Ethical Thought最新文献_第4页

Epistemic Foundations of Aristotle’s Ethics 亚里士多德伦理学的认识基础

Ethical Thought Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-48-61

R. Platonov

{"title":"Epistemic Foundations of Aristotle’s Ethics","authors":"R. Platonov","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-48-61","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-48-61","url":null,"abstract":"The article sets a goal to show Aristotle’s ethics (as a practical science) has its foundations in the fundamental conceptions of his philosophy, because they describe the process of knowledge, being in general and human as a specific existence. For this purpose the author analyses the concept of “episteme” in Aristotle’s philosophy, define the structure of knowledge through the main questions about existence (“what?” and “how?”), and we also show the specifics of the combination of these questions in ethics. We identify the limitations of human cognitive ability and the structure of the object of knowledge, which Aristotle described through the concepts “potency”, “energy” and “entelechy”. As an object of knowledge, a human is revealed through the process of transition from potentially existing to actually existing, while he does not have an actual completion. We make a detailed description of the object of knowledge through the conception of four causes, where the material cause fixes the potentially existing in knowledge, and three other reasons (efficient, formal, final) fix various aspects of its actualization. The description of the object of knowledge through four causes is universal for Aristotle's epistemology and it allows us to describe everything that exists as a global process of expedient change. We show that Aristotle considers the development of an individual as included in the process of human development. Its internal structure is represented by the concept of the soul, where the interaction of parts of the soul determines the quality of human activity. As a result, these notions are the epistemic foundations of ethics as a science, since they determine the subject of its study (human) and reveal his nature as a permanent activity that is included in the generic development and has a purpose in itself.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133071416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Correlation Between “Ought” and “Can”: Moral Aspects of the Choice of Religious Person “应该”与“可以”的关联:宗教者选择的道德层面

Ethical Thought Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-21-33

E. Koval

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引用次数: 0

Home / Archives / Vol. 21 No. 2 (2021) / MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility: Comments on a Paper by E. Loginov, M. Gavrilov, A. Mertsalov and A. Iunusov Home / Archives / Vol. 21 No. 2(2021) /道德责任道德责任的形而上学:评E. Loginov, M. Gavrilov, a . Mertsalov和a . Iunusov的论文

Ethical Thought Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-26-34

Dmitry A. Ananyev

{"title":"Home / Archives / Vol. 21 No. 2 (2021) / MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility: Comments on a Paper by E. Loginov, M. Gavrilov, A. Mertsalov and A. Iunusov","authors":"Dmitry A. Ananyev","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-26-34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-26-34","url":null,"abstract":"In my paper, I critically discuss the third part of an article by E. Loginov, M. Gavrilov, A. Mertsalov and A. Iunusov “Prolegomena to Moral Responsibility”. In the third part of the Prolegomena, the authors present an analysis of the structure of the concept of moral responsibility. An important feature of the structure is the distinction between the fittingness of moral assessment and the fittingness of moral consequences. My objection is that there are no sufficiently weighty reasons that could justify making this distinction in the structure provided by the authors. It seems more reasonable to identify the fact of an agent’s being morally responsible with fittingness of certain moral consequences. The authors also claim that cases in which a factor that belongs to an agent but lacks moral relevance is mistakenly described as having moral relevance is a distinct kind of case in which an agent is held responsible in an incorrect way. I show that the difference of this kind of mistake in holding people responsible from mistakes, which result from holding an agent responsible for a factor which does not belong to this agent in the way that is relevant for moral assessment, is unclear.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123239539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Margaret Fuller’s Woman in the Nineteenth Century: A Reading 玛格丽特·富勒的《十九世纪的女人

Ethical Thought Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-90-103

M. Kizima

{"title":"Margaret Fuller’s Woman in the Nineteenth Century: A Reading","authors":"M. Kizima","doi":"10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-90-103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-90-103","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the book on the equality of women “Woman in the Nineteenth Century” (1845) written by Margaret Fuller (1810–1850), an outstanding American romantic, to elaborate the ideas she had expressed in the essay “The Great Lawsuit: Man versus Men. Woman versus Women” (1843). The author compares these two works and shows their common conceptual ground, as well as the development of Fuller’s views that grew in scope and radicalism. The book is analyzed in its cultural and historical context as a religious and philosophical work that gave a unique expression to the ideas of American Transcendentalism: Fuller was the first to apply its fundamental principle of self-reliance to women and created in the cultural discourse the image of “woman thinking”, complementing thus the image of “man thinking” elaborated in the works of Emerson and other transcendentalists. The author shows that Fuller’s ethical conception drew on the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Christianity, mystical teachings (Swedenborg), utopian socialism (Fourier), Goethe, European romanticism and points out that transcendental moral universalism was Fuller’s basic premise. The article demonstrates that in her book Fuller combined ethical theory with a criticism of the social reality, norms and morals in the USA as unjust (particularly concerning women’s rights, slavery, rights of the underprivileged) and stressed the significance of justice as a moral value. A special attention is drawn to the peculiarities of the book as a publicistic work, in which Fuller develops her ethical ideas through forms of literary expression: sermon, artistic imagination (characters, dialogues), works by other writers in a discussion on the place of women in the history of cultures.","PeriodicalId":360102,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Thought","volume":"73 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114098194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Non-Killing as the Primary Act 不杀戮是首要行为

Ethical Thought Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-2-48-61

O. Zubets

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引用次数: 0

The Principle of Reciprocity in the Old Testament Ethics 旧约伦理中的互惠原则

Ethical Thought Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-100-115

R. Apressyan

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引用次数: 0

Some Remarks on How to Interpret the Concept of “Intermediate Appropriate” Action in Early Stoic Ethics 试论早期斯多葛派伦理学中“中间适当”行为概念的解读

Ethical Thought Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-1-68-80

A. Seregin

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引用次数: 0

The Golden Rule and the Principle of Justice in Henry Sidgwick’s Ethics 亨利·西季威克《伦理学》中的黄金法则与正义原则

Ethical Thought Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-86-99

O. Artemyeva

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引用次数: 0

The Concepts of “What is” and “What ought to be” in Ethical Contexts 伦理语境中的“是什么”与“应该是什么”的概念

Ethical Thought Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-2-38-50

L. Maximov

引用次数: 0

Schopenhauer’s Contribution to the Animal Welfare Movement 叔本华对动物福利运动的贡献

Ethical Thought Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.21146/2074-4870-2022-22-2-74-85

Natalia Yu. Chepeleva

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引用次数: 0