ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Restructuring Venezuela’s Debt: An Update","authors":"Mark Walker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3300189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3300189","url":null,"abstract":"Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati have proposed an innovative and aggressive strategy to facilitate the restructuring of Venezuela’s external debt based on consensual agreement between Venezuela and a supermajority of its broad creditor universe. Borrowing from the United Nations Security Council’s decision (supported by action of the United States) to shield Iraq’s assets from seizure by its creditors in order to promote a restructuring of Iraq’s debts, they propose that the Security Council or (more likely) the President of the United States by Executive Order shield Venezuela’s assets (particularly revenues from the sale of oil into the United States from) legal process. The rationale for their proposal rests on the premises that (1) virtually all of Venezuela’s foreign exchange is generated by sales of oil into the United States, (2) the revenues from exports of oil to the United States are vulnerable to attachment by creditors and therefore a small group of aggressive creditors could strangle the entire economy of the country, (3) existing restructuring techniques are inadequate to the task and (4) the policy of the United States is to promote the restructuring of sovereign debt based on an agreement between the debtor state and a supermajority of its creditors in the context of a process in which all creditors are bound by the vote of a supermajority. This article argues that (1) a new Venezuelan government (which all agree is a prerequisite to a restructuring) will have substantial means to shield the country’s oil revenues from seizure by creditors, (2) a new government will also be able to expand its foreign exchange earnings to include sale of oil outside the United States, (3) the proposals do not create a mechanism to allow all of Venezuela’s creditors to have a voice in the terms of a restructuring — by supermajority or otherwise — and would treat U.S. and non U.S. creditors differently and (4) the unintended consequences of the proposals advanced by Buchheit and Gulati would negatively affect the ability of emerging market sovereigns, and Venezuela in particular, to fund themselves in the debt markets and would be disruptive of the sovereign debt market generally. Referring to the paper that the author and Richard Cooper wrote one year ago, the author argues that there are tested, market-based mechanisms to achieve the goal of a consensual restructuring arrived at by a supermajority vote of creditors, in particular a restructuring of PDVSA’s debts under a newly enacted Venezuela law that is implemented with the support of a Chapter 15 proceeding under the United States Bankruptcy Code. To the extent that the application of Chapter 15 proves problematic, action by Executive Order of the President of the United States would ensure that the process and benefits envisaged by Chapter 15 are available.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130307600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Addiction to Debt Forgiveness in Developing Countries: Consequences and Who Gets Picked?","authors":"Leanora Brown, J. Martínez-Vázquez","doi":"10.1111/rode.12575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12575","url":null,"abstract":"We explore whether the expectation of debt forgiveness discourages developing countries from attaining sustainable fiscal independence through improving their tax effort. While the international financial community advises poor countries to improve revenue mobilization, the same international community routinely bails out poor countries that fail to meet their loan repayment obligations, among other reasons as a result of the low tax effort they exercise. The act of bailing out creates an expectation about receiving debt forgiveness time and again in the future. The key prediction of our theoretical framework is that in the presence of debt forgiveness, countries’ tax efforts will decline and more so the higher the intensity of the bailouts. We test this proposition using data for 55 countries from 1995 to 2015. We find that debt forgiveness is significant in lowering tax effort. In addressing the potential of reverse causality, we also find that the international financial community has been more forgiving to countries that exert lower tax effort. These results, which are robust to various specifications, have significant policy implications for donor and recipient countries.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122855792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Over-Indebted Subnational Mexico: Does Political Polarization Affect Debt Policy Decisions?","authors":"Heidi Smith, Isabel Melguizo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2518623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2518623","url":null,"abstract":"Does polarization promote overspending and increase local deficits? Alesina and Tabellini (1990) suggests that more conflict between political parties encourages the opposition to over spend causing inefficient levels of public debt. According to cross national OECD data analyst find that high-level of political conflict result in surging fiscal deficits. The larger the ideological difference, the higher the likelihood of not being reelected. Thus, the incumbent will have higher incentive to spend in order to meet campaign promises. These promises often exceed current expenditures and therefore lead to public officials to access the debt market, ultimately raising the total amount of debt spending. Empirical studies to evaluate this inefficiency are typically done at the state level or cross national, but few have evaluated sub-sovereign debt issuance (Alt and Lassen 2006; Alesina1989; Alt 1985; Drazen and Eslava 2010). This research evaluates Alesina and Tabellini?s polarization theory within the newly democratizing Mexico. By using data from 2000-2014, the study first uses Dalton (2008) measure of polarization, based on voter perceptions of party positions in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), and secondly as the margin of victory in a panel data set with public finance indicators (percentage of total expenditures gathered by Mexico?s National Geography and Statistics Institute (INEGI) and type of debt issuance presented by Mexico?s National Treasury office (Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico ?SHCP). Next the study evaluates not only when in the electoral political cycles (Hibbs 1977, 1987 and Cox and McCubbins 2001) influence deficit spending, but also which type of debt does (public bond bank, commercial banks, trusts funds of the bond market increases that debt). The tentative results show that municipal debt increases in non-electoral years, i.e. the year before and after the next election, which is congruent with other research on Mexico (Benton and Smith 2017); but also that debt issuance increases for commercial bank loans and the public bond bank in those years, suggesting the easier the accessibility of the type of debt will have more probability to be effected by these ideologically difference in the electoral cycle.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121287285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"New Debt Policy in Azerbaijan: Hopes, Realities, Risks and Perspectives","authors":"Rashad Hasanov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3485620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3485620","url":null,"abstract":"From the second half of 2014, Azerbaijani public debt increased considerably along with several new challenges facing the domestic economy. During this period, the ratio of foreign debt to GDP rose from 8.6% (01.01.2015) to 22.8% (01.06.2018). The increase was 3.4 billion US dollars in nominal terms. At the beginning of 2018, Azerbaijan’s public debt amounted to 10 billion 100 million US dollars, while the value of loans taken with state guarantees reached 12 billion 682 million US dollars, raising the ratio of debt to GDP to 55%.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127573315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rare Disasters, Financial Development, and Sovereign Debt","authors":"Sergio Rebelo, Neng Wang, Jinqiang Yang","doi":"10.3386/W25031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25031","url":null,"abstract":"We study the implications of the interaction between rare disasters and financial development for sovereign debt markets. In our model, countries vary in their financial development, by which we mean the extent to which shocks can be hedged in international capital markets. The model predicts that low levels of financial development generate a key feature of sovereign debt in emerging economies known as \"debt intolerance\": high credit spreads associated with lower debt-to-output ratios than those of developed countries.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130415613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Debtor Creditor Engagement in Sovereign Restructurings","authors":"Yannis Manuelides","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3211262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3211262","url":null,"abstract":"The NML v Argentina decision brought to the surface two problems which are potentially present in any sovereign debt restructuring. First, how to deal with activist holdout bond creditors once the vast majority of bond creditors and the sovereign debtor have agreed a restructuring. Second, how to ensure that the sovereign debtor engages with its bond (and other) creditors in an appropriate manner so as to resolve the insolvency and bring it to a finality. The former problem was resolved by the adoption by contractual collective action clauses. The latter problem remains largely unresolved not for lack of effort or proposals. At the heart of most proposals rests the injunction that the parties engage “in good faith”. The paper considers the proposals made so far and concludes that the good faith engagement cannot be assured or enforced contractually and it is unlikely that it will be imposed by any form of international treaty. Good faith engagement can only be done by reference to soft law guidelines, such as the ones found in the IIF “Principles” or discussed by the IMF in its recent policy papers. Ultimately, a proper engagement of a sovereign debtor with its creditors and other relevant stakeholders will very much depend on the behaviour of the sovereign debtor itself and/or its choice to seek an IMF program. Where the sovereign debtor acts in the rule-bound way of a “returning player” or allows the IMF to do so, it is likely that engagement with its creditors and other stakeholders will be appropriate and that the insolvency will be resolved with the required finality.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115534900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sovereign Illiquidity and Recessions","authors":"Violeta A. Gutkowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2956138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2956138","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by the European debt crisis and European Central Bank (ECB) measures to restore sovereign bond market liquidity, I examine the importance of sovereign debt liquidity in a New Keynesian environment with wage rigidities and financial frictions à la Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). The analysis implies that, independently of credit risk, a decrease in the liquidity of government bonds has significant detrimental effects on output, employment and investment. A shut down of sovereign debt market for one quarter generates a 7% drop in output and investment as well as a 2% increase in unemployment. Sovereign bond market illiquidity can account for 86% of the output drop in Italy between 2011q2 and 2013q1. ECB temporally policies taken in 2012 aimed at rising liquidity seem to have prevented a longer and deeper economic downturn.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122505117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Relationship Between External Debt and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Ukraine and Other Emerging Economies","authors":"I. Shkolnyk, Viktoriia Koilo","doi":"10.21511/IMFI.15(1).2018.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21511/IMFI.15(1).2018.32","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the relationship between external debt and economic growth in emerging economies for the period 2006-2016. The authors used different econometric tools, e.g., ADL model and correlation analysis. The regression results showed that the original values had no significant impact on the estimation of the parameters. Thus, there was made an assumption that emerging economies have a non-linear impact on macroeconomic parameters, including external debt that has a non-linear type of influence on economic growth. The authors established that high level of external debt, in conjunction with macroeconomic instability, impedes economic growth in such countries. The regression model also showed that there is a critical level of debt burden for emerging economies, where the marginal impact of external debt on economic growth becomes negative. The results of the study highlighted the significance of the problem of effective public debt management strategy implementation in Ukraine. This issue is predetermined by the appropriate organizational support. The study recommends improving a public external debt management model. In this paper, the authors proposed a new structure with the participation of new element -- independent agencies. The unified external debt management system should integrate all state institutions and executive power structures in this area.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132703166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Parameter Heterogeneity, Persistence and Cross-Sectional Dependence: New Insights on Fiscal Policy Reaction Functions for the Euro Area","authors":"R. Golinelli, Irene Mammi, Antonio Musolesi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3156879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3156879","url":null,"abstract":"A number of novelties have emerged in the study of the discretionary fiscal policy within the Euro area during the last decade. Among the others, the availability of up-to-date information on fiscal indicators for the years following the Great Recession, the introduction of cutting-edge econometric methods, and a renewed interest about the sustainability of fiscal policy and public debt. The aim of this paper is to address the challenges posed by the estimation of the discretionary fiscal reaction function for the Euro area. We exploit recently introduced testing and estimation strategies for heterogeneous dynamic panels with cross-sectional dependence and propose a new parsimonious approach. Using real-time data over the period 1996-2016, we investigate whether the fiscal policy reaction function is still a benchmark after the Great Recession. We find evidence of strong cross-sectional dependence in the panel, and clear support to a valid cointegration relationship among the main determinants of the function. Newly added covariates, such interest rate spreads, come out to play a relevant role in explaining discretionary actions.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133743291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Early Warning System of Government Debt Crises","authors":"Christian Dreger, K. Kholodilin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3146762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3146762","url":null,"abstract":"The European debt crisis has revealed serious deficiencies and risks on a proper functioning of the monetary union. Against this backdrop, early warning systems are of crucial importance. In this study that focuses on euro area member states, the robustness of early warning systems to predict crises of government debt is evaluated. Robustness is captured via several dimensions, such as the chronology of past crises, econometric methods, and the selection of indicators in forecast combinations. The chosen approach is shown to be crucial for the results. Therefore, the construction of early warning systems should be based on a wide set of variables and methods in order to be able to draw reliable conclusions.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114192194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}