Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy最新文献_第6页

Inference, Perception, and Recognition: Kaśmīr Śaivism and the Problem of Other Minds 推理，感知和识别:Kaśmīr Śaivism和其他思想的问题

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100109

Joshua S. Stoll

{"title":"Inference, Perception, and Recognition: Kaśmīr Śaivism and the Problem of Other Minds","authors":"Joshua S. Stoll","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100109","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will explore competing intuitions behind the problem of other minds. On the one hand, consciousness is strictly a self-manifest, first-person phenomenon: subjectivity is in each case one’s own. On the other hand, it is obvious, on the basis of their behavioral activity, that others are conscious agents despite this coming across through objective determinations. The tension between these intuitions is what grounds the problem of other minds. Attempts to navigate this problem generally neglect one of these intuitions and so are inadequate accounts of intersubjectivity. As such, and given the paradox involved in accepting each intuition, I argue that we must look to traditions that are comfortable with paradox if we are to give an adequate account of intersubjectivity and the relationship between one’s own and other minds. In particular, I point to the Kaśmīr Śaiva tradition, and specifically the work of Utpaladeva (ca. 900-950 CE) and Abhinavagupta (ca. 950-1025 CE), as an excellent resource for bringing together and holding in tension these paradoxical intuitions. For in this tradition, the very nature of reality is at once solipsistic and paradoxically revealed through a divine, intersubjective dialogue. As such, this tradition takes each intuition seriously despite the tension between them.","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114715694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Reply to Carlos Montemayor and Abrol Fairweather 回复Carlos Montemayor和Abrol Fairweather

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100116

J. Ganeri

引用次数: 0

A Further Look at Explanatory Potency of Constructive- Engagement Strategy: Replies to Soraj Hongladarom and Wei Sun 建设性参与策略的解释效力再看——答洪丽娟、孙伟

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100112

B. Mou

引用次数: 0

Disagreement and Convergence on the Case of Latin American Philosophy, For Example: Replies to Carlos Pereda and Robert Sanchez 拉丁美洲哲学案例的分歧与趋同，以卡洛斯·佩雷达和罗伯特·桑切斯为例

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100114

Manuel Vargas

引用次数: 0

Sino-African Philosophy: A Re-“Constructive Engagement” 中非哲学:重新“建设性接触”

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100107

Paul A. Dottin

引用次数: 2

Pragmatic Approach or Constructive-Engagement Strategy?—A Methodology in Comparing Chinese and Western Philosophy 务实策略还是建设性参与策略?——中西哲学比较的方法论

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100111

Wei Sun

引用次数: 7

Recapture, Transparency, Negation and a Logic for the Catuṣkoṭi 重新捕捉，透明，否定和Catuṣkoṭi的逻辑

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100108

Adrian Kreutz

{"title":"Recapture, Transparency, Negation and a Logic for the Catuṣkoṭi","authors":"Adrian Kreutz","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100108","url":null,"abstract":"The recent literature on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi centres around Jay Garfield’s (2009) and Graham Priest’s (2010) interpretation. It is an open discussion to what extent their interpretation is an adequate model of the logic for the catuskoti, and the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā. Priest and Garfield try to make sense of the contradictions within the catuskoti by appeal to a series of lattices – orderings of truth-values, supposed to model the path to enlightenment. They use Anderson & Belnaps's (1975) framework of First Degree Entailment. Cotnoir (2015) has argued that the lattices of Priest and Garfield cannot ground the logic of the catuskoti. The concern is simple: on the one hand, FDE brings with it the failure of classical principles such as modus ponens. On the other hand, we frequently encounter Nāgārjuna using classical principles in other arguments in the MMK. There is a problem of validity. If FDE is Nāgārjuna’s logic of choice, he is facing what is commonly called the classical recapture problem: how to make sense of cases where classical principles like modus pones are valid? One cannot just add principles like modus pones as assumptions, because in the background paraconsistent logic this does not rule out their negations. In this essay, I shall explore and critically evaluate Cotnoir’s proposal. In detail, I shall reveal that his framework suffers collapse of the kotis. Taking Cotnoir’s concerns seriously, I shall suggest a formulation of the catuskoti in classical Boolean Algebra, extended by the notion of an external negation as an illocutionary act. I will focus on purely formal considerations, leaving doctrinal matters to the scholarly discourse – as far as this is possible.","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123679787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

How to Understand the Identity of an Object of Study in Comparative Philosophy 如何理解比较哲学研究对象的同一性

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100110

Soraj Hongladarom

引用次数: 4

Review of Attention, Not Self by Jonardon Ganeri 《注意，而非自我》，作者:Jonardon Ganeri

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100115

Carlos Montemayor, A. Fairweather

{"title":"Review of Attention, Not Self by Jonardon Ganeri","authors":"Carlos Montemayor, A. Fairweather","doi":"10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100115","url":null,"abstract":"Jonardon Ganeri’s book is a signal contribution to philosophy. His fluency in philosophy of mind, epistemology, cognitive science, and classic Indian philosophy, among other traditions, has been previously highlighted (e.g., Arnold 2008; Brooks 2013; Westerhoff 2013). His recent book Attention, Not Self is a major achievement that synthesizes Ganeri’s knowledge of philosophy and its history, in a truly intercultural way. Our focus will be on the modular and normative aspects of Ganeri’s account of attention, highlighting possible areas of development and additions that would help complete the ambitious project of Attention, Not Self. The main topics we discuss are the relation between consciousness and attention, the importance of agency for normative evaluations, and the type of virtue theory that could best accommodate Ganeri’s proposals, given the cognitive architecture he proposes. A brief survey of the book suffices to appreciate the scope and ambition of Attention, Not Self. Ganeri defends a view of the mind in which attention, rather than the self, takes pride of place. Part I, on the priority of attention, surveys and analyzes classical sources in Indian philosophy (especially the work of Buddhaghosa) and compares them with many of the leading contemporary theories in philosophy. Ganeri argues that findings in cognitive science confirm classical Indian views of the mind. One of the main claims of this section is that the “agent-causal” self should play no role in a theory of mind. It remains to be seen if there are costs incurred when accounting for normative evaluation—an issue we explore below. Part II provides an attentional account of knowledge, focused on perceptual attention. We analyze how this attentional account of knowledge addresses issues involving epistemic normativity. Part III, “the calling of attention”, further explores the psychology of visual attention, emphasizing the modular architecture of the mind that dispenses with __________________________","PeriodicalId":338148,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy","volume":"408 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124331191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Correcting Things as Correcting Feelings: A Phenomenological Study of Wang Yang-ming’s Doctrine of Ge-Wu 正物如正情:王阳明“格武”学说的现象学研究

Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-01-25 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2019).100106

Minglai Dong

引用次数: 1