{"title":"Social Capital, Product Market Competition and Corporate Disclosure of Proprietary Information","authors":"Eunhee Kim, S. Radhakrishnan, Z. Wang, X. Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3319715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319715","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of social capital in local communities on corporate disclosure of proprietary information. Firms located in communities with higher social capital care more about the collective interests of the local communities. While the disclosure of proprietary information has the benefit of improving stock prices, the proprietary information revealed can be exploited by the firm’s product market rivals to its disadvantage and impose significant costs on both investors and the local community. Thus, when managers take the interests of local communities into consideration, they will view the disclosure of proprietary information to be a more costly action compared to those who only consider investors’ interests alone. Our empirical analysis confirms that firms located in communities with higher levels of social capital are associated with less disclosure of proprietary information. In addition, we find that the negative association between social capital and the disclosure of proprietary information is more pronounced for firms facing higher proprietary cost, with lower external financing dependence or with higher long-term institutional ownership.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114781987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Firm Value Effects of Targeted Disclosure Regulation: The Role of Reputational Costs","authors":"K. Hombach, T. Sellhorn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3204505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3204505","url":null,"abstract":"We study the reputational costs of targeted disclosure regulation – disclosure requirements aimed at policy objectives outside of securities regulators’ traditional missions. This emerging type of disclosure regulation empowers civil society to deter firms’ illicit actions. Our setting is the SEC’s extraction payments disclosure rule, which requires oil and gas firms to publish details about their payments to host governments. Consistent with reputational costs imposed on affected firms, our event-study results document that the rule’s negative effect on firm value is stronger where greater reputational risk makes firms more vulnerable to public pressure. Our qualitative field evidence suggests that reputational costs arise because the required disclosures facilitate pressure groups’ campaigning. These findings are robust to several alternative explanations and research design choices.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131309401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uncertainty in Managers’ Reporting Objectives and Investors’ Response to Earnings Reports: Evidence from the 2006 Executive Compensation Disclosures","authors":"F. Ferri, Rong Zheng, Yuan Zou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2902246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2902246","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether the information content of the earnings report, as captured by the earnings response coefficient (ERC), increases when investors’ uncertainty about the manager’s reporting objectives decreases, as predicted in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). We use the 2006 mandatory compensation disclosures as an instrument to capture a decrease in investors’ uncertainty about managers’ incentives and reporting objectives. Employing a difference-in-differences design and exploiting the staggered adoption of the new rules, we find a statistically and economically significant increase in ERC for treated firms relative to control firms, largely driven by profit firms. Cross-sectional tests suggest that the effect is more pronounced in subsets of firms most affected by the new rules. Our findings represent the first empirical evidence of a role of compensation disclosures in enhancing the information content of financial reports.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129480272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who Consumes Firm Disclosures? Evidence from Earnings Conference Calls","authors":"Ann Heinrichs, Jihwon Park, Eugene F. Soltes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2653088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2653088","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Using a set of proprietary records, we examine who consumes quarterly earnings conference calls and under which circumstances the calls are consumed. While there is significant interest in calls by institutional investors and sell-side analysts, we find that investors who do not hold a position in the firm are a leading consumer. We show that buy-side non-holders who consume calls are more likely to hold positions in competitors and to purchase the stock in the future. In addition, many investors who hold large positions only consume calls periodically. We also document a benefit of consuming calls by finding that the consumption of calls is associated with more informed trading decisions. Overall, our investigation illuminates the actual consumption of conference calls by different consumers and the potential benefits of consuming additional firm disclosures.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125334945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Profitability: Return on Equity, Return on Investment, Modigliani & Miller Proposition II And Economic Value Added","authors":"Roberto Moro Visconti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3144286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3144286","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate profitability is a core issue of financial statement analysis and corporate finance. Economic profitability, deriving from positive marginality where revenues exceed costs, is considered in complementary ways. Return on equity (ROE), Return on investment (ROI), Return on sales (ROS) and other ratios are systematically illustrated. This analysis is preparatory to Modigliani & Miller proposition II: as the proportion of debt in the company's capital structure increases, its ROE increases in a linear fashion. An empirical case is provided, starting from a real balance sheet. Economic Value Added represents the value created in excess of the required return of the company's shareholders, i.e. the net profit less the equity cost of the firm's capital.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125173713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Risk Committee on Financial Performance of UK Financial Institutions","authors":"Ahmed A. Elamer, Ismail Benyazid","doi":"10.1504/IJAF.2018.10014470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJAF.2018.10014470","url":null,"abstract":"Following the recent financial crisis, Walker (2009) recommended that financial institutions should form a separate board level risk committee (RC) to manage various risks and prevent excessive risk taking. This research focuses on investigating how firms with separate risk committees differ from those that do not have one. The main research question we address is whether RCs have a fundamental influence on financial performance. We measure financial performance by ROA and ROE and we control for firm size, liquidity and gearing. Our sample consists of all listed financial institutions in FTSE-100 index from 2010 through 2014. Results indicate a negative relationship between risk committee characteristics (i.e., existence, size, independence, and meeting frequency) and financial performance. The results also indicate that firms without RC performed considerably well than firms with RC. The results are contradictory to Walker's (2009) where RCs are recommended for their ability to mitigate and manage risks more expertly. However, we argue that establishing strong RC constrains management ability to make excessive risk taking behaviour, which may affect financial performance negatively. We contribute to the current research on the impact of risk committee governance attributes on financial performance after banking and governance reforms.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122263402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Disclosures Readable? An Empirical Test","authors":"Uri Benoliel, X. Zheng","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3128876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3128876","url":null,"abstract":"A major goal of federal disclosure laws is to ensure that pre-contractual disclosure documents are readable, i.e., easily understood by the average disclosee. Focusing as a case study on 523 U.S. disclosures in the franchise industry, this Article empirically indicates that disclosures are often difficult to read. Using the Gunning Fog linguistics readability index, this article indicates, inter alia, that prospective franchisees need, on average, more than 20 years of education to understand a franchise disclosure document on the first reading. This result undermines the readability goal of the federal franchise disclosure law since the highest level of education that most franchisees have completed is community college, which is normally the equivalent of 14 years of education. The results of our study also show a significant positive relationship between the franchise's size and age, and the readability of their disclosures. \u0000The empirical results of this study have significant implications, not only for the franchise industry, but also for the institutional design and enforcement of federal disclosure regulations.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"PC-28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126680315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Non-GAAP Reporting and Accounting Restatement","authors":"Shin-Rong Shiah-Hou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3107497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3107497","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, I examine whether disclosing Non-GAAP earnings is a signal of experiencing accounting restatement. I propose a scenario in which earnings are managed within the constraints of GAAP guidelines, as long as there is sufficient leeway to permit income-increasing accounting choices. Managers usually avoid issuing Non-GAAP earnings because of severe penalties. If this becomes no longer possible within GAAP earning management, managers have incentives to cross the line into Non-GAAP territory. At this point, disclosing Non-GAAP earnings is positively associated with accounting restatement because of the great magnitude of earnings management. I find that firms with restatements experience a significant increase in the relative use of disclosing Non-GAAP earnings with positive other exclusions. Firms with the positive other exclusions excluded from Non-GAAP earnings may exhibit increased likelihood of fraud or core-earnings restatement. Finally, firms disclosing Non-GAAP earnings and having high accounting complexity are more likely to restate than those disclosing Non-GAAP earnings and having low accounting complexity.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"142 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133665978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Earnings Management Preferences of Family Firms and Its Impact on the Market Value of the Firm","authors":"Suhas M. Avabruth, P. Saravanan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3102030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3102030","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we analyze the preference for earnings management techniques by the family firms and the impact of the same on the performance of the firm. Family firms contrary to non-family firms are driven by different objectives. Using socio emotional wealth theory, we hypothesize that family firms prefer an earnings management technique, which is less risky in the long term. Using the publicly available data on all the family firms listed on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), our analysis indicates prevalence both accrual based and real activity earnings management among Indian family firms. However, revenue based real activity earnings management was preferred by those family firms that have exhausted the possibility of accrual based earnings management. Our analysis of the impact of earnings management choice on market value indicates a short-term positive impact of the accrual based earnings management. Revenue based real activity earnings management was found to have long term positive impact but the cost based real activity earnings management had a long term negative impact on the value of the market value of the firm.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121514435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making a Market for Corporate Disclosure","authors":"Kevin S. Haeberle, M. Henderson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2814125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2814125","url":null,"abstract":"One of the core problems that law seeks to address relates to the inadequate production and sharing of information. The problem manifests itself throughout the law — from the basic contracts, torts, and constitutional law settings through that of food and drug, national security, and intellectual property law. Given that we live in the Information Age, the problem is both disconcertingly under-addressed and eminently addressable at the same time.Perhaps nowhere is the concern more notable than when it comes to the generation and release of valuable information by the public companies that drive the United States economy. This aspect of the problem is evidenced by prominent recent debates on the extent to which firms should be required to disclose information on their political spending since the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision. Beyond sharing of that valuable information, policymakers have long sought to ameliorate sub-optimally low levels of corporate disclosure to shareholders, regulators, and the public more generally. Their main tool has come in the form of the famous mandatory-disclosure rules of the mid-1930s, as well as the layers added on them over the years. But the disclosure regime has long been critiqued for falling well short of its goals. A number of solutions have been offered, ranging from the radical (dump the regime and its overlays altogether in favor of state-level regulation) to the mundane (adding to the 100-plus-page list of what issuers of securities must disclose). In this Article, however, we offer an innovative approach based on simple regulatory changes to allow market forces to interact in a way that has the potential to better address the problem of information underproduction: amend federal regulations that prevent forces of supply and demand from meeting in a market for early access to corporate disclosures. Thus, we propose a market for corporate disclosure.","PeriodicalId":355269,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Disclosure & Accounting Decisions (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130196937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}