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The Australasian Journal of Logic最新文献

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Richard Routley, "Semantic Analysis of Entailment and Relevant Implication: I" Richard Routley:《蕴涵与相关蕴涵的语义分析:I》
The Australasian Journal of Logic Pub Date : 2018-07-04 DOI: 10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4862
Nicholas Ferenz
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引用次数: 3
Two Manuscripts, One by Routley, One by Meyer: The Origins of the Routley-Meyer Semantics for Relevance Logics 两个手稿，一个由Routley，一个由Meyer:关联逻辑的Routley-Meyer语义的起源
The Australasian Journal of Logic Pub Date : 2018-07-04 DOI: 10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4066
K. Bimbó, J. Dunn, Nicholas Ferenz
{"title":"Two Manuscripts, One by Routley, One by Meyer: The Origins of the Routley-Meyer Semantics for Relevance Logics","authors":"K. Bimbó, J. Dunn, Nicholas Ferenz","doi":"10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4066","url":null,"abstract":"A ternary relation is often used nowadays to interpret an implication connective of a logic, a practice that became dominant in the semantics of relevance logics.  This paper examines two early manuscripts --- one by Routley, another by Meyer --- in which they were developing set-theoretic semantics for various relevance logics.  A standard presentation of a ternary relational semantics for, let us say, the logic of relevant implication R is quite illuminating, yet the invention of this semantics was fraught with false starts.  Meyer's manuscript, in which he builds on some ideas from Routley's manuscript, essentially contains a relational semantics for which R^{ot} is sound and complete.","PeriodicalId":367849,"journal":{"name":"The Australasian Journal of Logic","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132657809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Relevant Logics Obeying Component Homogeneity 相关逻辑服从组件同质性
The Australasian Journal of Logic Pub Date : 2018-07-04 DOI: 10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4864
R. Ciuni, D. Szmuc, T. M. Ferguson
{"title":"Relevant Logics Obeying Component Homogeneity","authors":"R. Ciuni, D. Szmuc, T. M. Ferguson","doi":"10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4864","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses three relevant logics (S*fde , dS*fde , crossS*fde) that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde , dS*fde , crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent calculi for S*fde , dS*fde , crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define (a given family of) containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde , dS*fde , crossS*fde and the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde  as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues.","PeriodicalId":367849,"journal":{"name":"The Australasian Journal of Logic","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125112495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Starting the Dismantling of Classical Mathematics 开始拆解古典数学
The Australasian Journal of Logic Pub Date : 2018-07-04 DOI: 10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4863
R. Brady
{"title":"Starting the Dismantling of Classical Mathematics","authors":"R. Brady","doi":"10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4863","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses the relevant logic, MCQ, of meaning containment to explore mathematics without various classical theses, in particular, without the law of excluded middle.","PeriodicalId":367849,"journal":{"name":"The Australasian Journal of Logic","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121380922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sylvan's Bottle and other Problems 塞尔万的瓶子和其他问题
The Australasian Journal of Logic Pub Date : 2018-07-03 DOI: 10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4858
D. Proudfoot
{"title":"Sylvan's Bottle and other Problems","authors":"D. Proudfoot","doi":"10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4858","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000According to Richard Routley, a comprehensive theory of fiction is impossible, since almost anything is in principle imaginable. In my view, Routley is right: for any purported logic of fiction, there will be actual or imaginable fictions that successfully counterexample the logic. Using the example of ‘impossible’ fictions, I test this claim against theories proposed by Routley’s Meinongian contemporaries and also by Routley himself (for what he called ‘esoteric’ works of fiction) and his 21st century heirs. I argue that the phenomenon of impossible fictions challenges even today’s modal Meinongians. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":367849,"journal":{"name":"The Australasian Journal of Logic","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133799362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Ontological Syncretistic Noneism 本体论的综合论
The Australasian Journal of Logic Pub Date : 2018-07-03 DOI: 10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4067
A. Voltolini
{"title":"Ontological Syncretistic Noneism","authors":"A. Voltolini","doi":"10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4067","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism (as developed in both Routley 1980 and Priest 20162) and Crane’s (2013) psychological reductionism are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished from Quinean allism in terms of the different scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only particular/existential quantifier that there is ranges. This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of first-order related notions.","PeriodicalId":367849,"journal":{"name":"The Australasian Journal of Logic","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115459614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Paraconsistency and its Philosophical Interpretations 超一致性及其哲学解释
The Australasian Journal of Logic Pub Date : 2018-07-03 DOI: 10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4860
E. Barrio, B. Ré
{"title":"Paraconsistency and its Philosophical Interpretations","authors":"E. Barrio, B. Ré","doi":"10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4860","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000Many authors have considered that the notions of paraconsistency and dialetheism are intrinsically connected, in many cases, to the extent of confusing both phenomena. However, paraconsistency is a formal feature of some logics that consists in invalidating the rule of explosion, whereas dialetheism is a semantical/ontological position consisting in accepting true contradictions. In this paper, we argue against this connection and show that it is perfectly possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and reject dialetheism, and, moreover, that there are examples of non-paraconsistent logics that can be interpreted in a dialetheic way. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":367849,"journal":{"name":"The Australasian Journal of Logic","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127112001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Bi-Modal Naive Set Theory 双峰朴素集合论
The Australasian Journal of Logic Pub Date : 2018-07-03 DOI: 10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4859
J. Wigglesworth
{"title":"Bi-Modal Naive Set Theory","authors":"J. Wigglesworth","doi":"10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4859","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes a modal conception of sets, according to which sets are 'potential' with respect to their members.  A modal theory is developed, which invokes a naive comprehension axiom schema, modified by adding `forward looking' and `backward looking' modal operators.  We show that this `bi-modal' naive set theory can prove modalized interpretations of several ZFC axioms, including the axiom of infinity.  We also show that the theory is consistent by providing an S5 Kripke model.  The paper concludes with some discussion of the nature of the modalities involved, drawing comparisons with noneism, the view that there are some non-existent objects.","PeriodicalId":367849,"journal":{"name":"The Australasian Journal of Logic","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129679020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
(In Some Fictions) Everything is True (在一些小说中)一切都是真的
The Australasian Journal of Logic Pub Date : 2018-07-03 DOI: 10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4856
Luis Estrada González
{"title":"(In Some Fictions) Everything is True","authors":"Luis Estrada González","doi":"10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v15i2.4856","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000I defend the idea that there are universal fictions, and that the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner way of generating them – namely, with a story including deliberately and explicitly the proposition Everything is true – is still the best one. I reconstruct Wildman and Folde’s Finean criticisms to universal fictions a la Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner based on the idea that the universal quantifier in such fictions may not target the intended range of quantification, that is, all propositions. I show that Wildman and Folde’s argument does not succeed, for they fail to show that every universal sentence has to be understood as involving a restricted quantifier. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":367849,"journal":{"name":"The Australasian Journal of Logic","volume":"173 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122494976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Sosein as Subject Matter Sosein作为主题
The Australasian Journal of Logic Pub Date : 2018-07-03 DOI: 10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4857
Matteo Plebani
{"title":"Sosein as Subject Matter","authors":"Matteo Plebani","doi":"10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26686/AJL.V15I2.4857","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000(Neo)Meinongians in general, and Routley in particular, subscribe to the principle of the independence of Sosein from Sein (Routley 1980). In this paper, I put forward an interpretation of the independence principle that philosophers working outside the Meinongian tradition can accept. Drawing on recent work by Stephen Yablo and others on the notion of subject matter, I offer a new account of the notion of Sosein (Being-so) as a subject matter (or topic) and argue that in some cases Sosein might be independent from Sein (Being, Existence). The question whether numbers exist, for instance, is not part of the question of how numbers are, which is the topic mathematicians are interested in. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":367849,"journal":{"name":"The Australasian Journal of Logic","volume":"63 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116026060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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