Open Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"The Mythical Absolute: The Fiction of Being","authors":"G. S. Moss","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0217","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The concept of “conceptual personae” is a contradiction in terms. On one sense of the term, personae are the characters in a work of art, such as a play or a novel. As characters, they are not common terms – King Lear is a particular; he is not a universal, for he cannot be shared in common. However, concepts are quite unlike King Lear. As universals, they are common terms that can be shared in common. “Conceptual personae” renders the particular universal and thereby declares the universal not to be universal. However, I argue that as long as philosophers maintain a traditional attitude toward conceptual truth, philosophers will not be able to successfully think the structure of being without appealing to the mythical imagination, of which conceptual personae form an essential constituent.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"606 - 621"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43485375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taking TV Series Seriously","authors":"S. Laugier","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0198","url":null,"abstract":"TV series are gaining increasing attention in current research. However, their aesthetic potential for visualizing ethical issues and both forming and facilitating collective inquiry into democratic values has not yet been fully appreciated. Because of their format (weekly/seasonal regularity, home viewing) and the participatory qualities of Internet usage (tweeting, chat forums), series allow for a new form of education by expressing complex issues through narrative and characters. This education is both political and moral. This topical issue elucidates the power, diversity, and richness of TV series and their moral and political purpose. TV series provide common reference points, which populate ordinary conversations and political debates. They become shared representations of moral reasoning and feelings. They arouse ethical reflection in their viewers – in the spirit of philosophy. Taking TV series seriously means investigating the intentions of media creators, reconsidering the public’s capabilities, and exploring how TV series structure our understanding of the world and our experiences of it. It seems that we have not yet taken the measure of the role that TV series play, and can play, in educating and constituting “publics,” in transmitting and sharing values, in creating awareness of terrorist or environmental threats, and in social inclusion and the integration of diversity in terms of gender, race, and sexuality. It is clear that the global distribution of US series (from ER, 1994–2007, to Game of Thrones, 2010–2018), as well as an increasing number of mainstream series produced in the EU (The Bureau, 2015–2020, Money Heist, 2017–2021) and in Asian countries (Delhi Crime, 2019, Squid Game, 2021) – to mention only the most spectacular ones – has made it possible to draw attention to a number of important social, political, racial, health, and security issues. An increasing number of scholars in philosophy, history, media studies, sociology, and political science are therefore taking an interest in TV series. Yet, TV series often remain marginal to their main research agenda: used as simple illustrations, they are not seen as serious objects of analysis. As of today, the existing research on TV series has focused on their modes of production, formal features, or reception – always separately. Most publications on TV series and philosophy take them as an opportunity to illustrate existing philosophical theses, debates, or ideas. The ambition of the present issue is to demonstrate the intellectual and philosophical ambition of TV series themselves, as works of art. Over the past fifty years, the relationship between cinema and philosophy has been explored by key scholars.1 It has evolved into acknowledging film as philosophy rather than seeing film as an “object” for philosophy;2 into analyzing film as sustaining an immanent ethics, thus following Cavell and his characterization of moral perfectionism through Hollywood film.3 TV series, w","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"250 - 253"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46366463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reason, Its Real Use, and the Status of Its Ideas and Principles: Response to Caimi, Gava, and Lewin","authors":"Marcus Willaschek","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0221","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this contribution, I respond to articles published in a Topical Issue of Open Philosophy on Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic by Mario Caimi, Gabriele Gava, and Michael Lewin, who criticize some of the views I put forward in my book Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The Dialectic of Pure Reason (Cambridge University Press, 2018). In particular, I discuss the “real use” of reason (in response to Caimi), the “regulative use” of principles and ideas of reason (in response to Gava), and Kant’s conception of reason (in response to Lewin).","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"689 - 698"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42452079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"“It’s Time for a Rent Strike”: COVID-19 Rent Strikes and the Absence of State Care","authors":"R. Valentine","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0219","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract COVID-19 unemployed millions of Americans, many of whom already lacked the financial ability to withstand an economic crisis. Mid-quarantine, politicians began to grapple on what protections for renters would stay in place as the assistance bills came to an end. The COVID-19 rent crisis raised significant moral questions to the American populace – namely, that of the State’s responsibility to care for its citizens. This article examines rent strikes in the context of care ethics. Care ethics contends that our actions have moral weight. What we do matters. Rent strikes sit at the intersection of political practice and care ethics. This article contends that rent strikes provided care when the State did not, and that this lack of care highlights the need for solidarity.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"636 - 649"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49317967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Where Do All These Ideas Come From? Kant on the Formation of Concepts Under the Guidance of Pure Reason","authors":"S. Klingner","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0215","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is not just rationalist metaphysics, but also Kant’s transcendental philosophy that is teeming with a priori concepts. According to Kant, some of these a priori concepts are “ideas,” and similar to the categories, some of these ideas in turn belong to the nature of human reason, while others can be derived from them. It is therefore part of Kant’s claim in the “Transcendental Dialectic” to be able to explain not only the leading ideas of rational psychology, cosmology, and theology as natural concepts of reason, but the origin of the entire a priori vocabulary of the metaphysica specialis as well. This article outlines how Kant’s derivations of these concepts work. After explaining Kant’s classification of a priori concepts and the derivation of the transcendental ideas, his derivations are explored in more detail using the example of the concepts of the pure doctrine of the soul. This contributes to a better understanding of Kant’s theory of philosophical concepts while also shedding light on the rather rarely treated topic of the “Transcendental Dialectic.”","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"510 - 531"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45736507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introduction to the Topical Issue “Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic: A Re-Evaluation”","authors":"M. Lewin, R. Meer","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0229","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"758 - 759"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42053656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Divergences and Convergences of Perspective: Amerindian Perspectivism, Phenomenology, and Speculative Realism","authors":"Ignas Šatkauskas","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0199","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Viveiros de Castro, comparison as ontology defines the ontological turn in anthropology. It presents a necessity for philosophy to approach the matter with comparative strategy. Morten Pedersen claims that ontological turn should be interpreted as a fulfillment of an anthropological version of Husserl’s method. Thus, phenomenology enters the field of interest along with its critique in Speculative Realism. In this article, we will see clearly why this selection is not accidental but rather unavoidable. Amerindian perspectivism necessitates the philosophical reconceptualization of perspective in general, which is to be taken as a challenge for the established discourses. The need arises to rethink the problematic of Kantian perspectivism and its offspring. Amerindian perspectivism proposes cosmological deictics that hold a spatiality of the perspective of the other, of the in-itself, thus it comes into an opposition to Kant’s system. Phenomenological perspective, as one of the Kantian offspring, faces a predicament that is interwoven with the critique of correlationism arriving from Speculative Realisms. The synthetic character of phenomenology allows enough flexibility for it to traverse these recent charges. We will draw a comparative picture of dynamic co-evolution of strains of recent thought, striving for a synthetic multiplicity, permeated by a common perspectival thread.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"308 - 329"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49483227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Bureau and the Realism of Spy Fiction","authors":"Pauline Blistène","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2020-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article addresses the issue of realism in relationship to contemporary serial fiction. Drawing on The Bureau (Canal+, 2015–2020), it argues that spy TV series are “realistic” not because they correspond to reality but because of their impact on reality. It begins by giving an overview of the many ways in which “realism,” in the ordinary sense of a resemblance with reality, served as the working framework for The Bureau’s team. It then identifies three distinct types of realisms in the series. The first is a “fictional realism,” namely the ability of The Bureau to conform to the aesthetic and narrative conventions of realistic fictions. The second type of realism, which I qualify as “ordinary,” refers to the possibilities offered by the show’s aesthetics and the enmeshment of The Bureau with viewers’ ordinary experience. The third type of “performative realism” refers to the series’ impact on shared representations and reality. By providing a common language about the secret activities of the state, The Bureau has gone from being a framed version of reality to being one of the defining frameworks through which state secrecy is experienced both individually and collectively, by insiders and the public at large.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"231 - 249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47530652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Adversarial Democracy and the Flattening of Choice: A Marcusian Analysis of Sen’s Capability Theory’s Reliance Upon Universal Democracy as a Means for Overcoming Inequality","authors":"Danelle Fourie, Justin Sands","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0222","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article critically examines the competitive, adversarial nature of the Western neoliberal style of democracy. Specifically, this article focuses on Amartya Sen’s notion of a “universal democracy” as a means of addressing socio-economic inequalities through Sen’s capability approach. Sen’s capability theory has become an acclaimed and widely used theory to evaluate and understand development and inequalities. However, we employ a distinctive critique by engaging Amartya Sen through Herbert Marcuse’s analysis of one dimensionality and the adversarial nature of Western democracy. We further highlight how contemporary neoliberal society employ a particular, adversarial form of public participation. Through this, we underline the various neoliberal problemata, such as Western idealism, political passivity, and a “flattening of choice,” within contemporary democracies and locate how their competitive, winner-take-all nature has become essential to contemporary, Western democratic models. Consequently, we argue that democracy, as a functional concept and form of public engagement, should be fundamentally re-examined in order to address inequalities.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"675 - 688"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45784305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Meillassoux’s Reinterpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic","authors":"Kristian Schäferling","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0224","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article attempts to read the Transcendental Dialectic through Meillassoux’s model of the absolute contingency of being in order to rethink some of its central difficulties. Specifically, this concerns better understanding the role played by the categories of relation and modality in the empirical use of the ideas of reason, which underlies their regulative use that is directed at an absolute unity of reason. It will be discussed which questions are implied in the central claim of Meillassoux’s ontology, i.e., that it is possible to derive from the necessity of contingency the existence and noncontradictory being of the thing in itself. First, I will retrace basic points of Meillassoux’s critique of “correlationism”, by means of which he reconfigures the divisions between metaphysics, physics, and ontology. Second, against the background of the Kantian concept of hope, I will examine a relation between the Transcendental Dialectic and ethics, as, respectively, conceived of in Kant and in Meillassoux’s reinterpretation. Third, I will critically ask in how far absolute contingency can be understood as grounding a concept of experience and in which sense the idea of the antinomy chapter in the Transcendental Dialectic contains an argument more complex than Meillassoux’s model suggests.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"702 - 717"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46130905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}