Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal最新文献_第7页

Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services 政治更替、官僚更替与公共服务质量

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2017-04-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2538354

M. Akhtari, Diana B. Moreira, L. Trucco

引用次数: 78

The Aims of Public Administration: Reviving the Classical View 公共行政的目的:古典观点的复兴

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2017-04-24 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2834272

A. Roberts

引用次数: 28

Attention, Institutional Friction, and Policy Change in U.S. Federal Bureaucracies 美国联邦官僚机构的关注、制度摩擦和政策变化

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2017-04-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2961393

Samuel Workman, S. Robinson, Tracey Bark

{"title":"Attention, Institutional Friction, and Policy Change in U.S. Federal Bureaucracies","authors":"Samuel Workman, S. Robinson, Tracey Bark","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2961393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2961393","url":null,"abstract":"This manuscript examines the dynamics of policy change in the U.S. federal bureaucracy. Existing theories of policy change, especially punctuated equilibrium, suggest limited attention and institutional friction as key drivers of punctuated policy change. Yet, scholars have not addressed the relative importance of these factors in leading to the punctuated dynamics associated with the theory. Furthermore, these sources of punctuated policymaking have not been examined alongside theories of delegation and centralization common in the study of American politics. This manuscript uses the considerable institutional variation in the bureaucracy to assess the relative influence of limited attention, institutional friction, and delegation on the dynamics of policy change. The empirical foundation for the analysis is a new data set on the regulatory agenda containing 63,289 agenda items from 2008–2016. The findings demonstrate the differential impacts of limited attention, institutional structure, and delegation on the dynamics of policy change. The findings also highlight the central role of institutional design in policy change, institutional information processing, and agenda setting.","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114448445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Welfare Analysis of Segmented Liquidity Markets 分割流动性市场的福利分析

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2017-04-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2022086

A. Guembel, Oren Sussman

{"title":"A Welfare Analysis of Segmented Liquidity Markets","authors":"A. Guembel, Oren Sussman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2022086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2022086","url":null,"abstract":"The 2008 financial crisis heightened concerns about contagion across high leverage investors. Some have suggested that segmenting markets into stand alone units may contribute to financial stability and enhance social welfare. We provide a welfare analysis of segmentation policies in a two country model with endogenous financial crises and cross country contagion due to fire sales externalities. We model a continuous shock to liquidity demand in each country, which allows us to distinguish between crises, depending on their severity and endogenize crisis probabilities. We identify a new trade-off created by segmentation decisions. When countries segment, they are protected from contagion when their shocks are mild, but exposed to crisis when shocks are large and access to a neighbor's liquidity is denied. This trade-off reduces welfare. We also show that segmentation only affects crisis probabilities when governments inject public liquidity. Then and only then can segmentation be welfare enhancing. Finally, failure to coordinate policies may lead to excessive segmentation when governments are involved in liquidity injection, but not when liquidity is provided solely privately.","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121713746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Policy Analysis with Endogenous Migration Decisions: The Case of Left-Behind Children in China 基于内生迁移决策的政策分析——以中国留守儿童为例

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2017-04-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3058134

R. Myerson

{"title":"Policy Analysis with Endogenous Migration Decisions: The Case of Left-Behind Children in China","authors":"R. Myerson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3058134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3058134","url":null,"abstract":"I present a model of parental decision-making with endogenous migration to study the human capital of children in migrant families, focusing on the case of rural China. I derive two main results related to (i) the effect of parental migration on children’s human capital, and (ii) the effects of government policies that increase services for children. First, I show that if government spending is a substitute for parental spending and parent time with the child is weakly complementary to spending on the child, then children’s human capital decreases as they become left-behind by migrant parents. This sheds light on a puzzle in the empirical literature about the ambiguous effects of parental migration on the human capital of left-behind children. Second, in some cases, government policies that increase services for rural children have the unintended consequence of separating children from parents due to endogenous migration effects, thereby reducing child human capital. More broadly, the analysis demonstrates how focusing on marginal treatment effects can facilitate signing comparative statics that are otherwise difficult to sign.","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127286064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Modern Sports-for-All Policy: An International Comparison of Policy Goals and Models of Service Delivery 现代全民体育政策:政策目标和服务提供模式的国际比较

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2017-03-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2928054

Tim Jaekel

{"title":"Modern Sports-for-All Policy: An International Comparison of Policy Goals and Models of Service Delivery","authors":"Tim Jaekel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2928054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2928054","url":null,"abstract":"The paper provides a collection and analysis of modern sports-for-all policies in Europe, North America, Australia and China. Promoting a healthy lifestyle among community members by providing easy access to sport facilities has been a traditional function of sport-for-all policies. Modern policy goals now also include promoting racial and gender equity and diversity, fighting doping, harassment and violence, in particular child abuse, and promoting tourism. Despite the different administrative contexts the implementation of policy goals heavily relies on volunteers and voluntary non-for profit organizations. Two in-depth case studies on sport governing bodies in Germany and England exemplify common patterns in service delivery and how policy goals have shifted from maintaining sporting facilities to non-sporting objectives like job creation, stimulation of tourism and gender equity.The paper identifies and discusses five challenges for modern sports-for-all policies: tracking the quality of public service delivery, the link between outcomes and impacts, goal ambiguity and complexity, staff size, and managing collaborations in a hyper-complex environment","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"323 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132425459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The Response by the UK Regulators to the Banking Crisis 英国监管机构对银行业危机的反应

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2016-12-16 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2939551

Sanad Abuharb

引用次数: 0

Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government 美国联邦政府的选举、意识形态和更替

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2884117

Alexander Bolton, J. de Figueiredo, D. Lewis

引用次数: 33

The Downs and Ups of the SNAP Caseload: What Matters? SNAP案件数量的起起落落:什么重要?

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2016-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3052570

Stacy Dickert‐Conlin, K. Fitzpatrick, L. Tiehen, Brian Stacy

{"title":"The Downs and Ups of the SNAP Caseload: What Matters?","authors":"Stacy Dickert‐Conlin, K. Fitzpatrick, L. Tiehen, Brian Stacy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3052570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3052570","url":null,"abstract":"Since the 1990s, states have received unprecedented flexibility to determine Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) eligibility and program administration. We investigate the role of state flexibility in explaining SNAP caseloads and find that state SNAP policies accounted for nearly 40 percent of the predicted caseload decline between 1993 and 2000 – primarily through the eligibility restrictions on noncitizens – and nearly one quarter of the 2000-2011 caseload increase. State economic conditions, measured by the unemployment rate, also play a strong role in caseload changes, accounting for more than half of the predicted caseload decline between 1993 and 2000 and almost two-thirds of the increase between 2007 and 2011. We then conduct a number of policy simulations, including simulations of the size of the SNAP caseload if states had not acquired flexibility over program rules between 2000 and 2011. We estimate that, if all required states to adopt policies that would be expected to restrict caseload growth, the caseload would be between 44 percent lower while if all states were required to adopt policies that would be expected to increase the caseload the caseload would be 18 percent higher.","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121858601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14

Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats Through Performance-Based Transfers 行动重要:通过绩效转移激励官僚的实验证据

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2016-11-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2927116

A. Khan, A. Khwaja, B. Olken

{"title":"Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats Through Performance-Based Transfers","authors":"A. Khan, A. Khwaja, B. Olken","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2927116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927116","url":null,"abstract":"Postings are often used by bureaucracies, especially in emerging economies, in an attempt to reward or punish their staff. Yet we know little about whether, and how, this type of mechanism can help incentivize performance. Using postings to induce performance is challenging, as heterogeneity in preferences over which postings are desirable non-trivially impacts the effectiveness of such schemes. We propose and examine the properties of a mechanism, which we term a performance-ranked serial dictatorship, in which individuals sequentially choose their desired location, with their rank in the sequence based on their performance. We then evaluate the effectiveness of this mechanism using a two-year field experiment with over 500 property tax inspectors in Punjab, Pakistan. We first show that the mechanism is effective: being randomized into the performance-ranked serial dictatorship leads inspectors to increase the growth rate of tax revenue by between 44 and 80 percent. We then use our model, combined with preferences collected at baseline from all tax inspectors, to characterize which inspectors face the highest marginal incentives under the scheme. We find empirically that these inspectors do in fact increase performance more under this mechanism. We estimate the cost from disruption caused by transfers to be small, but show that applying the scheme too frequently can reduce performance. On net the results suggest that bureaucracies have tremendous potential to improve performance by periodically using postings as an incentive, particularly when preferences over locations have a substantial common component.","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115460915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7