{"title":"Directly Indirect and Other Paradoxes: What Graduate Students Need to Know About Financial Aid","authors":"Z. Taylor, Alyssa Takatori, Karla Weber Wandel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3860208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3860208","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128588042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Greece Before and After the Euro: Macroeconomics, Politics and the Quest for Reforms","authors":"G. Alogoskoufis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3801659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3801659","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses developments in the Greek economy before and after the euro. The main thesis is that the imbalances that led to the crisis of the post-2010 period were building up during the previous three decades and that their root causes were not merely economic, but social, structural, institutional and political. The fiscal imbalances created in the 1980s were not adequately addressed by the convergence policies of the 1990s, while the long-standing problem of low international competitiveness was further exacerbated by the failure to promote the necessary structural reforms. Greece's accession to the euro area with major structural and fiscal imbalances and low and deteriorating international competitiveness, led to a steep rise in its external indebtedness. The lopsided adjustment and the inadequacy of the reforms was due to domestic political and social constraints, both before and after euro area entry. In view of the institutional weaknesses of the euro area itself, the external imbalances ultimately led to the external debt crisis of 2010, the imposition of the economic adjustment programs and the ‘great depression’ of the 2010s. The paper also explores the prerequisites for a sustained recovery of the Greek economy within the euro area, once the global economic crisis induced by the coronavirus pandemic is over. The quest for wide ranging reforms remains Greece’s top priority.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134466023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mandatory Pension Savings and Long-run Debt Accumulation: Evidence from Danish Low-wage Earners","authors":"H. Andersen, N. L. Hansen, A. Kuchler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3547997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547997","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Based on two decades of Danish register data at the individual level, this paper finds that a 1-dollar increase in pension wealth leads to a 42-cent rise in total debt for a group of low-wage earners. Collective bargaining in the labor market provides time-sector variation in mandatory pension contribution rates, which we exploit in two empirical research designs; an event study and a cross-sectional instrumental variable regression model. Both methods demonstrate that the debt rise is accompanied by increased housing wealth and homeownership rates. Together, the empirical evidence indicates that mandatory pension contributions lead to a significant increase in net wealth, as well as in gross debt.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132771986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Prudential Policy with Debt Overhang","authors":"Sichuang Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3767002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3767002","url":null,"abstract":"Modern macroeconomy experienced recurrent financial crises followed by protracted periods of debt overhang and slow recovery. This paper proposes a tractable dynamic framework in which debt accumulated during credit booms is sufficiently large that corporate entities cannot attract voluntary new lending during a crisis. We study the efficiency properties and show that firms’ individually optimal investment decisions during credit booms fail to internalize their collective effect in exacerbating economy-wide debt overhang during recessions. Stabilization policies such as debt bailouts make the economy more crisis-prone, whereas market-based monetary stimulus discourages ex ante risk taking. Numerical illustrations suggest that optimally designed prudential policy substantially mitigates the incidence, severity, and protractedness of financial crises.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128136797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Preventing the Next Financial Failure Post–COVID–19","authors":"Melissa S. Murphy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3776649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3776649","url":null,"abstract":"While the U.S. economic position today is unlike any period in modern U.S. history, understanding the cyclical nature of financial regulation and economic behavior patterns delivers valuable insights for mitigating risk in the current environment. Spanish philosopher George Santayana is credited for the aphorism, \"those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,\" but analyzing the last 100 years reveals patterns during periods of recession and recovery identified in this paper as the cycle of financial stability and the funnel of economic emergency. Historical patterns, economic data, and evaluation of current U.S. regulation indicate the looming threat of financial failure following the COVID-19 pandemic, making the crisis of 2020 a recession triggering event that ultimately leads to greater economic disaster. The U.S. has experienced economic crisis several times throughout history, but today's unique challenges require a different financial regulation approach. The absence of technology policies, lack of data privacy regulation, deregulated areas of the financial industry, and the nebulous industry/agency relationship create hurdles for ensuring financial stability. Without correcting financial regulation, introducing digital assets and technology conglomerates to the financial sector will result in unknown global pressure exacerbated by legislative deficiencies, drastically increasing systemic financial risk. Leveraging results from comprehensive analysis, the U.S. can prevent impending financial failure through effective financial regulation and ensure stability as the nation recovers from a deep recession and national debt crisis due to consecutive, compounding economic disasters.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123276626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private Overborrowing under Sovereign Risk","authors":"F. Arce","doi":"10.21033/wp-2022-17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21033/wp-2022-17","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that excessive international private debt increases the frequency and severity of sovereign debt crises. I develop a quantitative theory of private and public debt that allows me to measure the level of private overborrowing and its effect on the interest rate spread paid on public debt. In an environment where private credit is constrained by the market value of income, individually optimal private borrowing decisions are inefficient at the aggregate level. High private debt increases the probability of a financial crisis. During such crises, drops in consumption cause a decline in the market value of collateral that in turn further reduces consumption. To mitigate this financial amplification mechanism, the government responds with large fiscal bailouts financed with risky external public debt. I show that this response then causes a sovereign debt crisis, characterized by high interest rate spreads and in some cases default. I find that the model is quantitatively consistent with the evolution of international private debt, international public debt, and sovereign spreads in Spain from 1999 to 2015. I estimate that private debt was 5% of GDP above the socially optimal level in the lead-up to the crisis. Private overborrowing increased the annual probability of a financial crisis by 2.4 percentage points. Finally, excessive private debt raised the interest rate spread on public bonds by at least 3.8 percentage points at its peak in 2012.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124112613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can Pakistan Raise More External Debt? A Fiscal Reaction Approach","authors":"Sadia Mansoor, Mirza Aqeel Baig, Irfan Lal","doi":"10.22547/ber/12.4.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22547/ber/12.4.2","url":null,"abstract":"This study has assessed the role of existing policies in determining the state of debt sustainability for the Pakistan economy (1980- June 2019) through fiscal reaction function. This study adds to the literature in two aspects. First, a policy index has been constructed to formulate a debt-policy interactive term that implies whether or not existing macroeconomic policies contribute in making external debt sustainable in Pakistan. Second, this study has gauged the potential sustainable external debt through in-sample forecast method. The estimated results obtained by the ARDL method show that Pakistan has just entered into a phase of unsustainable debt burden in the long run as fiscal reaction analysis exhibits the weak significant negative relationship between primary balance and external debt to GDP ratio. Moreover, existing macroeconomic policies also show a negative association with the primary balance that implies the ineffectiveness of policies in making external debt sustainable for Pakistan. This study suggests that an increase in foreign inflows through remittances or export earnings may improve the debt sustainability state in Pakistan.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132334766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public Debt Dynamics and Fiscal Sustainability in Namibia: An Intertemporal Budget Constraint Analysis","authors":"J. Nyambe, T. Kaulihowa","doi":"10.31014/aior.1992.03.03.265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31014/aior.1992.03.03.265","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines Namibia’s salient issues of public debt-dynamics and fiscal sustainability from 1980 to 2018. Time series data for the same study period was used. Of interest is the aspect of demystifying the dearth surrounding the trend of increasing public debt in Namibia when it is economically concerning that the existing capacity to mobilize needed resources is inadequate. The inter-temporal budget constraints model was used to examine the various fiscal reaction functions, debt dynamics and fiscal policy adjustment to debt. The study found that the inter-temporal budget constraint does not hold for Namibia. This is for the period under review, confirming that no surplus exists or somewhat too little to offset the accumulated debt from the previous period. The fiscal reaction functions are consistent with the inter-temporal budget constraint with resounding results for both fiscal reaction and extended fiscal reaction functions. The debt dynamics function exposition is that in the short-run, Namibia’s public debt is unsustainable. The government can address debt and fiscal sustainability issues by adjusting its expenditure through resources-wise matching. While government expenditure-containment amidst a global down turn could be complicated there is scope to design workable approaches for generating needed revenues while seeking to balance up expenditure concerns.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128057131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ein Alternativkonzept zur Konsolidierung der Staatsschulden im Euroraum und zur Finanzierung des European Recovery Fund (An Alternative Plan for the Consolidation of Public Debt in Euroland and for Financing an European Recovery Fund)","authors":"Klaus F. Roehl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3633963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3633963","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: In der Folge der Corona-Krise werden die Staatsschulden der Eurozone 12 Billionen EUR erreichen. Ein Funftel davon halt das System der europaischen Zentralbanken (ESZB). Um die Schuldenlast ertraglich zu machen, sollte nicht auf eine Perpetuierung der Schulden gesetzt, sondern ein Schuldenerlass durch das ESZB erwogen werden. Finanztechnisch und rechtlich gibt es keine unuberwind-baren Probleme. Ein Inflationsschub ware nicht zu befurchten, da die umlaufende Geldmenge nicht ansteigt. Der Schuldenerlass konnte so gestaltet werden, dass daraus der von der Kommission vorgeschlagene Wiederaufbaufonds finanziert wurde. Politisch ware das Losung ein Befreiungsschlag, durch den sich viele Streitfragen erledigten, das ESZB seine Handlungsfahigkeit zuruckgewinnen und die Europaische Union insgesamt gestarkt werden konnte. \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: In the aftermath of the Corona-Crisis state debts will sum up to 12 Trillion EUR. One fifth of the outstanding debt is held by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). To make the burden of debts bearable the ESCB should not just consider debt perpetuation but cancellation of debts as an alternative. No unsurmountable financial or legal problems would arise. A burst of inflation should not be ex-pected because the volume of money in circulation would not be increased. The debt cancellation could be modelled to finance the European Recovery Fund planned by the Commission. Politically debt cancellation could appear as a mas-terstroke to handle many contested issues, to restore the ESCB to its full capacity to act and eventually to strengthen the European Union.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"os-45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127784552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The US Government Bond Liquidity during the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"Andrey Ermolov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3619251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3619251","url":null,"abstract":"US government bond illiquidity measures began rising during the last week of February 2020. Several of them surpassed the Great Recession levels during the second week of March. Illiquidity spikes do not seem to match with proposed explanatory events. The illiquidity measures of the most actively traded securities declined after the first Federal Reserve intervention, but normalizing the liquidity of other bonds required the second intervention. Liquidity measures were mostly back to normal by late April. The inflation-linked bonds illiquidity spike was milder but more persistent and less correlated with Federal Reserve actions compared to nominal Treasuries.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"2016 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130018103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}