Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal最新文献

The External Cost of Prostitution: Evidence from Shutting Down Red Light Districts in the Netherlands 卖淫的外部成本:来自荷兰关闭红灯区的证据

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3946631

Erasmo Giambona, Rafael P. Ribas

引用次数: 0

Prison Rehabilitation Programs: Efficiency and Targeting 监狱改造方案:效率和目标

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3761992

W. Arbour, G. Lacroix, Steeve Marchand

引用次数: 2

The Fall of Kabul: A Public Value Perspective 喀布尔的沦陷:公共价值视角

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3909121

Usman W. Chohan

引用次数: 2

The Multi-Agencies Dilemma of Delegation: Why Do Policymakers Choose One or Multiple Agencies for Financial Regulation? 授权的多机构困境:决策者为何选择一个或多个机构进行金融监管?

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-13 DOI: 10.1111/rego.12435

M. Moschella, L. Pinto

引用次数: 2

Consequences of Inconvenient Information: Evidence from Sentencing Disparity 信息不便的后果:来自量刑差异的证据

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2021-07-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3885069

Michal Šoltés

引用次数: 0

Estimating the Economic Impact of the 2021 Dream Act 估计2021年梦想法案的经济影响

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2021-06-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3861371

Ike Brannon, M. K. McGee

{"title":"Estimating the Economic Impact of the 2021 Dream Act","authors":"Ike Brannon, M. K. McGee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3861371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3861371","url":null,"abstract":"In 2012 President Obama established Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, providing legal protection for foreign nationals who arrived in the U.S. as children. In 2017 President Trump took steps to end DACA, only to be rebuffed by the courts. In 2021 President Biden reinstated DACA. DACA protects only those who arrived as children under the age of 16 before June 2007. That leaves millions of other foreign nationals who arrived in the U.S. with their families, either as 16- or 17-year-olds before June 2007, or under the age of 18 in the subsequent nine years, without recourse to obtain employment or various other legal protections themselves. Recently proposed legislation – The 2021 Dream Act, co-sponsored by Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Durbin – would make DACA’s protections permanent, while extending those protections to up to 500,000 other minors. We estimate the economic and budgetary impact of the passage of the bill. Our analysis suggests that it would lock in the current gains from DACA, which include nearly $57 billion of additional federal tax revenue in the 2022-2031 budget window, and $92 billion in additional income for this population. By extending DACA’s protections, it would also generate nearly $20 billion of additional federal tax revenue in the 2022-2031 budget window, while boosting the income of those who gain this protection by approximately $26 billion. The total impact it would have on U.S. economic activity would be well above this increased income. Because of the young age of most of these potential Dreamers, most of their increased earnings from obtaining legal status would accrue outside the budget window, which means that incremental revenues from passing the 2021 Dream Act would grow sharply in subsequent years.","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132370981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Public Administration: Meaning, Scope and Its Nature 公共行政:含义、范围与性质

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3765649

Anjali Kumari

{"title":"Public Administration: Meaning, Scope and Its Nature","authors":"Anjali Kumari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3765649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3765649","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses mainly to analyze the meaning, nature and scope of Public Administration. The purpose of the article to define public administration according to various renowned scholars and to demonstrate the scope and nature of the discipline. Firstly, the view of the article discusses the concepts i.e, meaning of administration and public administration thereby creating a comparison between the two concepts. Thus, Administration is a broader concept and includes within itself both organization and management. But, the Public Administration is the detailed a systematic execution of public law. Every particular application of law is public administration. Secondly, the understanding of two divergent views on the nature of public administration, viz. Integral view and managerial view. Thirdly, the view on that those definitions of both view of Public administration which has been used in two senses i.e, Narrower sense (view of traditional writers) and Wider sense (view of modern writers). In the narrower sense includes the activities of only the executive branch of the government. By contrast, in the Wider sense includes the activities of all three branches of the government i.e, legislature, executive and judiciary. Next, the view of the article discusses the scope of the Public Administration. Finally, the article ends with conclusions.","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130214184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Political Alignment and Bureaucratic Pay 政治结盟与官僚薪酬

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-08 DOI: 10.1093/JOPART/MUAA053

Jon H. Fiva, B. Geys, Tom-Reiel Heggedal, R. Sørensen

{"title":"Political Alignment and Bureaucratic Pay","authors":"Jon H. Fiva, B. Geys, Tom-Reiel Heggedal, R. Sørensen","doi":"10.1093/JOPART/MUAA053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JOPART/MUAA053","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Building on agency-theoretical perspectives of public bureaucracies, we argue that politician–bureaucrat preference alignment can have important implications for bureaucrats’ pay. We study such private gains to bureaucrats from their political alignment with elected politicians using detailed data on all 1,632 top administrators active in all Norwegian municipalities over a period of 25 years (1991–2015). Whereas existing studies generally rely on proxies for politician–bureaucrat political alignment, a rare feature of our data allows measuring it directly since 27% of top bureaucrats ran for political office. We focus explicitly on individuals at the very top of the administrative hierarchy and are able to separate the intensive margin (i.e., wage increases) from any additional effects at the extensive margin (i.e., new appointments). Using close elections for inference in a regression discontinuity analysis, we find that politician–bureaucrat alignment significantly increases top bureaucrats’ wage even in the Norwegian civil service system. This has important implications also from a theoretical perspective. Our results indeed go against predictions from models with policy-motivated bureaucrats, but are consistent with politically aligned principal–agent matches being more productive.","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125111967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Taxpayer Self-Inspections, Audits, and Optimal Tax Administration: Evidence from China 纳税人自查、审计与最优税收管理:来自中国的证据

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2020-11-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3738379

W. Cui

{"title":"Taxpayer Self-Inspections, Audits, and Optimal Tax Administration: Evidence from China","authors":"W. Cui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3738379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3738379","url":null,"abstract":"I document an important tax collection practice that is previously unknown to research on tax administration: mandatory taxpayer self-inspections. The practice emerged spontaneously across China in the 1990s and persists to this day despite having no basis in law. If taxpayers report additional liabilities after self-inspections, no penalties are imposed. Unlike tax amnesties, self-inspections are (i) backed up by the threat of government inspections with a significantly higher-than-normal audit probability, and (ii) used as a basic, routine revenue-generation technique. I show that self-inspections represent roughly 50% of the activity in China’s “tax inspection” (jicha) system and assume even greater importance in the larger “revenue management” (shuiyuan guanli) system. Evidence suggests that self-inspections are much more effective at generating revenue than costlier government inspections. \u0000 \u0000I argue that self-inspections show that the presumed centrality of audits to tax administration cannot rest on audit’s effectiveness in raising revenue. Rather, audits, but not self- inspections or tax amnesties, enforce a social/legal norm of truthful reporting. Audits are important only when the state relies on the norm of truthful reporting. Further, I argue that self-inspections highlight limits to the theory of optimal tax administration: where social norms are relevant, the enforcement elasticity of government interventions may be indeterminate. Finally, I suggest that self-inspections can be usefully classified in a scheme that sort enforcement strategies in terms of whether government interventions are (i) based on directly observable information or (ii) respond to taxpayer disclosure of private information. Recent research on building state capacity in developing countries privileges ex ante interventions afforded by case (i). But in case(ii), where intervention in compliance is necessarily ex post, social norms play a critical role.","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123842675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Administrative Competence: Reimagining Administrative Law 行政权限:重新构想行政法

Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal Pub Date : 2020-11-16 DOI: 10.1017/9781108870818

E. Fisher, S. Shapiro

{"title":"Administrative Competence: Reimagining Administrative Law","authors":"E. Fisher, S. Shapiro","doi":"10.1017/9781108870818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108870818","url":null,"abstract":"In this first chapter of a new book, Administrative Competence: Reimagining Administrative Law (Cambridge University Press 2020), we provide an overview of our argument that administrative law should be, but is not, the law of public administration. As the law of public administration, administrative law would ensure that public administration is “competent” in that it has both legitimate authority and the necessary capacity to accomplish its mission. Instead, administrative law since the 1960s has been understood only to limit public administration in the mistaken belief that the alternative is policymaking without constraints. Administrative law has arrived at this point by treating what happens inside the agency as a “black box” rather than understanding the complex and multifaceted role that expertise plays in rationalizing decision-making and contributing to agency accountability. By comparison, the history of administrative law dating back to the Founding shows how administrative law has always been shaped by an understanding of administrative competence. In arguing for the legal relevancy of what goes inside of an agency, we are recognizing that an agency’s legitimacy depends on its capacity to implement its mandate as well as its legal authority to do so.","PeriodicalId":342163,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Bureaucracies & Public Administration eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115952270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17