adopted contradicts the basic principle that competition policy should be concerned with evidence of adverse effects. The proponents of the adopted form of the DMA argue that ex ante action is required to forestall irreversible harm to competition, but that same logic also implies assessing the risk of harm from excessive regulation—and the DMA contains no mechanism to do so. Given the different underlying economics of different kinds of platform services, including the way some support digital ecosystems involving many firms, a different approach is needed. The EC missed the opportunity to introduce a market investigation tool. The rigid and static framework of the DMA seems like the wrong solution, given the economics of digital markets.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"504 - 521"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42769757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"European Antitrust Enforcement in the Digital Era: How It Started, How It’s Going, and the Risks Lying Ahead","authors":"Athena Kontosakou","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221126138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221126138","url":null,"abstract":"The digitalization of economy, the proliferation of data collection, and the increased dependency of consumers on online services has brought about new ecosystems, new business models, and new, complex antitrust issues. Delineating the new remits of antitrust enforcement to tackle those issues is not an easy task. The present contribution discusses significant legislative and enforcement changes in Europe, both at Union and Member State level and identifies risks for the future of antitrust enforcement.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"522 - 535"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48320670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introduction and Synopsis","authors":"Ioannis P. Kokkoris, Claudia Lemus","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221126127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221126127","url":null,"abstract":"Considering the emerging consensus that traditional antitrust enforcement tools may not be fully successful in addressing concerns raised by the development of the digital economy, key stakeholders across the world are making great efforts to address the issue. In particular, the legislative initiatives of the European Union (EU) have been prominent in this area. The United States has belatedly shown signs that there are concerns about concentrated economic power in digital markets and antitrust is being portrayed as an effective means to address the adverse consequences on competition. In China, regulators have recently expanded their remit on competition enforcement in digital markets. The strengthening of regulatory actions against digital platforms has also echoed across the globe, including in jurisdictions such as Australia and Brazil. Yet, even if all these efforts are remarkable, it is still yet unclear whether the variety of the proposed interventions would tackle the competition enforcement challenges posed by digital platforms and whether there is disparity of enforcement approaches that creates its own challenges for the companies involved in the digital sector. In the EU, after months of stakeholder consultations and internal debate, in December 2020 the European Commission (EC) presented the Digital Markets Act (DMA), which is aimed to control a range of anticompetitive conducts of large online platforms (LoPs) and to ensure the expansion of European platforms in fair and contestable markets. In other words, the DMA is intended to create a level playing field on which European tech firms can compete against America’s tech giants. Recently, on July 18, 2022, the DMA was approved by the Council of the EU and is expected to inspire regulatory intervention in other jurisdictions. Hence, the DMA constitutes an ex ante regulatory regime that places the EC as the digital regulator and includes an exhaustive list of rigid obligations and prohibitions that need to be observed by designated gatekeepers. A company is presumed to be a gatekeeper if it meets the qualitative and quantitative criteria set out in the provision. According to Margrethe Vestager, the Commissioner for Competition, without these rules “others will not get room to grow.”1 Perhaps, but it may also happen that firms would feel discouraged to expand to the point where they may be subject to the DMA. Paradoxically, an instrument that has been created with the intention of spurring growth and innovation could lead to having an adverse impact on","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"499 - 503"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44964930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Platform and Device Neutrality Regime: The New Competition Rulebook for App Stores?","authors":"O. Borgogno, G. Colangelo","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221103122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221103122","url":null,"abstract":"Among the numerous legislative initiatives implemented around the globe on digital platforms, some of these provisions are explicitly directed toward app stores. As they have all the distinctive features of multi-sided markets, app store owners represent the prototype of digital gatekeepers, controlling access to mobile ecosystems and competing with business users operating on the platforms. In light of the rule-setting and dual role of these gateway players, regulatory interventions are required in order to ensure that large app stores are treated like common carriers or public utilities, thereby imposing upon them a neutrality regime vis-à-vis new entrants. For the very same reasons, dominant app store providers have been subject to an increasing number of antitrust investigations attempting to ensure equal treatment and to avoid self-preferencing at the expense of rivals’ services. Against this background, the article investigates whether antitrust provisions are flexible enough to curb anticompetitive practices carried out by app stores and the extent to which regulatory interventions could, on the other hand, be necessary in order to address the seemingly unique features of the app economy.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"451 - 494"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43444333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Vertical Merger Guidelines and the Rule of Law","authors":"G. Werden","doi":"10.1177/0003603x221103113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603x221103113","url":null,"abstract":"Mid-1960s Supreme Court decisions undermined the rule of law by giving the government unbridled discretion in enforcing Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Since 1968, the government has promoted the rule of law through guidelines limiting discretion. The Vertical Merger Guidelines, however, place no meaningful limits on agency discretion. They articulate theories under which mergers can be harmful but neither specific nor general standards. They set out no principles for determining when a merger harms competition, rather than a competitor, and no criteria for determining when harm to competition is likely, rather than merely possible. Nor do they convey the agencies’ general attitude toward vertical mergers.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"406 - 423"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43640374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Radiation-induced coronary artery disease: a difficult clinical conundrum.","authors":"Ali Kirresh, Laura White, Adam Mitchell, Shahzaib Ahmad, Bernard Obika, Sarah Davis, Mahmood Ahmad, Luciano Candilio","doi":"10.7861/clinmed.2021-0600","DOIUrl":"10.7861/clinmed.2021-0600","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Accelerated coronary artery disease seen following radiation exposure is termed 'radiation-induced coronary artery disease' (RICAD) and results from both the direct and indirect effects of radiation exposure. Long-term data are available from survivors of nuclear explosions and accidents, nuclear workers as well as from radiotherapy patients. The last group is, by far, the biggest cause of RICAD presentation. The incidence of RICAD continues to increase as cancer survival rates improve and it is now the second most common cause of morbidity and mortality in patients treated with radiotherapy for breast cancer, Hodgkin's lymphoma and other mediastinal malignancies. RICAD will frequently present atypically or even asymptomatically with a latency period of at least 10 years after radiotherapy treatment. An awareness of RICAD, as a long-term complication of radiotherapy, is therefore essential for the cardiologist, oncologist and general medical physician alike. Prior cardiac risk factors, a higher radiation dose and a younger age at exposure seem to increase a patient's risk ratio of developing RICAD. Significant radiation exposure, therefore, requires a low threshold for screening for early diagnosis and timely intervention.</p>","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"61 1","pages":"251-256"},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87284489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The role of vaccination in a model of asset pricing during a pandemic.","authors":"Yuta Saito","doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0266511","DOIUrl":"10.1371/journal.pone.0266511","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper examines the effect of pandemic vaccination on asset prices in a simple asset pricing model à la Lucas 1978. In this model, asset prices depend on susceptible individuals' saving motives to insure against a reduction in labour income due to getting they get the virus. Hence distributing vaccine reduces precautionary saving motives and asset prices. This implies that reducing the income gap between susceptible and infected individuals, such as by cash handouts, eases the negative effect of vaccine supply on asset prices.</p>","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"65 1","pages":"e0266511"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2022-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9022870/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66533820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reshaping Digital Competition: The New Platform Regulations and the Future of Modern Antitrust","authors":"Elias Deutscher","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221082742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221082742","url":null,"abstract":"This article reflects on the way in which the new initiatives to regulate powerful online platforms in the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany challenge well-established fundamentals of modern antitrust and thereby reshape the future of competition law. It shows that the new platform regulations set in motion a profound transformation of modern antitrust law that operates along four parameters. First, the new platform regulations unsettle the long-standing baseline assumption that the maximization of consumer welfare constitutes competition law’s core mission. Second, the new instruments repudiate the orthodox understanding of error costs that advocates under-enforcement as the optimal standard of intervention in innovation-driven markets. Third, by relying primarily on rule-like presumptions as legal commands to regulate digital competition, the new platform regulations reverse the trend toward an increasingly inductive mode of analysis that characterized modern antitrust under the “more economic” or “effects-based” approach. Fourth, the new platform regulations also fundamentally diverge from a purely probabilistic standard of proof which requires the showing that impugned conduct is more likely than not to cause anticompetitive harm. The reconfiguration of modern antitrust along these four vectors, the article concludes, foreshadows a new, more inclusive model of innovation and growth in digital markets.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"302 - 340"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65215531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taming Tech Giants: The Neglected Interplay Between Competition Law and Data Protection (Privacy) Law","authors":"Wolfgang Kerber","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221084145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221084145","url":null,"abstract":"The debate about the economic power of large tech firms has led to the insight that due to the key role of personal data on large digital platforms competition and privacy issues are deeply intertwined. This leads also to a complex relationship between competition law and data protection (or privacy) law, and—also from an economic perspective—the need for policy-makers to take into account the interplay between both legal regimes. This article analyzes current discussions about (1) how to integrate privacy effects into traditional competition law and (2) the far-reaching reform discussions about taming the power of the large tech firms, for example, the Digital Markets Act in the European Union or the new antitrust discussion in the United States, with respect to the question whether and to what extent they take into account this interplay between competition policy and data protection (or privacy) law. It is surprising that also the second reform discussion, which directly intends to target the power of the large tech firms, does not take into account sufficiently this interplay and the ensuing need for a more collaborative approach between these policies. Therefore, the opportunities of developing a more effective joint strategy for achieving better both competition and privacy are still missed.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"280 - 301"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46476445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}