Antitrust Bulletin最新文献

Geographic Market Definition in Commercial Health Insurer Matters: A Unified Approach for Merger Review, Monopolization Claims, and Monopsonization Claims 商业健康保险公司事务中的地理市场定义:合并审查、垄断索赔和垄断索赔的统一方法

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-07-19 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231184666

D. Haas-wilson, Kristof Zetenyi, B. Gorin

{"title":"Geographic Market Definition in Commercial Health Insurer Matters: A Unified Approach for Merger Review, Monopolization Claims, and Monopsonization Claims","authors":"D. Haas-wilson, Kristof Zetenyi, B. Gorin","doi":"10.1177/0003603X231184666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X231184666","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a methodology for geographic market definition when the product(s) being purchased or sold has an intrinsic geographic component, such as (1) the sale of commercial health plans and (2) the purchase of health care providers’ services by commercial health plans. In these situations, we show that a straightforward application of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (hereafter, Guidelines) that uses the customer or supplier location to define the geographic market is not sufficient and can result in markets that are unintuitively small. This is often addressed by applying an assumption about aggregating based on similar competitive conditions. The practice of relying on the assumption of similar competitive conditions across counties, metropolitan statistical areas, or other geographic areas, without a methodology to support this assumption, could lead to market definitions that are too narrow or too broad and could influence the assessments of the extent of market concentration and the presence or absence of market power. We outline a framework that is consistent with the Guidelines and does not require a reliance on the assumption of aggregation based on similar competitive conditions. JEL Classification L12, L40, K21, D42, I11","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"533 - 546"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44482605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Wall Street’s Practice of Compelling Confidentiality of Private Underwriting Fees: An Antitrust Violation? 华尔街强制保密私人承销费用的做法:违反反垄断法?

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-07-13 DOI: 10.1177/0003603x231180244

Thomas C. Willcox

引用次数: 1

Do EU and U.K. Antitrust “Bite”?: A Hard Look at “Soft” Enforcement and Negotiated Penalty Settlements 欧盟和英国反垄断“咬”了吗？：严厉看待“软”执行和协商处罚解决

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-07-13 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231180245

O. Brook

引用次数: 0

Two Challenges for Neo-Brandeisian Antitrust 新布兰代斯反垄断的两个挑战

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-07-06 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231180251

J. Lindeboom

{"title":"Two Challenges for Neo-Brandeisian Antitrust","authors":"J. Lindeboom","doi":"10.1177/0003603X231180251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X231180251","url":null,"abstract":"Several scholars and policy-makers have proposed a “Neo-Brandeisian” reform of U.S. antitrust law, aimed at reviving “republican” antitrust. Republicanism conceives of domination as inherently detrimental to freedom. Republican antitrust considers antitrust law as an “institution of antipower,” aimed at dispersing economic power. This paper sets out two key challenges to the Neo-Brandeisian reform agenda and argues for legal formalism to address them. First, republicanism would alter the normative justification, but not necessarily the content of antitrust law. Neoclassical antitrust law does not broadly reflect a Schumpeterian endorsement of dominance. Rather, its epistemological priors and methodology entail skepticism about the mere presence of economic power. Thus, mainstream antitrust law and policy remain unfazed by the Neo-Brandeisian claim that antitrust should target domination instead of consumer welfare. Second, Neo-Brandeisian reform proposals are inherently polycentric. How Neo-Brandeisians aim to balance distinct values including the competitive process, the harm of concentrated power, and the protection of democracy and egalitarianism has remained unclear. This paper argues that both challenges demand for a formalistic approach to Neo-Brandeisian antitrust. Compared to a case-by-case approach, adopting general rules through legislative or administrative decision-making may legitimately overturn current precedent, incorporate alternate methods of measuring power and competitive harm, and pursue a variety of republican goals. Neo-Brandeisian formalism would essentially reinvigorate the Harvard school’s insight that multiple purposes—including both efficiency and republican liberty—can be attained by formalistic rules.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"392 - 410"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43626424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Epic Battles in Two-Sided Markets 双方市场的史诗之战

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-07-05 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231180250

Brianna L. Alderman, R. Blair

引用次数: 0

Innovation Competition and Innovation Effects in Horizontal Mergers: Theory and Practice in the United States and European Commission 横向并购中的创新竞争与创新效应——美国和欧盟委员会的理论与实践

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-06-28 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231182500

Marcos Puccioni de Oliveira Lyra, C. Pires-Alves

引用次数: 0

An Empirical Assessment of the European Commission’s Cartel Prosecutions, 2010–2019 2010-2019年欧盟委员会卡特尔起诉的实证评估

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-06-26 DOI: 10.1177/0003603x231180252

C. Veljanovski

引用次数: 0

Louis D. Brandeis and the New Brandeis Movement: Parallels and Differences 路易斯·d·布兰代斯和新布兰代斯运动:相同点和不同点

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-06-22 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231182494

Manuel Wörsdörfer

{"title":"Louis D. Brandeis and the New Brandeis Movement: Parallels and Differences","authors":"Manuel Wörsdörfer","doi":"10.1177/0003603X231182494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X231182494","url":null,"abstract":"The recent antitrust discourse in the U.S. is dominated by references to Brandeis and the New Brandeis movement. While it is laudable that many researchers acknowledge Brandeis’ work and recognize its business-ethical importance, it is also a missed opportunity to refer to him en passant and not investigate his philosophy in more depth. The following sections attempt to fill this gap in the academic literature by critically evaluating—and comparing—Brandeis’ social philosophy with the one of the New Brandeis movement. The research questions of this paper are twofold: First, it analyzes the parallels and differences between Brandeis and neo-Brandeisianism. Second, it addresses the question of which references to his work are valid and legitimate and which ones are not. The paper shows that Brandeis’ work encompasses much more than just competition policy; reducing him to antitrust issues (only) does not do him justice as it ignores significant parts of his social philosophy. The paper also shows that Brandeis was skeptical of big business and big government. In contrast, the new Brandeis movement focuses solely on antibigness in the economy while ignoring Brandeis’ demand(s) in the political sector.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"440 - 459"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48203519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Understanding the Digital Markets Act 理解数字市场法案

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-04-12 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231162998

Friso Bostoen

{"title":"Understanding the Digital Markets Act","authors":"Friso Bostoen","doi":"10.1177/0003603X231162998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X231162998","url":null,"abstract":"In September 2022, the European Union (EU) legislature adopted the Digital Markets Act (DMA)—a landmark piece of regulation with the potential to transform the digital economy in Europe and beyond. Even after adoption, however, questions remain about its stated goals, underlying assumptions, scope, obligations, and eventual effectiveness. This article examines these questions using EU competition law not as a touchstone but as a reference point. First, the DMA’s goals of “fairness” and “contestability” can be more accurately restated as the protection of intra-platform and the promotion of inter-platform competition. Second, the DMA is based on the idea that the enforcement of the abuse of dominance provision, Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), is ineffective both procedurally (due to lengthy investigations and remedial issues) and substantively (due to the difficulty of establishing dominance and abuse)—two assumptions that must be tested by examining competition law’s track record. Third, the scope of the DMA is built around the concept of “gatekeepers,” which are in turn defined based on turnover, market capitalization, and active users. Is this an application of the resurgent “big is bad” ideology or a proxy for market power? Fourth, the DMA imposes a list of dos and don’ts on gatekeepers, many of which are inspired by past or ongoing antitrust investigations. Does this experience justify the far-reaching obligations and if so, are they sufficiently flexible to allow for procompetitive gatekeeper conduct? Finally, the DMA is based on the idea that large online platforms have not continued to deliver the desired innovation outcomes and have reaped more than their fair share of the rewards from the innovation they brought. This assumption is tested by a historical look at Apple’s App Store—the most important innovation platform to arise in the digital economy.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"263 - 306"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47883287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Thirteen Sets of Observations/Recommendations Pertinent to the Revision of the DOJ/FTC (M&A) Guidelines 与司法部/联邦贸易委员会（M&A）指南修订相关的十三组意见/建议

Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-04-10 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X231162997

Richard S. Markovits

{"title":"Thirteen Sets of Observations/Recommendations Pertinent to the Revision of the DOJ/FTC (M&A) Guidelines","authors":"Richard S. Markovits","doi":"10.1177/0003603X231162997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X231162997","url":null,"abstract":"This Article provides recommendations both for improving the accuracy of applications of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act to mergers and acquisitions (M&A)s and for creating morally-desirable (M&A) policies. It defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent and lessening-competition tests of illegality that current U.S. antitrust law applies to (M&A)s; explains why neither classical economic markets nor antitrust markets can be defined non-arbitrarily, and why it is therefore inaccurate and unconstitutional to use market-oriented approaches to analyzing the illegality of (M&A)s under current U.S. antitrust law; outlines appropriate non-market-oriented protocols for determining the illegality of (M&A)s under the Sherman and Clayton Acts—whether the (M or A) was motivated by specific anticompetitive intent or would tend to lessen competition; delineates the liberal conception of justice and various egalitarian conceptions of the moral good and argues that in the U.S. those moral norms should be used to evaluate antitrust policies; outlines the protocol that is economically efficient to use to predict the economic efficiency of particular (M or A)s or particular (M&A) policies; and considers the relevance of the economic efficiency and competitive impact of any (M or A) or any (M&A)-focused antitrust policy for its moral desirability.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"318 - 358"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48031840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0