{"title":"Does Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Really Alleviate Agency Conflicts?","authors":"Baolei Qi, Liuchuang Li, Qing Zhou, Jinghui Sun","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12198","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates whether internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) alleviates the managerial expropriation of corporate resources. We do this by examining the potential effects of material weaknesses in internal control on the values of corporate cash holdings and capital expenditures. Our findings suggest that ICFR facilitates the scrutiny and discipline of capital markets and thus alleviates the agency problems. Our results support the premise that high financial reporting quality impairs managers' abilities to use corporate resources in a self-serving manner.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134115942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Succinct Survey of Disclosure Quality Measurements","authors":"Chi Keung Man","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3031472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3031472","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a sequel to prior studies, regarding the most common approaches to measuring CSR quality such as Analysts’ ratings, content or textual analysis, disclosure indices, and the measurement of characteristics such as Auditing and Assurance and Proxies for information quality (e.g. Length, numbers of words, sentences, pages). However, not all of these approaches are appropriate for measuring CSR information quality because CSR disclosures typically contain less financial information and more narratives, as well as more forward-looking information covering a wider range of topics such as human relations, customer relationships and environmental protection. This section explains how three measures, namely quality proxies, disclosure index as well as assurance, which were chosen to measure CSR in this study by drawing on prior studies and conceivable conceptual frameworks. The organization structure of this section is progressive more inclusive here as follows: the section 2 mentions what type of reports being examined in this study, where and how to collect the samples; how quantity approach to measure CSR quality in this study; the section 3 describes how the disclosure indices to measure CSR quality; then, measuring CSR quality through assurance is described; The last section concludes the whole.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124316836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Earnings Guidance and Corporate Diversification","authors":"D. Monk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3001291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3001291","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines voluntary disclosure differences between single business segment \"focused\" firms and multiple business segment \"diversified\" firms. Using management earnings guidance data this paper provides evidence that focused firms are less likely to provide an earnings forecast after controlling for typical determinants of forecast issuance, including various controls for competitive pressures and firm complexity. These results are consistent with higher proprietary costs of disclosure for focused firms potentially stemming from their disclosures being at a finer level of detail. Tests showing that disclosure ranking is not related to excess value are inconsistent with the alternative explanation that diversified firms are more likely to disclose in an attempt to mitigate their intrinsic opacity and therefore reap greater benefits of disclosure.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129749470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Value of Confession: Admitting Mistakes to Build Reputation","authors":"Carlos Corona, R. Randhawa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1702444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1702444","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: Often, firms reveal oversights and bad decisions publicly through their financial reporting (for instance, restating earnings, impairing goodwill, etc.). These “confessions,” which usuall...","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130079330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Linguistic Complexity in Firm Disclosures: Obfuscation or Information?","authors":"Brian J. Bushee, Ian D. Gow, Daniel J. Taylor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2375424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2375424","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research generally interprets complex language in firms’ disclosures as indicative of managerial obfuscation. However, complex language can also reflect the provision of complex information; for example, informative technical disclosure. As a consequence, linguistic complexity commingles two latent components—obfuscation and information—that are related to information asymmetry in opposite directions. We develop a novel empirical approach to estimate these two latent components within the context of quarterly earnings conference calls. We validate our estimates of these two latent components by examining their relation to information asymmetry. Consistent with our predictions, we find that our estimate of the information component is negatively associated with information asymmetry while our estimate of the obfuscation component is positively associated with information asymmetry. Our findings suggest that future research on linguistic complexity can construct more powerful tests by separately examining these two latent components of linguistic complexity.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129279704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ying Cao, Cory A. Cassell, Linda A. Myers, Thomas C. Omer
{"title":"Does Company Reputation Matter for Voluntary Disclosure Quality? Evidence from Management Earnings Forecasts","authors":"Ying Cao, Cory A. Cassell, Linda A. Myers, Thomas C. Omer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2034378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2034378","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we explore the association between company reputation and voluntary disclosure quality as proxied for by the issuance and characteristics of management earnings forecasts. We follow prior literature and proxy for company reputation using measures based on Fortune’s America’s Most Admired Companies List. We find that companies with higher reputations are more likely to issue earnings forecasts, and forecast earnings more frequently. We also find that for the subsample of companies selected to the Most Admired List, earnings forecasts issued by higher reputation companies are more accurate. We provide supporting results from a battery of sensitivity analyses designed to alleviate concerns related to potential endogeneity, the influence of managerial ability, and the influence of information demand. Our study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by identifying a unique factor that motivates companies to voluntarily disclose better forward-looking information, and to the reputation literature by demonstrating the effect of company reputation on company efforts to reduce information asymmetry with stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126059756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gregory Jackson, Julia Bartosch, Daniel Kinderman, J. Knudsen, E. Avetisyan
{"title":"Regulating Self-Regulation? The Politics and Effects of Mandatory CSR Disclosure in Comparison","authors":"Gregory Jackson, Julia Bartosch, Daniel Kinderman, J. Knudsen, E. Avetisyan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2925055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2925055","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on new forms of governance suggests important trade-offs regarding the role of government in relation to corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Theories associate state regulation with clear minimum standards and high compliance, but also suggest advantages of self-regulatory approaches that allow greater flexibility and support best-practices. Given these potential trade-offs, France, Denmark, and the UK were pioneers of a hybrid approach: mandatory non-financial disclosure (NFD). This article shows that despite the different motivations for mandatory NFD in these countries, the disclosure requirements are “soft” and flexible – acknowledging demands from business “that one size regulation doesn’t fit all.” The article further examines the effects of these regulations on CSR activities in 24 OECD countries using the Asset4 ESG database. Our analysis shows that firms in countries with mandatory non-financial disclosure adopt significantly more CSR activities. However, our analysis also highlights that mandatory disclosure decreases the variance between firm activities, contrary to arguments about flexibility. Furthermore, it does not lead to a decline in corporate irresponsibility. These results have implications for our understanding of regulatory trade-offs and how to promote more effective forms of CSR.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124808494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Earnings Management in Nigerian Food Product Companies","authors":"Igodo Ogbonnaya Eze","doi":"10.20474/jabs-3.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20474/jabs-3.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"One of the major challenges facing investors now is how to mitigate earnings management. Therefore, this research paper tries to find out whether this can be achieved through the application of corporate governance mechanisms. A sample of six (6) firms was selected out of eleven (11) firms in the Nigerian food product firms. The data were sourced from yearly report and account of selected firms for a period of twelve years (12), starting from 2003 to 2014. Descriptive statistics and correlation technique were employed in the analysis of data collected. A panel data regression technique was used because the data had time series and cross sectional attributes. It was found that board meeting has negative impact on earnings management; board gender and institutional ownership have negative relationship with earnings management while audit committee meeting has positive impact on earnings management. Size of the firm which is the control variable has positive effect on earnings management. The findings support the application of corporate governance principles as they motivate institutions to ensure that earnings management practice in Nigerian food product firms is adequately supervised. The study adopts agency theory which believes in bringing managers and shareholders to have a common understanding, thereby reducing agency cost. Therefore, the study recommends that institutional shareholdings should be encouraged as this would help to reduce the extent of earnings management in Nigerian food product firms.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117076013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scott D. Dyreng, Rahul Vashishtha, Joseph P. Weber
{"title":"Direct Evidence on the Informational Properties of Earnings in Loan Contracts","authors":"Scott D. Dyreng, Rahul Vashishtha, Joseph P. Weber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2494360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2494360","url":null,"abstract":"Using a sample of firms that disclose the realizations of earnings used for determining covenant compliance in loan contracts, we provide direct evidence on the informational properties of earnings used in the performance covenants included in debt contracts. We find that the earnings measure used in performance covenants does not exhibit asymmetric loss timeliness and has significantly greater cash flow predictive ability than GAAP measures of earnings. We suggest that these results reflect the idea that contracting parties design accounting rules for performance covenants to enhance their efficacy as “tripwires.”","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"91 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132679967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"GAAP as Ineffective Legal Defense of Financial Reporting: Implications for Truthfulness, Auditability, and the IASB's Proposed 2015 Conceptual Framework","authors":"Wally J. Smieliauskas, R. Craig, J. Amernic","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2899074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2899074","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the accounting reasoning of two expert accounting witnesses at the 2006 trial of Enron executives who testified that the financial reporting of Enron conformed fully with US generally accepted accounting principles [GAAP]. We analyze the experts’ evidence using argumentation theory to highlight important issues in the reasoning process underlying financial reporting as support for our critique of the IASB’s proposed 2015 Conceptual Framework. We make two recommendations. First, that a CF should be allowed to override any detailed standard whenever that standard results in untruthful/unethical reporting. This effectively means that the CF should be installed at the top of any GAAP hierarchy as the dominant item guiding standard setting and professional practice. Second, that the concept of ‘faithful representation’ should invoke the concept of ‘verifiably acceptable levels of accounting risk’ in order to incorporate the notion of truthfulness of forecasts in accounting estimates.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129582879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}