Antitrust Bulletin最新文献_第2页

What Is an Antitrust Problem, Anyway? Toward Antitrust Unlimited 什么是反垄断问题?反垄断无限制

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-04-10 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231163214

Salil K. Mehra

{"title":"What Is an Antitrust Problem, Anyway? Toward Antitrust Unlimited","authors":"Salil K. Mehra","doi":"10.1177/0003603X231163214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X231163214","url":null,"abstract":"What is it we talk about when we talk about antitrust? Frequently, a call for antitrust action at the frontier of the field is met by the response that the issue in question is “not an antitrust problem.” Things we were told pre-2020 were not “antitrust problems,” it ran the gamut from “patent holdup” and forcing a buyer to take an unwanted product to fake news and privacy breaches. Surprisingly, however, “antitrust problem” is not a well-defined term. As this has been pointed out, U.S. antitrust law as it exists today does not punish all ends that injure consumer welfare—for example, it is explicitly legal to possess a monopoly, and to use it to restrict output and charge monopoly prices. Nor does antitrust punish all means that injure consumer welfare—fraud and deception can injure consumer welfare, but without more they are not actionable under the antitrust laws. Post-2020, we find ourselves in an era in which policymakers are asking, not without some pushback, whether economic inequality, racial disparities, and decades of falling or stagnant wages can and should be addressed as problems by antitrust law. To define “antitrust problem,” we must consider what antitrust is ultimately supposed to protect: the benefits for Americans of a national economic system based on market competition. Displacing such a system, and thereby depriving consumers of the benefits of such a system, is at the heart of what antitrust was designed to accomplish—even if contemporary antitrust doctrine paints in much narrower brushstrokes.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"191 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42740232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Flawed Analysis Underlying Calls for Antitrust Reform: An Assessment of Lina Khan’s Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox 反垄断改革呼声背后的缺陷分析:对莉娜·汗《亚马逊反垄断悖论》的评估

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-04-07 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231163011

R. Atkinson, Michael R. Ward

引用次数: 0

The Friction Paradox: Intermediaries, Competition, and Efficiency 摩擦悖论：中介、竞争与效率

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-04-05 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231162999

Barak Orbach

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引用次数: 0

Analyzing Competition in the Online Economy 分析网络经济中的竞争

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-04-04 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231163001

Victor Glass, T. Tardiff

{"title":"Analyzing Competition in the Online Economy","authors":"Victor Glass, T. Tardiff","doi":"10.1177/0003603X231163001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X231163001","url":null,"abstract":"Since economic analysis of the workings of the online economy is in its early stages, detecting anticompetitive behavior remains challenging. There have been some insights from models that explain how two-sided markets work, but the practical uses of these models are limited thus far. More research is necessary on the definition and operations of platforms of different sizes and with different objectives, for example, the identification of data clustering and flows related to product clustering and information production and the relationships between data, information, and innovation. Furthermore, corporate culture, which can produce cultural clashes within an organization, may influence both (anti)competitive behavior and innovation. The cultural issue becomes even more complex when evaluating whether a merger would result in both innovation and the abuse of market power. This paper develops an overview of the technology and operations of the online economy as a start toward informing competition and antitrust policy. We present a technical overview that becomes a starting point for understanding potential areas of excessive market power. We also examine market dynamics from the large platforms’ points of view to understand where they believe the online economy is heading.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"167 - 190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42560909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Populist Antitrust: The Case of FTC v. Facebook 民粹主义反垄断:联邦贸易委员会诉Facebook案

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-04-04 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231163218

T. Hazlett

引用次数: 0

A Consumer Divided Cannot Stand 分裂的消费者是站不住脚的

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-04-02 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231163000

Shubha Ghosh

引用次数: 0

Swimming in Pools: Collusion in the Salmon Market 泳池游泳：三文鱼市场的共谋

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221150368

Danial Asmat, Margaret C. Levenstein, V. Suslow, Z. Wang