{"title":"Some Lessons on a Chronology of 20th Century Philosophy in Mexico","authors":"C. Pereda","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120209","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"176 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120960681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Truth in Chinese Philosophy: A Commentary on Bo Mou’s Semantic-Truth Approaches in Chinese Philosophy","authors":"Chenyang Li","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120210","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of Chinese philosophy have been overwhelmingly on ethics and social philosophy. Bo Mou’s book is significant because it is squarely on semantic truth, a topic which has seldomly been brought up in studying Chinese philosophy (Mou 2019). That alone makes his book worthy of our attention. Mou’s book contains many insights and breaks new grounds for further study. His pluralist account of semantic truth in Chinese philosophy is highly original and pioneering in the field. Here I will not attempt to make a comprehensive review or assessment of this important book. Instead, I focus on two points, for the sake of further explorations on the topic. The first is on the general topic of truth in Chinese philosophy. While I do not deny that there is semantic truth in Chinese philosophy, I believe the main orientation of Chinese philosophy on truth is pragmatic, in that the concept of truth is understood and functions in the context of the human condition; the nature and the value of truth lies with its service for the good life. Second, I will offer an alternative to Bo Mou’s characterization of Xun Zi’s concept of truth and show why Mou cannot dismiss a broadly characterized pragmatic interpretation of Xun Zi’s epistemology. In this commentary, I will try to quote Mou’s relevant passages in their entirety to ensure as much accuracy as possible in presenting his argument.","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133868190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gaps: When Not Even Nothing Is There","authors":"Charles Blattberg","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120106","url":null,"abstract":"A paradox, it is claimed, is a radical form of contradiction, one that produces gaps in meaning. In order to approach this idea, two senses of “separation” are distinguished: separation by something and separation by nothing. The latter does not refer to nothing in an ordinary sense, however, since in that sense what’s intended is actually less than nothing. Numerous ordinary nothings in philosophy as well as in other fields are surveyed so as to clarify the contrast. Then follows the suggestion that philosophies which one would expect to have room for paradoxes actually tend either to exclude them altogether or to dull them. There is a clear alternative, however, one that fully recognizes paradoxes and yet also strives to overcome them.","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129647814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"EDITOR’s Words","authors":"B. Mou","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2020).120104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2020).120104","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132561386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Empty or Emergent Persons? A Critique of Buddhist Personalism","authors":"Javier Hidalgo","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120108","url":null,"abstract":": In contrast to Buddhist Reductionists who deny the ultimate existence of the persons, Buddhist Personalists claim that persons are ultimately real in some important sense. Recently, some philosophers have offered philosophical reconstructions of Buddhist Personalism. In this paper, I critically evaluate one philosophical reconstruction of Buddhist Personalism according to which persons are irreducible to the parts that constitute them. Instead, persons are emergent entities and have novel properties that are distinct from the properties of their constituents. While this emergentist interpretation is an interesting and well-motivated reconstruction of the Personalist position, I ultimately reject it on substantive grounds. I distinguish between different kinds of emergentism in the contemporary philosophical literature and show that they fail to support Buddhist Personalism. I thus conclude that Buddhist Personalism is untenable if it’s committed to emergentism about persons. This paper also indirectly defends Buddhist Reductionism by showing that it has crucial advantages over Buddhist Personalism.","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130327975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Born believer?","authors":"Mark Siderits","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120112","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125239355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Respect and the Mengzian Conception of Yi as a Rule-related Virtue","authors":"Meng Zhang","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2020).110209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2020).110209","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on Meng Zi’s idea of yi (義) as a virtue. In it, I first briefly examine two influential interpretations of yi – the “appropriateness” approach that views yi as a disposition to do what is fitting in a given situation and the shame-centered approach that understands yi as a disposition to avoid what is shameful in the moral life. The first approach is too thin to distinguish yi from acting properly in general and the second reading confines the definitive feeling involved in yi to a too moralized understanding of shame. Moreover, both fail to pay enough attention to the reliance of yi on social norms to receive its content. Through textual analysis, I show that in addition to a sense of shame, respect as an attitude of prioritizing other persons in the way specified by the relevant norms also serves as an important emotional core of yi as a virtue. In the end, I highlight the potential contribution of the Mengzian idea of yi to virtue ethics. The two-faceted structure of yi points to a way to account for rule-related virtues – virtues that have rule-conformity as a component. Equipped with thick descriptions of rule-related virtues, virtue ethics will be in a better position to guide actions.","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115913584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Objectivity","authors":"Dagfinn Føllesdal","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2020).110108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2020).110108","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"20 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124916470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"AN INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN CONFUCIANISM AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHIES CONCERNING APPROACHES TO FAMILY: A REPORT FROM A WORKSHOP","authors":"Mu Fang","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100212","url":null,"abstract":"This report is a summary of the key outcomes of a recent workshop on the theme “Confucianism and Western philosophies concerning approaches to family,” which was held on July 23rd through 27th, 2018 at Tutzing, Germany. More than twenty professional philosophers from Europe, Asia, and USA participated in the workshop, presented ten papers, and conducted in-depth discussions on the theme. During the opening speech, Michael Spieker, a senior researcher at Akademie fur Politische Bildung, asserted the importance of comparative study on approaches to family. “Family presents a primary, perpetual topic in philosophy, which is still debated in contemporary philosophy with great social relevance. An intercultural dialogue between Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy can significantly contribute to the better understanding of family, while enabling a more profound understanding of the fundamentals of both sides” (Spieker & Guo, 2018). In this essay, I recapitulate the key points of the workshop in terms of the three dimensions of family as a value, an art of life, and a model of social order.","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"379 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124729566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"THE QUEST FOR RECOGNITION: THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY","authors":"Stephanie Rivera Berruz","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100206","url":null,"abstract":": Latin American philosophy has long been concerned with its philosophical identity. In this paper I argue that the search for Latin American philosophical identity is motivated by a desire for recognition that largely hinges on its relationship to European thought. Given that motivations are seldom easily accessible, the essay comparatively draws on Africana and Native American metaphilosophical reflections. Such juxtapositions serve as a means of establishing how philosophical exclusions have themselves motivated and structured how Latin American philosophy has understood its own quest for philosophical identity. In closing, I gesture toward the possibilities of shifting the conversation away from what makes Latin American philosophy distinct toward one of praxis—what do we want Latin American philosophy to do.","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114833184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}