{"title":"健康的基本原则","authors":"Christopher Howard","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0010","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Many authors, including Derek Parfit, T. M. Scanlon, and Mark Schroeder, favor a “reasons-first” ontology of normativity, which treats reasons as normatively fundamental. Others, most famously G. E. Moore, favor a “value-first” ontology, which treats value or goodness as normatively fundamental. Chapter 10 argues that both the reasons-first and value-first ontologies should be rejected because neither can account for all of the normative reasons that, intuitively, there are. It advances an ontology of normativity, originally suggested by Franz Brentano and A. C. Ewing, according to which fittingness is normatively fundamental. The normative relation of fittingness is the relation in which a response stands to an object when the object merits—or is worthy of—that response. The author argues that his “fittingness-first” ontology is no less parsimonious than either the reasons- or the value-first ontology, but it can plausibly accommodate the existence of all the normative reasons there are. It therefore provides a superior ontology of normativity.","PeriodicalId":364795,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"45","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Fundamentality of Fit\",\"authors\":\"Christopher Howard\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0010\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Many authors, including Derek Parfit, T. M. Scanlon, and Mark Schroeder, favor a “reasons-first” ontology of normativity, which treats reasons as normatively fundamental. Others, most famously G. E. Moore, favor a “value-first” ontology, which treats value or goodness as normatively fundamental. Chapter 10 argues that both the reasons-first and value-first ontologies should be rejected because neither can account for all of the normative reasons that, intuitively, there are. It advances an ontology of normativity, originally suggested by Franz Brentano and A. C. Ewing, according to which fittingness is normatively fundamental. The normative relation of fittingness is the relation in which a response stands to an object when the object merits—or is worthy of—that response. The author argues that his “fittingness-first” ontology is no less parsimonious than either the reasons- or the value-first ontology, but it can plausibly accommodate the existence of all the normative reasons there are. It therefore provides a superior ontology of normativity.\",\"PeriodicalId\":364795,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"45\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0010\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198841449.003.0010","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 45
摘要
包括Derek Parfit, T. M. Scanlon和Mark Schroeder在内的许多作者都赞成“理性优先”的规范性本体论,认为理性是规范性的基础。其他人,最著名的是摩尔,赞成“价值优先”的本体论,将价值或善良视为规范的基础。第10章认为,理由优先和价值优先的本体论都应该被拒绝,因为它们都不能解释直觉上存在的所有规范性原因。它提出了一种规范性本体论,最初是由弗朗茨·布伦塔诺和a·c·尤因提出的,根据这种本体论,适宜性是规范性的基础。适合性的规范性关系是当一个对象做出或配得上这个反应时,这个反应就会对这个对象产生的关系。作者认为,他的“适宜性优先”本体论并不比理由或价值优先本体论更吝啬,但它似乎可以容纳所有规范性原因的存在。因此,它提供了一种优越的规范性本体论。
Many authors, including Derek Parfit, T. M. Scanlon, and Mark Schroeder, favor a “reasons-first” ontology of normativity, which treats reasons as normatively fundamental. Others, most famously G. E. Moore, favor a “value-first” ontology, which treats value or goodness as normatively fundamental. Chapter 10 argues that both the reasons-first and value-first ontologies should be rejected because neither can account for all of the normative reasons that, intuitively, there are. It advances an ontology of normativity, originally suggested by Franz Brentano and A. C. Ewing, according to which fittingness is normatively fundamental. The normative relation of fittingness is the relation in which a response stands to an object when the object merits—or is worthy of—that response. The author argues that his “fittingness-first” ontology is no less parsimonious than either the reasons- or the value-first ontology, but it can plausibly accommodate the existence of all the normative reasons there are. It therefore provides a superior ontology of normativity.