{"title":"Credit Derivatives: CDSs and Value’s Firms; Effect on Financial Statements","authors":"A. Azami","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1940716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1940716","url":null,"abstract":"A derivative is bilateral agreement that shift risk from one party to another. The CDSs are standardized relative to be the underlying cash market and in this way can help promote market liquidity. This paper develops general instruments of credit derivatives especial credit default swaps and mutual of relation between financial statements which are mirrored firm’s value like balance sheet, cash flow, income statements and default probability. To take up about interest rate risk, Gap, Gap ratio and that how it work and we discuss about effect of a default on balance sheet and reformulated balance sheet. Eventually, how function of CDS in the real world.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124482475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Management Disclosures on Internal Control in Annual Reports - A Study on Banking Sector: Bangladesh Perspective","authors":"A. Saha, S. Arifuzzaman","doi":"10.5539/IJEF.V3N5P216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5539/IJEF.V3N5P216","url":null,"abstract":"Even though no regulations require, public limited companies include management reports regarding internal controls in annual reports. Accountants and auditors are in a good position to suggest what degree of reporting is appropriate as they are directly involved in auditing financial statements and reviewing internal controls. This is a unique opportunity for management to discuss issues and concerns not communicated elsewhere in the annual report. From the very beginning there is a growing consensus as to what the content should include: financial statement presentation; purpose, nature and components of internal controls; roles of internal audit, independent auditor and audit committee. A significant number of companies studied acknowledge that “the systems are designed to provide only a reasonable assurance of meeting stated objectives.” If independent auditor’s attestation of such management reports were required; such a mandate would have a significant impact on roles of both the independent auditor and management.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125094562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does the Enron Case Study Provide Valuable Lessons in the Early Detection of Corporate Fraud & Failure?","authors":"Baitshepi Tebogo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1906045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1906045","url":null,"abstract":"The company that came to be known as Enron underwent an extensive transformation in terms of name, and scope of activities. By the time of its collapse, it had a massive number of subsidiaries and was considered one of the most successful companies in the world partly because financial analysts were not paying attention to the very basic financial metrics. The large size and, until 2001, exquisite reputation of Enron appeared to have made financial analysts and other investigators lax and devoid of vigilance when it came to scrutinising its financial performance. However, several financial analysis done after the demise of Enron showed that its collapse could have been predicted much earlier. In this paper, the Beneish ratios, the Modified Altman Z-Score, Chanos Algorithm and the Grove and Cook ratios have all shown that the Enron collapse was predictable, had analysts done what they were supposed to do and not considered the company to be too big to fail. The Enron case study also highlights the importance of qualitative analysis in reviewing corporate performance, which as things turned out was instrumental in drawing the public’s attention to the company’s dubious accounting practices.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129536519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Ball, Sudarshan Jayaraman, Lakshmanan Shivakumar
{"title":"Audited Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure as Complements: A Test of the Confirmation Hypothesis","authors":"R. Ball, Sudarshan Jayaraman, Lakshmanan Shivakumar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1626195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1626195","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the “confirmation” hypothesis that audited financial reporting and disclosure of managers' private information are complements, because independent verification of outcomes disciplines and hence enhances disclosure credibility. Committing to higher audit fees (a measure of financial statement verification) is associated with management forecasts that are more frequent, specific, timely, accurate and informative to investors. Because private information disclosure and audited financial reporting are complements, their economic roles cannot be evaluated separately. Our evidence cautions against drawing inferences exclusively from market reactions around “announcement periods” because audited financial reporting indirectly affects information released at other times and through other channels.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"172 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132751080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Qian Wang, Michael L. Ettredge, Y. Huang, Lili Sun
{"title":"Strategic Revelation of Differences in Segment Earnings Growth","authors":"Qian Wang, Michael L. Ettredge, Y. Huang, Lili Sun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1081708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081708","url":null,"abstract":"Prior studies have theoretically and empirically documented that incentives to disclose information involve a trade-off between the benefits to the corporation of reducing information asymmetry and the costs of revealing proprietary information. This study investigates the interplay of managers’ motives to conceal versus reveal cross-segment differences in earnings growth in multi-segment firms. We find that revealed segment earnings growth differences are negatively associated with proxies for proprietary costs and agency costs, and positively associated with firms’ reliance on external financing. We also find that SFAS No. 131 improved the quality of segment information by requiring or allowing revelation of greater cross-segment differences in earnings growth.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"451 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115286481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Managers’ Segment Financial Reporting Choice: An Analysis Of Firms’ Segment Reconciliations","authors":"E. Alfonso, Dana Hollie, S. Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1804463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1804463","url":null,"abstract":"Under SFAS No. 131, a company is required to provide a reconciliation of the total of the reportable segments’ profit or loss to the firm’s consolidated income. This paper investigates these segment disclosures and related determinants of managers’ segment financial reporting choices. We focus on managers’ decisions to report segment-to-firm level reconciliations (i.e., segment reconciliations (SERs)) – differences between firm-level and aggregated segment-level earnings. On average, we find that SERs are significant when the differences are not equal to zero. Firms with higher agency costs and greater accruals are less likely to report segment reconciliations. However, firms that have a greater number of segments, larger firms, and firms with higher leverage, losses, and greater earnings volatility are more likely to report SER≠0. Consistent with managers having some segment reporting discretion, our overall findings suggest a manager’s segment reporting choice is partly driven by agency costs. Interestingly, among firms with reported segment reconciliations, firms with higher agency costs are more likely to report positive SERs. Consequently, this study documents a relation between proxies for agency costs and managers’ decisions to report segment reconciliations. Policy implications and suggestions for future research are discussed in the paper.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125312451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Polish Public Companies 'Cooking the Books'? The Evidence from Annual Earnings Thresholds","authors":"J. Welc","doi":"10.19030/IBER.V10I3.4104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.19030/IBER.V10I3.4104","url":null,"abstract":"Earnings management erodes the usefulness of financial statements, because the typical result of “cooking the books” is the occurrence of “earnings bubble” that bursts sooner or later, causing stock price to dive. This paper explores the presence of earnings management in the case of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2000-2009 period. We used the methodology based on two earnings thresholds: the negative / positive annual earnings threshold and the threshold between the decrease / increase of annual earnings. The research found that there is unusually low number of observations with the net margin between -1,5% and 0% and unusually high number of observations with the net margin between 0% and 2%, which suggests that companies with unmanaged earnings just below zero boost those earnings to the levels just above zero. The research also confirmed (although less strongly than in the case of negative / positive net margin threshold) the earnings management around zero earnings growth, which suggests that companies with unmanaged earnings that would show the small decline y/y boost those earnings in order to report the positive growth at the level just above zero.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127613774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Information Disclosure Influence on Investment Activity of Russian Public Companies","authors":"V. Udaltsov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1584103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1584103","url":null,"abstract":"Improvements in investment efficiency and increase in volume of investments are parts of investment activity, and the growth of it is a necessary condition for economic development in every country. In environment of external mechanisms weakness for favorable investment climate creation, the use of internal mechanisms, such as increase of an information transparency is critical. For purpose of our research of estimating the relationship between transparency level and investment activity we have developed new measure for determining transparency of accessible information - Transparency index of accessible information (TIAI). For testing positive relationship between informational transparency and investment activity we used data of 34 Russian public companies.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"24 18","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113955462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investment Opportunity Set, Accounting Policy, and Discretionary Accruals","authors":"H. Chaibi, Abdelwahed Omri, Samir Trabelsi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1762816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762816","url":null,"abstract":"This study analyzes the effect of the investment opportunity set (IOS) on management's use of discretionary accruals to increase or decrease income. We argue that the relation between the IOS and the managerial decision to select accounting methods to maximize or minimize reported results is based upon the level of firm information asymmetry. First, given the information asymmetry, managers engage in income-increasing earnings management to signal firm performance or to achieve personal gains. Second, given their greater information asymmetry, firms with high investment opportunity set are more likely to select income-increasing accounting procedure. Third, we argue that discretionary accruals are a global measure of corporate accounting choices. The results of this paper show that firms with more investment opportunities are more likely to use discretionary accruals to maximize reported earnings. These results are robust to various discretionary accruals models and other sensitivity tests.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"455 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122827453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Feng Chen, Ole‐Kristian Hope, Qingyuan Li, Xin Wang
{"title":"Financial Reporting Quality and Investment Efficiency of Private Firms in Emerging Markets","authors":"Feng Chen, Ole‐Kristian Hope, Qingyuan Li, Xin Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1635425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1635425","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: Prior research shows that financial reporting quality (FRQ) is positively related to investment efficiency for large U.S. publicly traded companies. We examine the role of FRQ in private firms from emerging markets, a setting in which extant research suggests that FRQ would be less conducive to the mitigation of investment inefficiencies. Earlier studies show that private firms have lower FRQ, presumably because of lower market demand for public information. Prior research also shows that FRQ is lower in countries with low investor protection, bank-oriented financial systems, and stronger conformity between tax and financial reporting rules. Using firm-level data from the World Bank, our empirical evidence suggests that FRQ positively affects investment efficiency. We further find that the relation between FRQ and investment efficiency is increasing in bank financing and decreasing in incentives to minimize earnings for tax purposes. Such a connection between tax-minimization incentives and the...","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122740246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}