{"title":"Debt and Growth: A Decade of Studies","authors":"J. Salmon, Véronique de Rugy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3690510","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3690510","url":null,"abstract":"In this policy brief, we review the literature on the debt-growth relationship since the publication of “Growth in a Time of Debt” to evaluate the claim that high government-debt-to-GDP ratios have negative or significant (or both) effects on the growth rate of an economy. In addition, we assess the claim that there is a nonlinear threshold, around 90 percent of GDP, above which debt has a significant deleterious impact on growth rates. With several European countries taking action to successfully reduce their debt-to-GDP ratios in recent years, it is important for Americans to broaden their understanding of the potential negative effects of debt on growth potential, particularly in light of America’s current fiscal trajectory.<br><br>A large majority of studies on the debt-growth relationship find a threshold somewhere between 75 and 100 percent of GDP. More importantly, every study except two finds a negative relationship between high levels of government debt and economic growth. This is true even for studies that find no common threshold. The empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the view that a large amount of government debt has a negative impact on economic growth potential, and in many cases that impact gets more pronounced as debt increases. The current fiscal trajectory of the United States means that in the coming 30-year period, the effects of a large and growing public debt ratio on economic growth could amount to a loss of $4 trillion or $5 trillion in real GDP, or as much as $13,000 per capita, by 2049.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129710082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk","authors":"D. Andolfatto","doi":"10.20955/wp.2020.008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2020.008","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the optimal maturity structure for government debt when markets for liquidity insurance are incomplete or non-competitive. There is no fiscal risk. Government debt in the model solves a dynamic inefficiency. Issuing debt in short and long maturities solves a liquidity insurance problem, but optimal yield curve policy is only possible if long-duration debt is rendered illiquid. Optimal policy is implementable through treasury operations only--adjustments in the primary deficit are not necessary.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115428829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Government Bonds Net Wealth or a Liability? ---Optimal Debt and Taxes in an OLG Model with Uninsurable Income Risk","authors":"YiLi Chien, Y. Wen, Hsin-Yi Yu","doi":"10.20955/wp.2020.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2020.007","url":null,"abstract":"The rapidly growing national debt in the U.S. since the 1970s has alarmed and intrigued the academic world. Consequently, the concept of dynamic (in)efficiency in an overlapping generations (OLG) world and the importance of the heterogeneous-agents and incomplete markets (HAIM) hypothesis to justify a high debt-to-GDP ratio have been extensively studied. Two important consensus emerge from this literature: (i) The optimal quantity of public debt is positive—due to insufficient private liquidity to support private saving and investment (see, e.g., Barro (1974), Woodford (1990), and Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998)); (ii) the optimal capital tax is positive—because of precautionary saving and the consequent failure of the modified golden rule (see, e.g., Aiyagari (1995)). But these two consensus views are seldom derived jointly in the same model, so the dynamic relationship between optimal debt and optimal taxation remains unclear in HAIM models, especially considering that the optimal quantity of debt must be judged by the golden-rule saving rate and any debt must be financed by future taxes. We use a primal Ramsey approach to analytically characterize optimal debt and tax policy in an OLG-HAIM model. We show that since precautionary saving and oversaving are not necessarily the same thing, they have different policy implications—the Ramsey planner opts to issue bonds to crowd out private savings if and only if a competitive equilibrium is dynamically inefficient regardless of precautionary savings. In other words, optimal debt can be negative even if households cannot insure themselves against idiosyncratic risk under borrowing constraints. The sign and magnitude of the optimal quantity of debt in turn dictate the sign and magnitude of optimal taxes as well as the priority order of tax tools such as a labor tax vs. a capital tax.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114555320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bond Premium Cyclicality and Liquidity Traps","authors":"Nicolas Caramp, Sanjay R. Singh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3529769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3529769","url":null,"abstract":"Safe asset shortages can expose the economy to liquidity traps. The nature of these traps is determined by the cyclicality of the bond premium. Self-fulfilling liquidity traps are associated with a counter-cyclical bond premium. Small issuances of government debt crowd out private debt and exacerbate these pessimism-driven recessions. In contrast, fundamental liquidity traps arise under a pro-cyclical bond premium and government debt is expansionary. In the data, we find evidence of a counter-cyclical bond premium and a pro-cyclical supply of safe assets. We propose robust policies that prevent the existence of self-fulfilling traps and are expansionary in fundamental traps.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130301027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Efficient Computation with Taste Shocks","authors":"Grey Gordon","doi":"10.21144/wp19-15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21144/wp19-15","url":null,"abstract":"Taste shocks result in nondegenerate choice probabilities, smooth policy functions, continuous demand correspondences, and reduced computational errors. They also cause significant computational cost when the number of choices is large. However, I show that, in many economic models, a numerically equivalent approximation may be obtained extremely efficiently. If the objective function has increasing differences (a condition closely tied to policy function monotonicity) or is concave in a discrete sense, the proposed algorithms are O(n log n) for n states and n choice--a drastic improvement over the naive algorithm's O(n2) cost. If both hold, the cost can be further reduced to O(n). Additionally, with increasing differences in two state variables, I propose an algorithm that in some cases is O(n2) even without concavity (in contrast to the O(n3) naive algorithm). I illustrate the usefulness of the proposed approach in an incomplete markets economy and a long-term sovereign debt model, the latter requiring taste shocks for convergence. For grid sizes of 500 points, the algorithms are up to 200 times faster than the naive approach.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121805170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. A. Abbas, Kenneth Rogoff, Chengyu Huang, K. Diao
{"title":"A Guide to Sovereign Debt Data","authors":"S. A. Abbas, Kenneth Rogoff, Chengyu Huang, K. Diao","doi":"10.5089/9781513511948.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513511948.001","url":null,"abstract":"The last decade or so has seen a mushrooming of new sovereign debt databases covering long time spans for several countries. This represents an important breakthrough for economists who have long sought to, but been unable to tackle, first-order questions such as why countries have differential debt tolerance, and how debt levels affect the scope for countercyclical policy in recessions and financial crises. This paper backdrops these recent data efforts, identifying both the key innovations, as well as caveats that users should be aware of. A Directory of existing publicly-available sovereign debt databases, featuring compilations by institutions and individual researchers, is also included.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121346964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Persistent Government Debt and Aggregate Risk Distribution","authors":"M. Croce, Steve Raymond, T. T. Nguyen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3289075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3289075","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When government debt is sluggish, consumption exhibits lower expected growth, more long-run uncertainty, and more long-run downside risk. Simultaneously, the risk premium on the consumption claim (Koijen et al. 2010;Lustig et al. 2013) increases and features more positive (adverse) skewness. We rationalize these findings in an endogenous growth model in which fiscal policy is distortionary, the value of innovation depends on fiscal risk, and the representative agent is sensitive to the resulting distribution of consumption risk. Our model suggests that committing to a rapid reduction of the debt-to-output ratio can enhance the value of innovation, aggregate wealth, and welfare.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129577065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alfiia Khuzina, Tatiana Tischenko, Nikita Moguchev, Olga Suchkova, I. Sokolov, Elizaveta Hudko
{"title":"Перспективы развития рынка государственных и корпоративных инфраструктурных облигаций в Российской Федерации (Prospects for the Development of the Market of Government and Corporate Infrastructure Bonds in the Russian Federation)","authors":"Alfiia Khuzina, Tatiana Tischenko, Nikita Moguchev, Olga Suchkova, I. Sokolov, Elizaveta Hudko","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3361009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3361009","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: Инфраструктурные облигации, как один из наиболее важных инструментов финансирования долгосрочных масштабных инфраструктурных проектов в разных странах мира, получил свое распространение как в государственном, так и в корпоративном сегменте. В исследовании предпринята попытка разработать предложения по формированию российского рынка инфраструктурных облигаций с учетом лучших мировых практик и инвестиционных потребностей российской экономики. Особое внимание уделено особенностям применения инфраструктурных облигаций и тенденциям развития и регулирования данного инструмента в России. \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: Infrastructure bonds, as one of the most important instruments for financing long-term large-scale infrastructure projects in different countries of the world, have become widespread in both the government and corporate segments. The study attempted to develop proposals for the expansion of the Russian market of infrastructure bonds, taking into account the best international practices and investment needs of the Russian economy. Particular attention is paid to the features of the use of infrastructure bonds and trends in the development and regulation of this instrument in Russia.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133435170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Community Revitalization Levy as a Municipal Financing Mechanism in Alberta","authors":"Marina Spahlinger, N. Wayne","doi":"10.11575/SPPP.V12I0.43158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V12I0.43158","url":null,"abstract":"What do Edmonton’s glittering new Arena District and Calgary’s complete overhaul of its Rivers District have in common? Both cities pulled their projects off using a novel method of financing: the community revitalization levy (CRL). Because CRLs can cause economic harm when they are used incorrectly, there are general principles that cities should follow when using them. Unfortunately, these principles are not fully in place in Alberta. The result could be that, for all their charm, Calgary’s Rivers District and Edmonton’s Capital City Downtown Plan may not have lived up to be quite the deal citizens might have expected. A CRL should only be used if it is in fact the best financial tool available for the project. It must past certain tests. In the case of Calgary’s River District, it appears that those tests were not properly met, and so it is unclear whether the CRL really was the best financial tool available for the city to use in its effort to improve the area. While the property tax base in the Rivers District has grown more quickly than in the rest of the city, it is impossible to know how much more quickly it would have grown without the use of the CRL as a tool. There also seems to be a lack of clarity of whether new projects funded by the CRL will be in the public’s best interest or if the money would be better used if returned to the tax base. Edmonton, meanwhile, did not pre-define the scope and the cost of all the projects it expects for its Capital City Downtown Plan. While that provides flexibility to develop new project ideas as more revenue materializes, it also allows for scope creep, and the risk that revenues will continue to be spent, even beyond their need, rather than being returned to the tax base. It is also unclear whether the Edmonton plan has actually succeeded in inducing economic growth. It may be that it has only shifted where people spend their money away from other parts of the city and into the downtown district, potentially harming some residents and businesses. 1 CRLs are powerful tools, but they come with risks. They can lead to poor outcomes for taxpayers or businesses and residents in other areas, and they can divert tax revenues away from necessary infrastructure into subsidizing private infrastructure, as may be the case with the Edmonton arena. It is unclear whether the CRL plans in Calgary and Edmonton have turned out to be the best approach for revitalizing parts of the two cities’ downtowns. The province, and the two cities, should look at implementing new measures to better protect taxpayers, and ensure CRLs are being used correctly.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116481887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Banks as Producers of Financial Services","authors":"Wilbur John Coleman, C. Lundblad","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3309317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3309317","url":null,"abstract":"This paper documents that a rise in government debt is associated with a fall in shadow banking and a rise in traditional banking. This is explained in a model where banks are valued for the financial services they offer. Government debt does not compete directly with banks in providing financial services, but the demand for government debt by banks imparts a liquidity premium to government debt. A rise in government debt is estimated to disproportionately benefit traditional banks so they expand at the expense of shadow banks. An optimal debt policy leads both types of banks to become default free.","PeriodicalId":360770,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Debt; Debt Management (Topic)","volume":"303 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126748259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}