Danial Asmat, Margaret C. Levenstein, V. Suslow, Z. Wang
{"title":"泳池游泳：三文鱼市场的共谋","authors":"Danial Asmat, Margaret C. Levenstein, V. Suslow, Z. Wang","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221150368","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study the events alleged in recent Norwegian salmon industry antitrust cases to explore the relationship between vertical integration, public price indexes, and collusion. The salmon market provides an intriguing opportunity to study these issues, as there was a vertical merger followed by a reformulation of the methodology by which prices were reported for a new price index. We explore whether the confluence of the merger and the creation of the Nasdaq price index is associated with evidence consistent with collusion. JEL codes: L13, L41, L42, Q22","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"137 - 153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Swimming in Pools: Collusion in the Salmon Market\",\"authors\":\"Danial Asmat, Margaret C. Levenstein, V. Suslow, Z. Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/0003603X221150368\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study the events alleged in recent Norwegian salmon industry antitrust cases to explore the relationship between vertical integration, public price indexes, and collusion. The salmon market provides an intriguing opportunity to study these issues, as there was a vertical merger followed by a reformulation of the methodology by which prices were reported for a new price index. We explore whether the confluence of the merger and the creation of the Nasdaq price index is associated with evidence consistent with collusion. JEL codes: L13, L41, L42, Q22\",\"PeriodicalId\":36832,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Antitrust Bulletin\",\"volume\":\"68 1\",\"pages\":\"137 - 153\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Antitrust Bulletin\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221150368\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Antitrust Bulletin","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221150368","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the events alleged in recent Norwegian salmon industry antitrust cases to explore the relationship between vertical integration, public price indexes, and collusion. The salmon market provides an intriguing opportunity to study these issues, as there was a vertical merger followed by a reformulation of the methodology by which prices were reported for a new price index. We explore whether the confluence of the merger and the creation of the Nasdaq price index is associated with evidence consistent with collusion. JEL codes: L13, L41, L42, Q22
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
