Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14最新文献

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 Pub Date : 2019-07-01 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0004

G. Fletcher

{"title":"Taking Prudence Seriously","authors":"G. Fletcher","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. Yet little time has been spent on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation. Chapter 4 takes up two major meta-prudential questions. It first examines whether there is a set of prudential reasons, generated by evaluative prudential properties, and defends the view that evaluative well-being facts generate agent-relative reasons (for action or for attitudes) for the relevant agent. It also investigates whether prudential discourse is normative. It is proposed that prudential discourse is normative by arguing that prudential judgements are normative judgements. The case for this is presented by analogy with moral discourse by showing that the features of moral judgements that metaethicists appeal to when articulating, explaining, and justifying the claim that moral judgements are normative are also possessed by prudential judgements. Various objections to the analogy are also considered.","PeriodicalId":364795,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128900122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Infinitism about Cross-Domain Conflict 跨领域冲突的无限性

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 Pub Date : 2019-06-13 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0007

David Killoren

引用次数: 1

Internalism and Prudential Value 内部主义与审慎价值

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 Pub Date : 2019-06-13 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0005

J. Hawkins

{"title":"Internalism and Prudential Value","authors":"J. Hawkins","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Existence internalism claims that facts about human psychological responsiveness constrain the metaphysics of value in particular ways. Chapter 5 examines whether some form of existence internalism holds for prudential value (as opposed to moral or aesthetic value). It emphasizes the importance of a modal distinction that has been traditionally overlooked. Some facts about personal good are facts about realized good. For example, right now it may be true that X is good for me. Other facts about goodness are facts about what would be good for me in certain possible futures. These are facts about merely possible good. Philosophers should be internalists about realized good. The chapter defends a qualified version of the idea that a necessary constraint on something’s being good for a person at a time is that the thing in question elicits some kind of positive psychological response from the person at that time. However, philosophers should be motivational externalists about merely possible good. Facts about the superior future goodness of an option may ground reasons now to choose it. But we should not expect individuals to always recognize such facts, and so there is no reason to think such facts are always motivating.","PeriodicalId":364795,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129698040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Desiring under the Proper Guise 正当伪装下的欲望

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 Pub Date : 2019-06-13 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0006

Michael Milona, M. Schroeder

引用次数: 11

How Principles Ground 原则是如何建立起来的

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 Pub Date : 2019-06-13 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0001

D. Enoch

引用次数: 14

Reason without Reasons For 没有理由的理由

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 Pub Date : 2019-06-13 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0009

Michael G. Titelbaum

引用次数: 3

We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It, Too 我们可以承担责任，也可以传递责任

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 Pub Date : 2019-06-13 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0008

Z. J. King

{"title":"We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It, Too","authors":"Z. J. King","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198841449.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 8 argues against the view that the moral rightness of an act is not a reason to perform it, and our reasons are instead the features that make the act right. Philosophers typically defend this view by noting that it seems redundant to take rightness to be an additional reason, once it has been acknowledged that the right-making features are already reasons. The author shows that this argument dramatically overgeneralizes, ruling out all cases in which two or more reasons are arranged in relationships of metaphysical constitution. She then proposes an alternative way of thinking about these metaphysical hierarchies: Rather than assuming that at most one of the facts in each hierarchy is the “real” reason, bearing all the normative weight, it should be accepted that these facts can all be genuine reasons, whose normative weight is shared in virtue of the metaphysical relationships between them. Some tests are offered that can be used to determine which facts occur in metaphysical hierarchies with shared weight, and it is argued that the fact that an act is morally right passes the tests. The author then explains what she takes to be some kernels of truth underlying the redundancy argument, arguing that these phenomena are pragmatic, not metaphysical.","PeriodicalId":364795,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116808150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 16

The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement 来自分歧的自我破坏的论点

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 Pub Date : 2019-06-13 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0002

E. Sampson

{"title":"The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement","authors":"E. Sampson","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Arguments from disagreement against moral realism begin by calling attention to (or supposing) widespread, fundamental moral disagreement among a certain group of people (e.g., the folk, moral philosophers, idealized agents). Then, some skeptical or anti-realist-friendly conclusion is drawn. Chapter 2 proposes that arguments from disagreement share a structure that makes them vulnerable to a single, powerful objection: they self-undermine. For each formulation of the argument from disagreement, at least one of its premises casts doubt either on itself or on one of the other premises. On reflection, this shouldn’t be surprising. These arguments are intended to support very strong metaphysical or epistemological conclusions about morality (e.g., that there are no moral facts, that none of our moral beliefs are justified). They must therefore employ very strong metaphysical or epistemological premises. But, given the pervasiveness of disagreement in philosophy, especially about metaphysics and epistemology, very strong premises are virtually certain to be the subject of widespread, intractable disagreement—precisely the sort of disagreement that proponents of these arguments think undermine moral claims. Thus, these arguments undermine their own premises. If Chapter 2’s argument is sound, it provides realists with a single, unified strategy for responding to any existing or forthcoming arguments from disagreement.","PeriodicalId":364795,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128227154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Contextualism, Moral Disagreement, and Proposition Clouds 语境主义、道德分歧与命题云

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0003

Jussi Suikkanen

{"title":"Contextualism, Moral Disagreement, and Proposition Clouds","authors":"Jussi Suikkanen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"According to contextualist theories in metaethics, when a moral term is used in a context, the context plays an ineliminable part in determining what natural property will be the semantic value of the term. Furthermore, on subjectivist and relativist versions of these views, it is either the speaker’s own moral code or her moral community’s moral code that constitutes the reference-fixing context. One standard objection to views of this type is that they fail to enable disagreement in ordinary conversations. Chapter 3 develops a new response to this objection on the basis of Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies’s notion of proposition clouds. It is argued that, because we live in a multicultural society, the conversational contexts we face will fail to disambiguate between all the things we could mean. This is why we can at best put into play proposition clouds when we make moral utterances. All the propositions in such clouds are then available for rejection and acceptance on behalf of our audiences. The norms of conversation then guide us to make informative contributions to the conversation—accept and reject propositions in a way that leads to coordination of action and choice.","PeriodicalId":364795,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114988708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Fundamentality of Fit 健康的基本原则

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14 Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0010

Christopher Howard

引用次数: 45