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Italy - At the Half-Way Mark in 2012 意大利——2012年，意大利的发展已经过半
ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-09-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2147398
Maurizio Mazziero, Leonardo Baggiani, S. Fait, A. Lawford
{"title":"Italy - At the Half-Way Mark in 2012","authors":"Maurizio Mazziero, Leonardo Baggiani, S. Fait, A. Lawford","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2147398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2147398","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the quarterly evolution of Italy's sovereign debt, its stock of government bonds, official reserves, GDP, inflation and unemployment. Please see also: Mazziero, Maurizio, Baggiani, Leonardo, Fait, Silvano and Lawford, Andrew, Italia 1 Trim 2012: Pil, Debito & Co (Italy 1q2012: GDP, Debt & Co) (June 11, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2082954.Mazziero, Maurizio, Baggiani, Leonardo, Fait, Silvano and Lawford, Andrew, Italia 2011: Un Anno Di Sofferenza (Italy 2011: A Year of Sufferance) (February 18, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007513 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2007513.Mazziero, Maurizio, Italia 3 Trim 2011: Pil, Debito & Co (Italy 3q2011: GDP, Debt & Co) (December 13, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1972366. Mazziero, Maurizio, Italia: L’Economia al Giro di Boa del 2011 (Italy: The Economy Halfway Through 2011) (August 16, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911942. Mazziero, Maurizio, Italia 1q2011: Pil, Debito & Co. (Italy 1q2011: GDP, Debt & Co.) (May 17, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1854888.Mazziero, Maurizio, 2010: Un Altro Anno a Debito per l’Italia (2010: Another Year of Debt for Italy) (April 10, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=180648 .","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124595443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Transmission of European Debt Crisis on the Region of Western Balkans: Some Stylized Facts 欧债危机在西巴尔干地区的传播:一些风格化的事实
ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2382451
M. Ganić
{"title":"The Transmission of European Debt Crisis on the Region of Western Balkans: Some Stylized Facts","authors":"M. Ganić","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2382451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2382451","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to analyze economies which are affected by the European debt crisis most by examining the effects on the Western Balkans countries reflected by Foreign direct investments flows of selected countries, trade performance indicators of Western Balkans and remittances from abroad. The analysis comprises the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The data set used in the analysis has been extracted from the following databases: UNCTAD, World bank, Eurostat, World Trade Organization from National statistics.Structure of the paper is given as follows: Section 2 deals with new economic trends and new developments in the countries of Western Balkans from the moment of their independence. Section 3 discusses the recent developments in the foreign trade for the last decades between European Union-27 and Western Balkan also it describes the main specific features of the overall trade performance indicators of Western Balkan for last two decades. Section 4 compares and analyses the implications of debt crisis in European Union-27 on the economies of Western Balkans during current debt crisis.Our findings show that the debt crisis in European Union-27 has indeed affected the countries of Western Balkans to a particular degree through financial and trade linkages.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"11 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114031219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Debt Fragility and Bailouts 债务脆弱性与救助
ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-09-01 DOI: 10.3386/W18377
Russell Cooper
{"title":"Debt Fragility and Bailouts","authors":"Russell Cooper","doi":"10.3386/W18377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W18377","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies debt fragility and the sharing of the resulting strategic uncertainty through ex post bailouts. Default arises in equilibrium because of both fundamental shocks and beliefs. The probability of default depends on borrowing rates and, in equilibrium, on the beliefs of lenders about this probability. This interaction creates a strategic complementarity and thus the basis for strategic uncertainty. The paper analyzes the role of credible ex post bailouts as a means of sharing both fundamental and strategic uncertainty. While bailouts may occur in some states, debt fragility remains.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"327 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124617281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
The Great EU Debt Write Off 欧盟债务大勾销
ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-08-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1847506
A. Evans, Terence Tse
{"title":"The Great EU Debt Write Off","authors":"A. Evans, Terence Tse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1847506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1847506","url":null,"abstract":"When one economic entity is both a creditor and debtor to another, a somewhat obvious and simple idea is to cross cancel their debt. We created a classroom simulation where students were required to research the debt position of 8 EU countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Britain, France and Germany) and then conduct a negotiation exercise to reduce their total debt burdens. As a result students developed their research skills and data analysis, and increased their understanding of the data regarding an important topical issue. The simulation itself exposed students to a number of different trading strategies, in particular the complexity of going from bilateral to wider deal making, and negotiating from weak positions. By making students the focus of the exercise their engagement and learning outcomes were high.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131626458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Threshold Effects of Sovereign Debt: Evidence from the Caribbean 主权债务的门槛效应:来自加勒比地区的证据
ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-06-01 DOI: 10.5089/9781475504507.001
K. Greenidge, Roland C. Craigwell, Chrystol Thomas, Lisa Drakes
{"title":"Threshold Effects of Sovereign Debt: Evidence from the Caribbean","authors":"K. Greenidge, Roland C. Craigwell, Chrystol Thomas, Lisa Drakes","doi":"10.5089/9781475504507.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475504507.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the issue of threshold effects between public debt and economic growth\u0000in the Caribbean. The main finding is that there exists a threshold debt to gross domestic\u0000product (GDP) ratio of 55–56 percent. Moreover, the debt dynamics begin changing well before\u0000this threshold is reached. Specifically, at debt levels lower than 30 percent of GDP, increases in\u0000the debt-to-GDP ratio are associated with faster economic growth. However, as debt rises\u0000beyond 30 percent, the effects on economic growth diminishes rapidly and at debt levels\u0000reaching 55–56 percent of GDP, the growth impacts switch from positive to negative. Thus,\u0000beyond this threshold, debt becomes a drag on growth.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117261535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 57
Odious Debt in an Imperfect World 不完美世界中的可恶债务
ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-05-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2012.00663.x
Thorsten Janus
{"title":"Odious Debt in an Imperfect World","authors":"Thorsten Janus","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9361.2012.00663.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2012.00663.x","url":null,"abstract":"The odious debt problem refers to a government's ability to borrow for elite consumption while the general population repays. Although an intuitive response is to ban lending to such regimes, this paper shows that if a government faces endogenous replacement risk, then an international odious debt doctrine which (i) decreases the country's debt ceiling; (ii) decreases the likelihood that the citizens must repay the debt; or (iii) increases the government's cost of borrowing for a given default risk can all decrease citizens' welfare. These findings suggest that, even when a regime is clearly odious, allowing it to borrow up to a point may be preferable to a complete lending ban.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130897460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
The Added-Value of New Debt Indicators for European Countries 欧洲国家新债务指标的增加值
ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-04-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2033654
Andreas Weida
{"title":"The Added-Value of New Debt Indicators for European Countries","authors":"Andreas Weida","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2033654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2033654","url":null,"abstract":"While the financial crisis of 2008 has shown the insufficient predicting power of the indicators of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the search for other macroeconomic indicators is worthwhile. The paper tries to underline that - among the indicators discussed in the literature and statistically already available - the net international investment position (NIIP) can be seen as a relative good predictor of a crisis. One of the synthetic weighted indicators presented in this paper (WEIGH IV) has similar qualities and might even benefit more from the separate inclusion of private debt as a sub-indicator.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114400179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Serial Default and Debt Renegotiation 连续违约和债务重新谈判
ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-04-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2416482
T. Asonuma
{"title":"Serial Default and Debt Renegotiation","authors":"T. Asonuma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2416482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2416482","url":null,"abstract":"Emerging countries that have defaulted on their debt repayment obligations in the past are more likely to default again in the future than are non-defaulters even with the same debt-to-GDP ratio. This paper explains this stylized fact within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework by explicitly modeling renegotiations between a defaulting country and its creditors. The quantitative analysis of the model reveals that the equilibrium probability of default for a given debt-to-GDP level is weakly increasing with the number of past defaults, consistent with empirical observations. The equilibrium of the model also accords with an additional observed fact: a country for which default terms require less than a 100 percent recovery rate tends to pay a higher rate of return (relative to a risk-free rate) on subsequently issued debt than do defaulting countries that agree to a full recovery rate.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130754427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
A Tale Of Two Debtors: Responding to the Shock of Over‐Indebtedness in France and England – A Story from the Trente Piteuses 两个债务人的故事:应对法国和英国过度负债的冲击——一个来自特伦特皮特乌斯的故事
ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2012.00897.x
I. Ramsay
{"title":"A Tale Of Two Debtors: Responding to the Shock of Over‐Indebtedness in France and England – A Story from the Trente Piteuses","authors":"I. Ramsay","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2230.2012.00897.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2012.00897.x","url":null,"abstract":"England and France have developed distinct treatment systems to address the shock of a substantial increase in over-indebted individuals since the mid-1980s. In France, Over-Indebtedness Commissions, with the Bank of France playing a central role in their management, now dominate the system. A more fragmented system of private and public providers of remedies developed in England, with innovation driven by private actors modifying existing commercial procedures and increased access to bankruptcy relief a side-effect of government promotion of entrepreneurialism. This article explains the differences between these countries in terms of the influence of interest groups, including state actors, and ideologies. Historical contingency also plays a role. The distinct responses were not hard-wired to legal origins and the article argues that analysis of the interaction of interest groups, state actors and ideology in shaping institutions, which in turn structure future change, provides a productive approach for future comparative research in this area.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121552592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 39
Engineering an Orderly Greek Debt Restructuring 安排有序的希腊债务重组
ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-01-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1993037
G. Gulati, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
{"title":"Engineering an Orderly Greek Debt Restructuring","authors":"G. Gulati, Jeromin Zettelmeyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1993037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1993037","url":null,"abstract":"For some months now, discussions over how Greece will restructure its debt have been constrained by the requirement that the deal be “voluntary” – implying that Greece would continue debt service to any creditors that choose retain their old bonds rather than tender them in an exchange offer. In light of Greece’s deep solvency problems and lack of agreement with its creditors so far, the notion of a voluntary debt exchange is increasingly looking like a mirage. In this essay, we describe and compare three alternative approaches that would achieve an orderly restructuring but avoid an outright default: (1) “retrofitting” and using a collective action clause (CAC) that would allow the vast majority of outstanding Greek government bonds to be restructured with the consent of a supermajority of creditors; (2) combining the use of a CAC with an exit exchange, in which consenting bondholders would receive a new English-law bond with standard creditor protections and lower face value; (3) an exit exchange in which a CAC would only be used if participation falls below a specified threshold. All three exchanges are involuntary in the sense that creditors that dissent or hold out are not repaid in full.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116946139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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