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Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6最新文献

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Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes 知识、实践充分性和利害关系
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 2019-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0010
Charity Anderson, J. Hawthorne
{"title":"Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes","authors":"Charity Anderson, J. Hawthorne","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Defenses of pragmatic encroachment commonly rely on two thoughts: first, that the gap between one’s strength of epistemic position on p and perfect strength sometimes makes a difference to what one is justified in doing, and second, that the higher the stakes, the harder it is to know. It is often assumed that these ideas complement each other. This chapter shows that these ideas are far from complementary. Along the way, a variety of strategies for regimenting the somewhat inchoate notion of stakes are indicated, and some troubling cases for pragmatic encroachment raised.","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"141 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115787387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37
Modal Empiricism 模态经验主义
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 2019-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0003
A. Casullo
{"title":"Modal Empiricism","authors":"A. Casullo","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Kant contends that necessity is a criterion of the a priori—that is, that all knowledge of necessary propositions is a priori. This contention, together with two others that Kant took to be evident—we know some mathematical propositions and such propositions are necessary—leads directly to the conclusion that some knowledge is a priori. Although many contemporary philosophers endorse Kant’s criterion, supporting arguments are hard to come by. Gordon Barnes provides one of the few examples. My purpose in this chapter is to articulate and examine his argument. I have two goals in doing so. The first is to uncover several significant gaps in the argument. The second is to show that it suffers from a common defect in rationalist arguments. If the argument were successful against empiricist accounts of modal knowledge, it would apply with equal force to extant rationalist accounts of such knowledge. Hence, the cost of refuting modal empiricism is modal scepticism.","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122689314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Subjective Probability and the Content/Attitude Distinction 主观概率与内容/态度的区别
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 2019-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0002
J. Carr
{"title":"Subjective Probability and the Content/Attitude Distinction","authors":"J. Carr","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"On an attractive, naturalistically respectable theory of intentionality, mental contents are a form of measurement system for representing behavioral and psychological dispositions. This chapter argues that a consequence of this view is that the content/attitude distinction is measurement system relative. As a result, there is substantial arbitrariness in the content/attitude distinction. Whether some measurement of mental states counts as characterizing the content of mental states or the attitude is not a question of empirical discovery but of theoretical utility. If correct, this observation has ramifications in the theory of rationality. Some epistemologists and decision theorists have argued that imprecise credences are rationally impermissible, while others have argued that precise credences are rationally impermissible. If the measure theory of mental content is correct, however, then neither imprecise credences nor precise credences can be rationally impermissible.","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125333526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Space, Structuralism, and Skepticism 空间、结构主义和怀疑主义
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 2019-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0008
Jonathan Vogel
{"title":"Space, Structuralism, and Skepticism","authors":"Jonathan Vogel","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter takes structuralism to be the thesis that if F and G are alike causally, then F and G are the same property. It follows that our beliefs about the world can be true in various brain-in-a-vat scenarios, giving us (some) refuge from skeptical arguments. The trouble is that structuralism doesn’t do justice to certain metaphysical aspects of property identity having to do with fundamentality, intrinsicality, and the unity of the world. A closely related point is that the relation…lies-at-some-spatial-distance-from…obeys necessary truths that need not apply to other relations with the same causal profile. This observation is especially important if, as David Lewis argued, the only alternatives to skepticism are structuralism and an anti-Humean stance toward modality. Some pertinent views of David Chalmers’s are discussed, and parallels are drawn between the structuralist response to skepticism and functionalism in the philosophy of mind.","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129730807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
On the Accuracy of Group Credences 论组凭证的准确性
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 2019-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0006
Richard Pettigrew
{"title":"On the Accuracy of Group Credences","authors":"Richard Pettigrew","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising has increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? And how do they relate to the individual credences assigned by the members of the particular group in question? According to the credal judgement aggregation principle, linear pooling, the credence function of a group should be a weighted average or linear pool of the credence functions of the individuals in the group. In this chapter, I give an argument for linear pooling based on considerations of accuracy. And I respond to two standard objections to the aggregation principle.","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129992082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment 澄清语用侵占
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 2019-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0011
Jeremy Fantl, M. McGrath
{"title":"Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment","authors":"Jeremy Fantl, M. McGrath","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses concerns that pragmatic encroachers are committed to problematic knowledge variance. It first replies to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne’s new putative problem cases, which purport to show that pragmatic encroachment is committed to problematic variations in knowledge depending on what choices are available to the potential knower. It argues that the new cases do not provide any new reasons to be concerned about the pragmatic encroacher’s commitment to knowledge-variance. The chapter further argues that concerns about knowledge-variance are not limited to the pragmatic encroacher, but come up for traditional purist invariantism as well.","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127884379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism 表现主义、规范不确定性和概率论的论证
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 2019-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0007
J. Staffel
{"title":"Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism","authors":"J. Staffel","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that in order to account for normative uncertainty, an expressivist theory of normative language and thought must accomplish two things: first, it needs to find room in its framework for a gradable conative attitude, degrees of which can be interpreted as representing normative uncertainty. Secondly, it needs to defend appropriate rationality constraints pertaining to those graded attitudes. The first task—finding an appropriate graded attitude that can represent uncertainty—is not particularly problematic. I tackle the second task by exploring whether we can devise expressivist versions of the standard arguments used to support rationality constraints on degrees of uncertainty, Dutch book arguments, and accuracy-dominance arguments. I show that we can do so, but that the resulting arguments don’t support the same rationality constraints as the original versions of the arguments.","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127250012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Stakes, Practical Adequacy, and the Epistemic Significance of Double-Checking 利害关系、实践充分性和复核的认知意义
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 2019-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0012
Sanford C. Goldberg
{"title":"Stakes, Practical Adequacy, and the Epistemic Significance of Double-Checking","authors":"Sanford C. Goldberg","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"In their chapter “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes,” Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne present several challenges to the doctrine of pragmatic encroachment. In this brief reply to their chapter two things are aimed at. First, the chapter argues that there is a sense in which their case against pragmatic encroachment is a bit weaker, and another sense in which that case is much stronger, than Anderson and Hawthorne’s own argument would suggest. Second, the chapter highlights and then builds upon their extremely interesting reflections on one sort of practical matter that has not received proper attention in the literature: the epistemic significance of double-checking. This is done with an eye towards pointing in the direction of further work.","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131318519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Accuracy and Educated Guesses 准确性和有根据的猜测
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 2019-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0004
Sophie Horowitz
{"title":"Accuracy and Educated Guesses","authors":"Sophie Horowitz","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Credences, unlike full beliefs, can’t be true or false. So what makes credences more or less accurate? This chapter offers a new answer to this question: credences are accurate insofar as they license true educated guesses, and less accurate insofar as they license false educated guesses. This account is compatible with immodesty; : a rational agent will regard her own credences to be best for the purposes of making true educated guesses. The guessing account can also be used to justify certain coherence constraints on rational credence, such as probabilism. The chapter concludes by discussing some advantages of the guessing account over rival accounts of accuracy.","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131147109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
How Much is at Stake for the Pragmatic Encroacher 实用主义蚕食者面临多大风险
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 2019-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0013
Encroacher Jeffrey Sanford Russell
{"title":"How Much is at Stake for the Pragmatic Encroacher","authors":"Encroacher Jeffrey Sanford Russell","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198833314.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"People who defend “pragmatic encroachment” about knowledge generally advocate two ideas: (1) you can rationally act according to what you know; (2) knowledge is harder to achieve when more is at stake. In their chapter in this volume, Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne argue that these two ideas may not fit together so well. This chapter extends Anderson and Hawthorne’s argument. By applying some standard decision theory, we can calculate a precise quantity of “how much is at stake” that does fit together with knowledge and action. While this calculated quantity matches intuitions about how much is at stake in certain standard cases, in others it does not.Keywords","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133216235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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