Open Philosophy最新文献_第9页

Nietzsche’s Ariadne: On Asses’s Ears in Botticelli/Dürer – and Poussin’s Bacchanale 尼采的阿里阿德涅：论波提切利/丢勒的阿塞斯耳朵——与普桑的酒曲

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0216

Babette E. Babich

引用次数: 0

Towards a Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason: On the Constitutive Significance of the Transcendental Dialectic 走向理论理性与实践理性的统一——论超越辩证法的构成意义

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0218

R. König

{"title":"Towards a Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason: On the Constitutive Significance of the Transcendental Dialectic","authors":"R. König","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0218","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article focuses on re-evaluating Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic by initially highlighting its seemingly negative function within the Critique of Pure Reason as a mere regulative form for cognition and experience. The Dialectic, however, does not only have such a negative-regulative function but also its very own positive and founding character for cognition that even is present in the supposedly most immediate forms of intuition. In exploring this positive side of the Transcendental Dialectic it becomes clear that it manifests itself as a bridge between the so-called theoretical and practical reason inasmuch as it fills in their gap within Kant’s philosophy. From the practical side, the Dialectic is manifest as an action full of purposiveness, maxims, and imperatives within cognition, from a theoretical side it assumes the form of syllogistic inference, which is the adequate and acting theoretical form of practical reason. Therefore, the unity of reason is shown in presenting its inner gap as a dialectical misunderstanding that Kant not only highlights in the Transcendental Dialectic but also tends to leave unsolved mostly. Nevertheless, the Dialectic can be shown as the a priori synthetic act of unifying reason, if investigated in the context of Kant’s complete critical endeavour.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"622 - 635"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44556832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The “Slicing Problem” for Computational Theories of Consciousness 意识计算理论的“切片问题”

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0225

Andrés Gómez-Emilsson, Chris Percy

{"title":"The “Slicing Problem” for Computational Theories of Consciousness","authors":"Andrés Gómez-Emilsson, Chris Percy","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0225","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The “Slicing Problem” is a thought experiment that raises questions for substrate-neutral computational theories of consciousness, including those that specify a certain causal structure for the computation like Integrated Information Theory. The thought experiment uses water-based logic gates to construct a computer in a way that permits cleanly slicing each gate and connection in half, creating two identical computers each instantiating the same computation. The slicing can be reversed and repeated via an on/off switch, without changing the amount of matter in the system. The question is what do different computational theories of consciousness believe is happening to the number and nature of individual conscious units as this switch is toggled. Under a token interpretation, there are now two discrete conscious entities; under a type interpretation, there may remain only one. Both interpretations lead to different implications depending on the adopted theoretical stance. Any route taken either allows mechanisms for “consciousness-multiplying exploits” or requires ambiguous boundaries between conscious entities, raising philosophical and ethical questions for theorists to consider. We discuss resolutions under different theories of consciousness for those unwilling to accept consciousness-multiplying exploits. In particular, we specify three features that may help promising physicalist theories to navigate such thought experiments.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"718 - 736"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45952101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Rethinking Dionysus and Apollo: Redrawing Today’s Philosophical Chessboard 对狄奥尼索斯和阿波罗的再思考：重新绘制今天的哲学棋盘

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0209

C. Segovia

{"title":"Rethinking Dionysus and Apollo: Redrawing Today’s Philosophical Chessboard","authors":"C. Segovia","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0209","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay pursues Gilbert Durand’s plea for a new anthropological spirit that would overcome the bureaucracy-or-madness dichotomy which has since Nietzsche left its imprint upon contemporary thought, forcing it to choose between an “Apollonian” ontology established upon some kind of first principle and a “Dionysian” ontology consisting in the erasure of any founding norm. It does so by reclaiming Dionysus and Apollo’s original twin-ness and dual affirmation in dialogue with contemporary anthropological theory, especially Roy Wagner’s thesis on the interplay of “elicitation” and “containment” in sociocultural life. What would happen then, I ask, if we were to reimagine today’s philosophical game – which after Heidegger Deleuze, and Derrida turns variously and increasingly around subtraction – otherwise: as a chiastic board on which Apollo would cut Dionysus’s continuum, which Dionysus would in turn restore despite Apollo’s cuts, and on which the obliteration of any of the two gods would entail the inevitable dismemberment of the other? Accordingly, I offer a full reassessment of Dionysus’s and Apollo’s complementary roles in ancient-Greek culture in discussion not only with Nietzsche’s Dionysian philosophy but also with Ihab Hassan’s postmodern critique of Orpheus. All of it less with the purpose of putting forward a new metaphysics than with the intent of restating the translucent-ness that keeps together reality and thought against any claim that they are either transparent or opaque to one another.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"360 - 380"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46363394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

For a Dialectic-First Approach to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 康德纯粹理性批判的辩证法第一论

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0213

James Kreines

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引用次数: 0

Semantic Anti-Realism in Kant’s Antinomy Chapter 康德《矛盾论》一章的语义反实在论

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0228

Kristoffer Willert

{"title":"Semantic Anti-Realism in Kant’s Antinomy Chapter","authors":"Kristoffer Willert","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0228","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract By considering the semantic footings of the so-called antinomies of pure reason, this article contributes to the debate about whether Kant was committed to semantic realism or anti-realism. That is, whether verification-transcendent judgements are truth-apt (realism) or not (anti-realism). Against the (empiricist) semantic principle that Strawson, and others, have ascribed to Kant as the “principle of significance,” the bedrock of my article is what I call Kant’s Real Principle of Significance: an extension-based and normative principle stating that a judgement can have no “significance” or “objective validity” (truth-value) without a universally recognizable norm for verifying it. This principle entails semantic anti-realism. I argue that we can extract the principle from the antinomy chapter of KrV, since in there Kant concludes that judgements of the form “the world as such is x” are without “significance” (lack a truth-value) in virtue of being unverifiable as a matter of principle. I propose that Kant’s reference to some of the antinomical judgements as “false” is not incompatible with this anti-realist reading because he operates with two distinct world-concepts: an illegitimate transcendental realist one and a legitimate transcendental idealist one. In contrast to most anti-realist Kant-interpretations, it is furthermore argued that any satisfactory anti-realist construal of Kant’s view must be compatible with his assertion that the thesis in the third antinomy about freedom “can be true.” That requires a thicker conception of “significance” or “objective validity” than what is often ascribed to Kant, which is encapsulated by the Real Principle of Significance.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"737 - 757"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41481303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Collective Unity of Reason in the First Critique 第一批判中理性的集体统一

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0220

Annapaola Varaschin

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A Phenomenological Look at the Orgasm Gap 从现象学角度看高潮差距

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0204

Rita Niineste

{"title":"A Phenomenological Look at the Orgasm Gap","authors":"Rita Niineste","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0204","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The orgasm gap is the marked difference in the frequency of orgasm between cisgender men and women in heterosexual intercourse that has been documented in research for decades. However, orgasm as a state of intense sexual excitement and gratification is physiologically uncomplicated and readily available for most people regardless of gender. This article undertakes a philosophical study of the processes by which the individual experience of orgasm is invested with meaning and embedded in social and cultural practices that collectively both produce and sustain the orgasm gap. By looking at the experience of orgasm as horizonal, I draw a distinction between the social and the cultural horizons of sexual experiences. I argue that social standards of sexual modesty make sexuality a field where the process through which we make sense of our individual experiences is especially dependent on how these experiences are depicted in cultural representation. The current socially normalised male perspective in cultural representation continues to conflict with the ways orgasm is experienced in female bodies. This is probably one reason why the orgasm gap persists even in countries where sex education and gender equality are highly advanced.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"424 - 436"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41748696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Bite of the Forbidden Fruit: The Abject of Food and Affirmative Environmental Ethics 一口禁果：食物的唾弃与肯定的环境伦理

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0200

Anne Sauka

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Rivalry and Philosophy after Deleuze’s Reversal of Platonic Participation 德勒兹颠覆柏拉图式参与后的竞争与哲学

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Open Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0223

S. Butera

引用次数: 0