{"title":"消费者对牛肉价格的担忧","authors":"R. Blair","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221149366","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There have been allegations that the dominant meatpackers have conspired to raise beef prices in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. In this article, I examine the market structure and find it to be conducive to collusion, which may be tacit or overt. The article analyzes the allegations of collusion in a partial conspiracy model. The empirical evidence appears to be consistent with the implications of the theory. The article also considers evidentiary problems for the plaintiffs as well as the pursuit of private damages and public sanctions.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"107 - 116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Consumers’ Beef about Beef Prices\",\"authors\":\"R. Blair\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/0003603X221149366\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"There have been allegations that the dominant meatpackers have conspired to raise beef prices in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. In this article, I examine the market structure and find it to be conducive to collusion, which may be tacit or overt. The article analyzes the allegations of collusion in a partial conspiracy model. The empirical evidence appears to be consistent with the implications of the theory. The article also considers evidentiary problems for the plaintiffs as well as the pursuit of private damages and public sanctions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36832,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Antitrust Bulletin\",\"volume\":\"68 1\",\"pages\":\"107 - 116\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Antitrust Bulletin\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221149366\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Antitrust Bulletin","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221149366","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
There have been allegations that the dominant meatpackers have conspired to raise beef prices in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. In this article, I examine the market structure and find it to be conducive to collusion, which may be tacit or overt. The article analyzes the allegations of collusion in a partial conspiracy model. The empirical evidence appears to be consistent with the implications of the theory. The article also considers evidentiary problems for the plaintiffs as well as the pursuit of private damages and public sanctions.