Accuracy and Educated Guesses

Sophie Horowitz
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引用次数: 12

Abstract

Credences, unlike full beliefs, can’t be true or false. So what makes credences more or less accurate? This chapter offers a new answer to this question: credences are accurate insofar as they license true educated guesses, and less accurate insofar as they license false educated guesses. This account is compatible with immodesty; : a rational agent will regard her own credences to be best for the purposes of making true educated guesses. The guessing account can also be used to justify certain coherence constraints on rational credence, such as probabilism. The chapter concludes by discussing some advantages of the guessing account over rival accounts of accuracy.
准确性和有根据的猜测
信任,不像完整的信仰,不能是真的或假的。那么,是什么让凭证更准确或更不准确呢?本章为这个问题提供了一个新的答案:凭据在允许正确的有根据猜测时是准确的,而在允许错误的有根据猜测时是不准确的。这种说法是不谦虚的;一个理性的人会认为,为了做出真实的有根据的猜测,她自己的凭据是最好的。猜测解释也可以用来证明理性信任的某些一致性约束,例如概率。本章最后讨论了猜测式叙述相对于其他叙述的准确性的一些优点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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