The Mythical Absolute: The Fiction of Being

IF 0.3 0 PHILOSOPHY
G. S. Moss
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract The concept of “conceptual personae” is a contradiction in terms. On one sense of the term, personae are the characters in a work of art, such as a play or a novel. As characters, they are not common terms – King Lear is a particular; he is not a universal, for he cannot be shared in common. However, concepts are quite unlike King Lear. As universals, they are common terms that can be shared in common. “Conceptual personae” renders the particular universal and thereby declares the universal not to be universal. However, I argue that as long as philosophers maintain a traditional attitude toward conceptual truth, philosophers will not be able to successfully think the structure of being without appealing to the mythical imagination, of which conceptual personae form an essential constituent.
神话中的绝对:存在的虚构
摘要“概念人物”的概念在术语上是矛盾的。从某种意义上说,人物角色是艺术作品中的人物,如戏剧或小说。作为字符,它们不是常用术语 – 李尔王是一个特殊的人物;他不是一个普世的人,因为他不可能有共同点。然而,这些概念与李尔王截然不同。作为普遍性,它们是可以共享的共同术语。“概念人物”赋予特定的普遍性,从而宣告普遍性不是普遍性。然而,我认为,只要哲学家对概念真理保持传统的态度,哲学家就不可能在不诉诸神话想象的情况下成功地思考存在的结构,而概念人物是神话想象的重要组成部分。
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来源期刊
Open Philosophy
Open Philosophy Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
20.00%
发文量
25
审稿时长
15 weeks
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