Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso最新文献

{"title":"Devenires comunistas","authors":"Sergio Fiedler","doi":"10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp411-432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp411-432","url":null,"abstract":"A más de 30 años de la caída del bloque soviético y como resultado de las crisis sociales y políticas que han ocurrido en diferentes lugares del mundo en años recientes, han resurgido con fuerza debates académicos y políticos acerca del significado del concepto del comunismo. El presente artículo busca contribuir teóricamente a esta discusión destacando diferentes devenires dentro de los cuales el comunismo puede ser entendido en la actualidad. Entre estos se cuenta la importancia performática de la palabra “comunismo” en términos simbólicos y políticos; el comunismo como procesos que antecede y modula el desarrollo del capitalismo; el comunismo como espectro y multiplicidad; así como su relación con nuevas formas de explotación capitalista y subjetividad política.","PeriodicalId":36808,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44852082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hatred and Anger: A Conceptual Analysis and Practical Effects. A tribute to Jonathan Haidt","authors":"G. Lariguet","doi":"10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp107-123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp107-123","url":null,"abstract":"This work intends to study the status of some emotions in a practical environment. I shall focus specifically on two: anger and hatred. My first objective will be to show that the distinction between the two is not as simple as might appear at first sight. This is because, as I will show, anger and hatred appear to be neighboring emotions. It is therefore necessary to analyze them conceptually to pull aside the veils of appearance and thus identify their relevant differences. My second objective is to show that the conceptual distinction I seek is not in pursuit of a merely analytical interest. I shall claim that the conceptual differences here have a practical impact, especially in the political environment, because anger and hatred should be dealt with differently in the realm of democracies.","PeriodicalId":36808,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42186001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Forward, for “Connections Between Ethics and Moral Psychology. Studies Around the Work of Jonathan Haidt”","authors":"J. Haidt","doi":"10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp13-14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp13-14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36808,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42646956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Nudges y psicología de colmena: empujoncitos a la felicidad comunal","authors":"Daniel Loewe","doi":"10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp125-162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp125-162","url":null,"abstract":"El artículo analiza y critica el uso político de la psicología de colmena propuesto por Jonathan Haidt que recurre a los “empujoncitos” del paternalismo libertario. El artículo presenta el paternalismo y discute la teoría de los empujoncitos, y en base base a esa discusión examina el uso político de la psicología de la colmena y sostiene que (i) los empujoncitos no respetan a las personas como seres autónomos, y (ii) las políticas de la colmena son peligrosas. En su lugar, bien valdría asumir una perspectiva cosmopolita.","PeriodicalId":36808,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48206385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"La simpatía indolente: una explicación desde la perspectiva de Haidt","authors":"José Oliverio Tovar-Bohórquez","doi":"10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp203-219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp203-219","url":null,"abstract":"En este trabajo me valgo de la teoría de Jonathan Haidt para explorar una disposición afectiva a la que llamo “simpatía indolente”. Argumento que esta disposición impide que un grupo considerable de seres humanos se solidarice con los millones de personas que se encuentran en condición de pobreza o extrema pobreza. Para demostrarlo, presentaré primero dos casos disímiles que muestran el tipo de disposición afectiva que deseo someter a consideración del lector. En segundo lugar, discutiré las principales características de esta disposición afectiva. En tercer lugar, expondré el modelo intuicionista social, destacando los aspectos que me ayudarán a dar cuenta de la simpatía indolente. Por último, leeré la simpatía indolente a la luz de la teoría de Haidt y explicaré una de sus características más importantes: la brutalidad.","PeriodicalId":36808,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48344702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Emotional Dog Was a Glauconian Canine: The Reception of the Social Intuitionist Model, From the Neurocentric Paradigm to the Digital Paradigm","authors":"Pedro Jesús Pérez Zafrilla","doi":"10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp63-83","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp63-83","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I analyze the academic reception of Jonathan Haidt’s seminal article The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. My thesis is that in the spheres of philosophy and psychology, this article was initially studied within the neurocentric paradigm, which dominated the field of scientific reflection in the fifteen years following its publication. This neurocentric reading established a specific interpretation of the text with several limitations. However, more recently a digital paradigm has emerged and come to prevail in academia, providing a new perspective from which to return to Haidt’s text. Indeed, this approach makes it possible to unravel elements of the famous article that in the neurocentric paradigm went unnoticed by researchers. Moreover, the digital paradigm manages to better integrate Haidt’s seminal article into his later work as a whole.","PeriodicalId":36808,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48855272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Under- and Overspecification in Moral Foundation Theory. The Problematic Search for a Moderate Version of Innatism","authors":"Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich","doi":"10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp163-179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp163-179","url":null,"abstract":"Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundation Theory has been criticized on many fronts, mainly on account of its lack of evidence concerning the genetic and neurological bases of the evolved moral intuitions that the theory posits. Despite the fact that Haidt’s theory is probably the most promising framework from which to integrate the different lines of interdisciplinary research that deal with the evolutionary foundations of moral psychology, i) it also shows a critical underspecification concerning the precise mental processes that instantiate the triggering of our evolved moral intuitions, and that ii) that underspecification coexists with and overspecification of the structure of human nature when it comes to exploring alternatives to capitalist societies.","PeriodicalId":36808,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42046895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Far from Heart, Far from Eyes: Empathy, Personal Identity, and Moral Recognition","authors":"María del Mar Cabezas Hernández","doi":"10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp221-243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp221-243","url":null,"abstract":"Do we empathize with the others because first we have recognized them as somehow equals, or do we recognize them as equals because first we have empathized with them? This article explores the relation between affective empathy, the moral recognition of the others, and personal identity. I defend that, to recognize others as valuable and act in line with this, one must be able to feel affective empathy for their situation, and, to do so, one has to 1) be curious about them to surpass indifference, and 2) feel that your identity is not threatened by recognizing the others. Otherwise, rationalizations and justifications of antisocial behaviors would arise. Thus, I focus on how the construction of the self plays a key role in prosocial behaviors and the activation of affective empathy, which has been overlooked by moral philosophy in the debate on empathy.  In order to do so, firstly, I explore cases where moral recognition is broken, secondly, I explore the dichotomic debate on the role of empathy for moral recognition and moral agency, and, thirdly, I try to enrich the debate by shifting the focus to the prerequisites to feel empathy, such as curiosity, a well-integrated self and healthy narcissism, addressing so how the construction of the self plays a key role in the possibility of empathizing with others and, therefore, in epistemic virtues and moral agency. As a result, I advocate the importance of psychological education for moral agency. ","PeriodicalId":36808,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49393969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Intuition, Reason, and Responsibility","authors":"Stephen A. Setman","doi":"10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp85-106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp85-106","url":null,"abstract":"According to one highly influential approach to moral responsibility, human beings are responsible (eligible to be praised or blamed) for what they do because they are responsive to reasons (Fischer & Ravizza 1998). However, this amounts to a descriptive assumption about human beings that may not be borne out by the empirical research. According to a recent trend in moral psychology (Haidt 2001), most human judgment is caused by fast, nonconscious, and intuitive processes, rather than explicit, conscious deliberation about one’s reasons. And when humans do engage in explicit deliberation, it primarily serves to provide post hoc rationalization of their intuitive judgments (confabulation). If this is correct, it is tempting to conclude that most of our judgments—and the actions we perform on their basis—are not genuine responses to reasons. The reasons-responsiveness approach would thus appear to be committed to the implausible conclusion that we are not responsible for very much after all, including, most problematically, our implicit biases. I argue that the reasons-responsiveness approach can avoid this conclusion by showing three things: (1) that affective and intuitive processes can be reasons-responsive; (2) that the responsiveness of those processes can be bolstered by the agent’s environment; and (3) that practices like blame are one of the key ways in which human beings are attuned to reasons over time. I argue that the first and second of these items, despite their initial plausibility, are insufficient on their own to explain why humans can be held accountable for things like implicit biases, and that the way forward is to appreciate what holding each other accountable does—i.e., its effects.","PeriodicalId":36808,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45468755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cognición moral y cognición psicológica: las intuiciones vienen primero","authors":"C. Scotto","doi":"10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp15-42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp15-42","url":null,"abstract":"La comprensión psicológica es una capacidad requerida para la competencia moral en el sentido en que entender las intenciones, creencias e intereses de otros es un input crítico para evaluar las responsabilidades involucradas en sus comportamientos y comprender, a su vez, cómo interactuar con ellos para alcanzar nuestros propósitos. Por su parte, la interacción con otros está en el corazón de ambas capacidades, dado que una y otra son componentes esenciales y estrechamente relacionados de la vida social humana. Mi objetivo en este trabajo, en relación con ambos supuestos, será poner de relieve una semejanza estructural entre la cognición psicológica y la cognición moral ordinarias, mostrando cómo ciertos tipos diferenciados de explicaciones en uno y otro dominio, permiten identificar un marco teórico consistente que, a su turno, puede dar cuenta de las relaciones entre ambas. Para ello, me referiré en primer lugar, sintéticamente, al Modelo Intuicionista Social (MIS) de J. Haidt (2001), en tanto ejemplifica un enfoque no clásico y dual de la cognición moral en el cual las intuiciones morales desempeñan un papel más básico que las razones. En el ámbito de la cognición psicológica, me referiré con más detenimiento al enfoque interactivo o de segunda persona, enriquecido por el enfoque dual de la cognición, en particular, por las propuestas sobre variedades implícitas o “mínimas” de atribución mental. En ese contexto, identificaré los llamados comportamientos expresivos: su naturaleza y su papel en la conducta y las interacciones humanas y su importancia como base evidencial de la comprensión mental. Ellos constituyen los objetos primarios de las intuiciones psicológicas. Espero mostrar que las señales expresivas son “legibles” por medio de las capacidades intuitivas que las detectan y comprenden su significación psicológica de maneras eficientes. Una vez expuestas las afinidades teóricas entre el MIS y el enfoque interactivo-dual, pondré de relieve que, así como para el primero, las intuiciones morales vienen primero y las razones después, también para el enfoque interactivo-dual de la comprensión psicológica, las intuiciones psicológicas vienen primero y las razones después.","PeriodicalId":36808,"journal":{"name":"Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42503753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}