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Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6最新文献

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Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater 知觉辩护和笛卡尔戏剧
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0001
D. Barnett
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引用次数: 3
What to Believe About Your Belief that You’re in the Good Case 如何相信你的信念，你是在一个好情况
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6 Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0009
Alex Worsnip
{"title":"What to Believe About Your Belief that You’re in the Good Case","authors":"Alex Worsnip","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Going about our daily lives requires us to dismiss many metaphysical possibilities. We take it for granted that we are not brains in vats, or living in the Matrix, or in an extended dream. Call these things that we take for granted “anti-skeptical assumptions.” What should a reflective agent who believes these things think of such beliefs? The chapter surveys and criticizes some prominent answers to this question, then offers a positive view that blends externalism about evidence with a mild, qualified kind of pragmatism. The view offered aims to do justice to the sense that anti-skeptical assumptions are evidentially groundless while also maintaining that one cannot rationally believe something that one judges oneself to lack sufficient evidence for.","PeriodicalId":334846,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6","volume":"169 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121721034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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