{"title":"HAPPINESS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF AFFECT","authors":"Daniel M. Haybron","doi":"10.7202/1097015ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1097015ar","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":354270,"journal":{"name":"Les ateliers de l'éthique","volume":"22 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125890803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CONTEXTUALISER L’ATROCITE ? LE MUSEE DE LA MEMOIRE ET DES DROITS DE L’HOMME AU CHILI","authors":"Mauro Basaure","doi":"10.7202/1071137ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1071137ar","url":null,"abstract":"Cet article cherche a innover dans le cadre de la controverse sur le musee de la Memoire et des Droits de l’homme (MMDH) du Chili : devrait-il ou non integrer dans sa museographie la periode anterieure au 11 septembre 1973, c’est-a-dire le contexte du coup d’Etat ? Je defends la these selon laquelle le MMDH peut integrer une dimension contextuelle sans trahir sa mission, sa vision et sa fonction, tant qu’il repond a une approche de la notion de contexte-sans-causalite. Selon moi, le grand probleme de la critique venant de la droite politique – qui accuse le musee de ne pas remplir sa mission pedagogique, car il decontextualise le coup d’Etat – est que cette critique repond a une vision causale de la notion de contexte, ce qui la conduit a des contradictions insurmontables. Si, grâce a une museographie bien reflechie, le concept de contextualisation non causale etait mis en oeuvre avec succes, ceci n’engendrerait pas une contradiction au sein du musee mais pourrait meme le favoriser. La conviction que le coup d’Etat et ses atrocites n’ont ni causes ni antecedents et ne peuvent en avoir renforce la mission pedagogique du MMDH.","PeriodicalId":354270,"journal":{"name":"Les ateliers de l'éthique","volume":"165 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126837639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"MÉTAÉTHIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIE NORMATIVE : DEUX APPROCHES","authors":"Ophélie Desmons, J. Maclure","doi":"10.7202/1069953ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1069953ar","url":null,"abstract":"Cet article se propose de comparer deux approches differentes de la metaethique, toutes deux portees par des penseurs qui ont conjugue un interet pour les questions metaethiques et pour les questions normatives. La premiere approche, qui est celle de Ruwen Ogien, accorde une priorite a la question semantique. La semantique inspire le reste de la reflexion metaethique. La deuxieme approche, qui trouve ses sources chez John Rawls et ceux qui lui ont succede, prend quant a elle les questions normatives comme point de depart, sans pour autant delaisser la reflexion metaethique. Celle-ci est menee dans des termes differents, qui s’averent particulierement pertinents pour ceux qui s’interessent aux questions normatives. Elle aboutit neanmoins a ce que nous appellerons un « minimalisme metaethique », qui appelle un certain nombre de complements.","PeriodicalId":354270,"journal":{"name":"Les ateliers de l'éthique","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130441109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF RECOVERING HISTORICAL MEMORY SEEING LAND: RESITUATING LANDSCAPES THROUGH CONTEMPORARY INDIGENOUS ART EXHIBITIONS","authors":"Carmen Robertson","doi":"10.7202/1071134ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1071134ar","url":null,"abstract":"Canadian landscapes on gallery walls in art museums serve as a primer for understanding the nation. Visitors cannot easily escape the purposeful emptiness of rugged scenes meant to visually assure them of the nation’s right to colonial possession. Most viewers respond positively to these pretty pictures because such ways of seeing the art history of Canada has been naturalized and normalized, appearing politically neutral.Ubiquitous Canadian landscape paintings also reinforce colonial claiming of land and authorize erasure of Indigenous relations with the land. Understanding the noted landscapes as something other than part of a national narrative, however, has not been widely accepted, even as a sanctioned mandate to broaden art historical narratives has resulted in displaying additional Indigenous art in galleries. In an analysis that considers ways to re-vision the privileged colonial narrative present in Canadian art museums, deeper ethical issues arise in relation to institutional structures. Here the analysis focuses on three projects in and around Canada 150, including examples such as Shame and Prejudice: A Story of Resilience (2017–2020, Kent Monkman), the rehanging of Norval Morrisseau’s Artist and Shaman between Two Worlds (1980) at the National Gallery of Canada, and the Michael Belmore and A. J. Casson: Nkweshkdaadiimgak Miinwaa Bakeziibiisan/Confluences and Tributaries exhibit at the Ottawa Art Gallery (2018, Ottawa). This essay explores questions regarding whether ways of seeing land differently come about simply by hanging Indigenous art on institutional walls or whether more systemic change is required.","PeriodicalId":354270,"journal":{"name":"Les ateliers de l'éthique","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129819979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"IN PRAISE OF LUMPEN HUMANITY: AGGREGATION, PERSONAL & IMPERSONAL REASONS","authors":"V. Munoz-Dardé","doi":"10.7202/1069955ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1069955ar","url":null,"abstract":"T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism and more specifically his conception of morality narrowly conceived proscribe direct appeal to what he calls impersonal values, such as items of natural beauty or cultural goods. In the scope of what we owe to each other, one should appeal only to concerns arising from what bears directly on individuals, by reference to which they can reasonably reject one set of principles in favour of another. There is an overlooked ambiguity here in how we should understand the scope of “what we owe to each other.” Unpacking this helps us see more clearly how contractualism can respond to the challenge that it must accommodate the intuitive force of aggregating: that, when all other things are equal, we are required to save a greater number of people over a lesser. I explain the role personal and impersonal value have in Scanlon’s contractualism. I connect the focus on personal value with perspectivalism, the justificatory privileging of the perspective of victims. Perspectivalism, I suggest, is motivated by Scanlon’s constructivist methodology. Whether perspectivalism is adequate as the basis of contractualism is not independent of the question of aggregation. Given the ambiguity highlighted, I conclude that other forms of contractualism might safely ignore the demands of aggregation.","PeriodicalId":354270,"journal":{"name":"Les ateliers de l'éthique","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115557627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE VIETNAM PIETA: SHAPING THE MEMORY OF SOUTH KOREA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR","authors":"Justine Guichard","doi":"10.7202/1071131ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1071131ar","url":null,"abstract":"Conceived to commemorate the victims of South Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War, the statue of the Vietnam Pieta invites us to question who shapes the memory of this neglected facet of the conflict. The present article analyzes the various actors involved in this contentious process in and across both countries, starting with the South Korean activists behind the statue’s making and the movement for recognizing the crimes committed by their army. Examining these activists’ advocacy work since the late 1990s, the article argues that they are triply situated in the fight over remembering South Korea’s intervention in Vietnam. Truth advocates first appear in a position of privilege and leadership vis-a-vis Vietnamese victims of South Korean military wrongdoings, which raises the issue of the material and political asymmetries at stake in the construction of memory. Simultaneously, the same advocates occupy a position of marginality vis-a-vis the dominant public discourse held on the war by Hanoi and Seoul, whose common interest lies in deepening their mutually beneficial but unequal economic partnership. Thirdly, the memory of the conflict pits truth activists against another group within their own civil society: veterans’ organizations aggressively denying all war crimes accusations. Ultimately, remembering the war is not the object of a bilateral dispute between the South Korean and Vietnamese states, but rather a site of domestic tensions within South Korea itself.","PeriodicalId":354270,"journal":{"name":"Les ateliers de l'éthique","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123045107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Afterword","authors":"Cynthia E. Milton","doi":"10.7202/1071140ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1071140ar","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":354270,"journal":{"name":"Les ateliers de l'éthique","volume":"6 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132063459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CONNAISSANCE MORALE ET DOGMATISME","authors":"Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette","doi":"10.7202/1069951ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1069951ar","url":null,"abstract":"Le realisme moral, dans son acception classique, affirme qu’il existe des verites morales objectives et necessaires qu’il nous est parfois donne de decouvrir. Appele a motiver cette position forte, le realiste se contente d’ordinaire de refuter les accusations sceptiques. Au mieux, il invoque des faits moraux de premier ordre (ethique) pour justifier sa doctrine de second ordre (metaethique). En un mot, si l’on croit au realisme, ce serait ou bien sans argument ou bien en vertu d’un argument circulaire. Dans les deux cas, le realisme semble reposer sur une forme de dogmatisme. Le realisme est aussi accuse, souvent implicitement, de cautionner le dogmatisme en ethique. Apres tout, selon le realisme, la morale n’est pas une question d’opinion ou de consensus, mais de verite et de decouverte. Neanmoins, cette double accusation est erronee. D’une part, le realisme ne repose pas forcement sur le dogmatisme puisqu’il est possible d’etre realiste sans etre dogmatique. D’autre part, le realisme ne cautionne pas le dogmatisme en ethique. Pour avancer ces deux theses, j’offre une definition du dogmatisme en quatre volets et je montre que le realisme peut tous les eviter. Cette reflexion suggere que la pratique de l’ethique et celle de la metaethique doivent etre reliees.","PeriodicalId":354270,"journal":{"name":"Les ateliers de l'éthique","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133015740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"VIRTUE, HAPPINESS, AND EMOTION","authors":"A. Kauppinen","doi":"10.7202/1097017ar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1097017ar","url":null,"abstract":"For Ateliers de l’éthique . Special issue on well-being and affective states.","PeriodicalId":354270,"journal":{"name":"Les ateliers de l'éthique","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127566789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"DE LA MENACE DU BIAIS D’ANTHROPOMORPHISME DANS NOS RAPPORTS MORAUX AUX NON-HUMAINS","authors":"Timothée Gallen, R. Monvoisin","doi":"10.7202/1077531AR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1077531AR","url":null,"abstract":"La philosophie antispeciste souffre-t-elle d’un angle mort en accordant des sentiments et des capacites aux autres animaux ? Ce texte examine la critique du biais d’anthropomorphisme, qui atteindrait la philosophie animaliste. En analysant de quelle maniere se construisent nos connaissances sur les comportements des animaux non humains, nous montrons que faire appel a un anthropomorphisme critique est non seulement une option logique et rationnelle, mais surtout la seule dont nous disposons pour comprendre le comportement des autres animaux. Ainsi, l’une des critiques principales faites aux conclusions morales de la philosophie animaliste n’a selon nous pas lieu d’etre.","PeriodicalId":354270,"journal":{"name":"Les ateliers de l'éthique","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114877042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}