Open Philosophy最新文献_第4页

How does one Cosmotheoretically Respond to the Heat Death of the Universe? 一个人如何从宇宙学上回应宇宙的热寂?

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0233

Joel R. White

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Signifying Nothing: Nihilism, Information, and Signs 无意义：虚无主义、信息和符号

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0239

Ashley Woodward

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Stanley Cavell on the “Disgusting Child”: Ordinary Aesthetics and the Mental Health Crisis in Schools 斯坦利·卡维尔论“恶心的孩子”:普通美学与学校心理健康危机

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0243

Jeffery M. Frank

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G. Deleuze’s Untimely [non-]: The Inverter of Platonic Nihilism to Ethics of Creation G.德勒兹的不合时宜

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0232

Konstantinos Nevrokoplis

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Jeremy Bentham on David Hume: “Having Enter’d into Metaphysics,” but “Having Lost His Way” 杰里米·边沁评大卫·休谟:“进入了形而上学”，但“迷失了方向”

Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0262

Yanxiang Zhang

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引用次数: 0

Whither Rough Ground? On the “Ordinary” of Ordinary Aesthetics 哪里是粗糙的地面?论普通美学的“普通”

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0254

Edward Guetti

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引用次数: 0

An Ontologically Nihilist Critique of Graham Harman’s Ontological Liberalism 本体论虚无主义者对哈曼本体论自由主义的批判

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0231

A. Lovasz

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引用次数: 0

The Uncanniness of the Ordinary: Aesthetic Implications of Stanley Cavell’s Rethinking of Das Unheimliche 平凡的不平凡——斯坦利·卡维尔对《Unheimliche》再思考的美学意蕴

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0252

Lorenzo Gineprini

{"title":"The Uncanniness of the Ordinary: Aesthetic Implications of Stanley Cavell’s Rethinking of Das Unheimliche","authors":"Lorenzo Gineprini","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0252","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Through the many reinterpretations of Freud’s essay Das Unheimliche (1919) within French Postmodernism, in recent decades, the uncanny has become a vague synonym for the methodology of deconstruction. The article aims to disambiguate the uncanny by reestablishing its characterizing nucleus and relocating it within the aesthetics through the philosophy of Stanley Cavell. The American philosopher claims that this feeling can be generated by drawing attention to the ordinary, which is so close and familiar to fade out of focus. Cavell and the German Philosopher Juliane Rebentisch following him show that artistic practices can reinforce this experience, as through displacements and dislocations, they deprive objects of daily use and ordinary matters of their familiarity and force us to look more closely at their material, sensorial, and phenomenological dimensions. In this way, Cavell and Rebentisch offer a path to reconstitute a stable conceptual framework for defining the uncanny, linking it to Freud’s definition of something familiar appearing in an unfamiliar light. At the same time, they also propose a novelty by interpreting the uncanny not as inherently frightening and disturbing but as a compelling affective state that encourages a willingness to reappropriate and rediscover the ordinary.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42770074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Eternal Return Hermeneutics in Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida 永恒回归:尼采、海德格尔和德里达的诠释学

Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0267

Lee Braver

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The Poetry of Ordinary Language 《日常语言的诗

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0244

Patricia Verge

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