{"title":"Safety in Police Numbers: Evidence of Police Effectiveness from Federal COPS Grant Applications","authors":"Emily K. Weisburst","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2845099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2845099","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding the impact of police on crime is critical to designing policies that maximize safety. In this article, I use a novel estimation approach to measure the impact of police hiring, which exploits variation in federal Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) hiring grants, while also controlling for the endogenous decisions of police departments to apply for these grants. Using data from nearly 7,000 U.S. municipalities, I find that a 10% increase in police employment rates reduces violent crime rates by 13% and property crime rates by 7%. The results also provide suggestive evidence that law enforcement leaders are forward-looking.","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130132526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Drug Consumption in Colombia","authors":"Adriana Camacho, Alejandro Gaviria, C. Rodríguez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2877199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2877199","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the evolution of drug use in Colombia over the past years. Our analysis, based on surveys from the Direccion Nacional de Estupefacientes, shows that drug consumption grew substantially between 1996 and 2013. The growth occurred for both genders, all ages, socioeconomic strata and types of occupation. The results also suggest that men of high socioeconomic strata who regularly consume alcohol and cigarettes and who are between 18 and 24 years of age are more likely to use drugs. Finally, the paper presents some indirect evidence that contradicts the alleged effects of the judgment of the Constitutional Court (Sentencia C-221 of May 1994) that decriminalized the personal dose on the consumption of drugs in Colombia.","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115558219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Absolute Inequality and Violent Property Crime","authors":"Thomas Goda, A. Torres","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2827788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2827788","url":null,"abstract":"Rational choice models argue that income inequality leads to a higher expected utility of crime and thus generates incentives to engage in illegal activities. Yet, the results of empirical studies do not provide strong support for this theory; in fact, Neumayer provides apparently strong evidence that income inequality is not a significant determinant of violent property crime rates when a representative sample is used and country specific fixed effects are controlled for. An important limitation of this and other empirical studies on the subject is that they only consider proportional income differences, even though in rational choice models absolute difference in legal and illegal incomes determine the expected utility of crime. Using the same methodology and data as Neumayer, but using absolute inequality measures rather than proportional ones, this paper finds that absolute income inequality is a statistically significant determinant of robbery and violent theft rates. This result is robust to changes in sample size and to different absolute inequality measures, which not only implies that inequality is an important correlate of violent property crime rates but also suggests that absolute measures are preferable when the impact of inequality on property crime is studied.","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125888845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges","authors":"Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin, Crystal S. Yang","doi":"10.1257/AER.20161503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.20161503","url":null,"abstract":"Over 20 percent of prison and jail inmates in the United States are currently awaiting trial, but little is known about the impact of pre-trial detention on defendants. This paper uses the detention tendencies of quasi-randomly assigned bail judges to estimate the causal effects of pre-trial detention on subsequent defendant outcomes. Using data from administrative court and tax records, we find that being detained before trial significantly increases the probability of a conviction, primarily through an increase in guilty pleas. Pre-trial detention has no detectable effect on future crime, but decreases pre-trial crime and failures to appear in court. We also find suggestive evidence that pre-trial detention decreases formal sector employment and the receipt of employment- and tax-related government benefits. We argue that these results are consistent with (i) pre-trial detention weakening defendants' bargaining position during plea negotiations, and (ii) a criminal conviction lowering defendants' prospects in the formal labor market.","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128124581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Most Local Officials are Satisfied with Law Enforcement Services, But Almost Half from Largest Jurisdictions Say Their Funding is Insufficient","authors":"D. Horner, Thomas M. Ivacko","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2772192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2772192","url":null,"abstract":"This report examines Michigan local government leaders’ opinions on law enforcement services in their community, including the perception of problems with crime in the community, satisfaction with law enforcement performance, and funding of law enforcement at the local level. The findings are based on statewide surveys of local government leaders in the Fall 2015 wave of the Michigan Public Policy Survey (MPPS).","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"249 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123161763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution","authors":"David M. Uhlmann","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2642455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2642455","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate crime continues to occur at an alarming rate, yet disagreement persists among scholars and practitioners about the role of corporate criminal prosecution. Some argue that corporations should face criminal prosecution for their misconduct, while others would reserve criminal prosecution for individual corporate officials. Perhaps as a result of this conflict, there has been a dramatic increase over the last decade in the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements for some corporate crimes, even as the government continues to bring criminal charges for other corporate crimes. To move beyond our erratic approach to corporate crime, we need a better understanding of what is accomplished by the criminal prosecution of corporations, a construct that considers retributive and utilitarian theories but also takes into account the expressive function of criminal law and the societal need for condemnation, accountability, and justice when crime occurs.In this article, I provide a justification for corporate criminal prosecution that identifies the moral content of corporate crime, considers the deterrent value of corporate prosecution, and explains why the expressive value of the criminal law is indispensable in the corporate context. Corporate wrongdoing has pernicious effects on our communities, the economy, and the environment, which warrant the condemnation the criminal law provides. Criminal prosecution of corporations upholds the rule of law, validates the choices of law-abiding companies, and promotes accountability. Together those values contribute to our sense that justice has been done when crime occurs, which enhances trust in the legal system, provides the opportunity for societal catharsis, and allows us to move forward in the aftermath of criminal activity. When corporations face no consequences for their criminal behavior, we minimize their lawlessness, and increase cynicism about the outsized influence of corporations.","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116062234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Air Pollution and Criminal Activity: Evidence from Chicago Microdata","authors":"Evan M. Herrnstadt, E. Muehlegger","doi":"10.3386/W21787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W21787","url":null,"abstract":"A large and growing literature documents the adverse impacts of pollution on health, productivity, educational attainment and socioeconomic outcomes. This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence that air pollution causally affects criminal activity. We exploit detailed location data on over two million serious crimes reported to the Chicago police department over a twelve-year period. We identify the causal effect of pollution on criminal activity by comparing crime on opposite sides of major interstates on days when the wind blows orthogonally the direction of the interstate and find that violent crime is 2.2 percent higher on the downwind side. Consistent with evidence from psychology on the relationship between pollution and aggression, the effect is unique to violent crimes – we find no effect of pollution on the commission of property crime.","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116104333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Policeman on the Frontline or a Soldier? The Effect of Police Militarization on Crime","authors":"V. Bove, E. Gavrilova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2678967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2678967","url":null,"abstract":"Recently a considerable popular debate has been dedicated to the issue of “police militarization�?. We investigate whether the “1033 Program�?, which allows local law enforcement agencies to acquire excess property of the US Department of Defense, affects crime rates. To identify the causal effect of militarized policing on crime, we use temporal variations in US military expenditure and between-counties variations in the odds to receive a positive amount of military aid. We find that (i) military aid reduces street-level crimes; (ii) the program is cost-effective; and (iii) there is evidence in favor of a deterrence mechanism.","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133410436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Crime and Vigilance","authors":"Lones Smith, Jorge Vásquez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2629321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2629321","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a novel equilibrium theory of property crime. A population of potential victims elects how much costly vigilance to exert to guard their property, while a population of potential criminals chooses whether to engage in crime, and if so, how much, and what caliber of oenses to attempt. Crimes arise from random encounters of criminals and potential victims. The deterrence rate | i.e., the failure chance of an attempted crime | rises in vigilance and falls in caliber. It acts as a market-clearing price in the unique equilibrium, equilibrating actions of all agents. Our model predicts how changes in the values of goods to criminal or owner, legal punishment, the technology of theft, or vigilance, or policing aect seven observables: the crime rate, attempted crime rate, deterrence rate, criminal entry rates, oenses","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130105464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Incentives Structures and Criminal Justice","authors":"Aurelie Ouss","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2685952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2685952","url":null,"abstract":"The conventional assumption in economics of crime is that criminal justice system actors behave like social planners, choosing punishment levels to equate the marginal benefits and costs from society’s perspective. This paper presents empirical evidence suggesting in practice, punishment is based on a much narrower objective function, leading to over-incarceration. The costs and benefits of various punishment options are reflected at different government levels in the US. The 1996 California Juvenile Justice Realignment can be used as a natural experiment: it shifted the costs of juvenile corrections from states to counties, keeping overall costs and responsibilities unchanged. Moving the cost of incarceration from state to counties resulted in a discontinuous drop in the number of juveniles being sent to state facilities, but no change in juvenile arrests. This indicates that when costs and benefits of incarceration are not borne by the same agency, there is excess incarceration: not only is there more demand for prison than when costs are fully internalized; but there are no gains in terms of crime reduction from this extra incarceration.","PeriodicalId":350529,"journal":{"name":"Criminology eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129710131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}