PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Optimal Compensation Under Inventory Delegation and Supply/Demand Mismatch","authors":"Haotian Song, Wenqiang Xiao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3832363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3832363","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: We study how a firm should design its compensation plan to include both the sales performance and the operational performance (i.e., the supply/demand mismatch), for its sales division, who not only exerts unobservable demand-enhancement efforts but also makes the inventory ordering decision based on her private information about the local sales territory. Methodology/results: We build on the classical agency model by incorporating the supply/demand mismatch and inventory ordering delegation. We derive the closed-form expression for the firm's optimal compensation scheme in the most general contract space and show that it takes a simple form, coupling the classical linear compensation scheme with a compensation component contingent on some operational metric. Managerial implications: First, the firm should include a compensation component that is tied to operational metrics such as the sales division's leftover inventory and the unfulfilled demand. Second, the optimal compensation scheme needs to be adapted to the distinct operational features such as demand being censored or not, lost sales or backorder. Third, the optimal compensation scheme possesses the property of piece-wise linearity in demand (or sales) with a drop in the commission rate after demand exceeds the available inventory. This is in contrast not only with the classical linear compensation scheme, but also with the quota-based compensation scheme featuring a progressively increased commission rate when the demand exceeds a prespecified quota.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122358087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sharing Demand Information with Retailer Under Upstream Competition","authors":"Aditya Jain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3388957","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3388957","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze demand information sharing collaboration between two manufacturers and a retailer under upstream competition. The manufacturers produce partially substitutable products, which are stocked by the retailer that sells them in the market characterized by random demand. The manufacturers are privately informed about uncertain demand and decide on whether to share this information with the retailer. We show that by not sharing information, a manufacturer ends up distorting its wholesale price upward to signal its private information to the retailer, and under upstream competition, this distortion is propagated to the competing manufacturer. Thus, although a manufacturer’s decision to not share information may benefit or hurt its own profit, this always benefits the competing manufacturer. Under low intensity of competition, signaling-driven distortions exacerbate double marginalization and hurt all parties, whereas under more intense competition, these distortions help manufacturers offset downward pressure on wholesale prices. Thus, in equilibrium similarly informed manufacturers share information in the former case but not in the latter case. Additionally, when manufacturers differ in their information accuracies, only the better-informed manufacturer shares information. The retailer always benefits from both manufacturers sharing information, and its benefits are larger when the better-informed manufacturer shares information. We show existence of a contracting mechanism the retailer can employ to enable information sharing. Finally, we analyze manufacturers’ information acquisition decisions and find that under competition, two manufacturers acquire minimal information so that they are better off not sharing information in the information sharing game. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125404039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Supplement to 'A Simple Heuristic Policy for Stochastic Distribution Inventory Systems with Fixed Shipment Costs'","authors":"Han Zhu, Frank Y. Chen, Ming Hu, Yi Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3606084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3606084","url":null,"abstract":"As a supplement to Zhu et al. (2020), this document consists of five parts. First, it provides technical proofs of some theoretical results in Zhu et al. (2020). Second, it introduces some preliminary results on stochastic distribution systems with fixed shipment costs. Third, it provides some examples and illustrations on the modified echelon (r,Q) policies (and some related concepts) studied in Zhu et al. (2020). Fourth, it presents some explicit performance bounds that depends on system primitives for the modified echelon (r,Q) policies in stochastic distribution systems. Finally, extensive numerical experiments are conducted to test the effectiveness of the modified echelon (r,Q) policies. Specifically, the numerical studies show that the modified echelon (r,Q) policies perform well with an average gap of about 5% above the cost lower bound, 2) outperform the echelon-stock (r, Q) policy used in Chen and Zheng (1997), and 3) have robust performances with respect to the allocation rule at the warehouse.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114400825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strategic Contracting and Supplier Encroachment Through an E-commerce Platform","authors":"Yusuke Zennyo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3488243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3488243","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers a supplier's encroachment strategy through an e-commerce platform. When the supplier sells goods through an online channel in addition to a traditional retailer, it should either select a conventional wholesale contract or an emerging agency contract. Under the agency contract, the supplier can directly set its retail price while sales revenues are split with the platform according to a royalty rate (also called a commission rate). The platform should determine its optimal royalty rate by considering the supplier's decision on which contract to select. I show that the royalty rate is set at the highest level possible while still inducing the supplier to choose the agency contract, above which, the wholesale contract is chosen. Moreover, compared with when the supplier does not encroach, adding the online channel is beneficial to the encroaching supplier but is detrimental to the traditional retailer. More interestingly, all firms (a supplier, retailer, and platform) can benefit from recent industrial changes from traditional wholesale agreements toward agency agreements when brick-and-mortar and online channels are highly substitutable.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130260195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Buy-One-Get-One Promotions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain","authors":"Yuefeng Li, M. Khouja, Jingming Pan, Jing Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3561162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561162","url":null,"abstract":"Buy-one-get-one (BOGO) promotions have become popular. With BOGO, the first unit is sold for the regular price, and the second unit is discounted. We analyze BOGO in manufacturer–retailer supply chains. We identify conditions under which BOGO outperforms price reduction (PR) and everyday low price (EDLP) policies. We find that, for some products, whether consumers stockpile or not, if BOGO and PR have the same market size, BOGO has a larger retailer profit and the same or larger manufacturer profit because BOGO induces more consumers to buy and consume two units. When consumers stockpile, the retailer sets prices to prevent such behavior, and the retailer’s share of supply chain profits is largest under BOGO, whereas consumer surplus with BOGO is smaller than PR. We also find that BOGO reduces double marginalization. When PR expands market size more than BOGO, BOGO’s effectiveness diminishes. When consumers stockpile without increasing consumption and/or production cost is high, EDLP is best. Our results are robust to multiperiod with single-promotion-period settings. A large number of regular-price periods following a promotion period increases stockpiling, which erodes the retailer’s profit and favors EDLP. If promotions are offered for consecutive periods, a larger number of promotion periods increases PR’s efficacy relative to BOGO. Time-inconsistent consumers increase stockpiling and make PR outperform BOGO. Heterogeneous consumers’ holding cost and marginal utility prevent retailers from perfectly discriminating among consumers who make profit-reducing choices. Compared with retailers’ BOGO, manufacturers’ BOGO increases double marginalization and decreases retailers’ and manufacturers’ profits and consumer surplus. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management. Funding: This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation of China [Grants 71972026, 72101102]. Y. Li’s work was supported by the China Scholarship Council [Grant 201806070094]. Supplemental Material: The online companion and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4638 .","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132748987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Supplement to the Article: How Product Representation Influences the Understanding of Supply Chain Process Models","authors":"J. Leukel, V. Sugumaran","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3386680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3386680","url":null,"abstract":"This document provides additional data analysis for a laboratory experiment that assessed the usefulness of two alternate product representations in so called SCOR thread diagrams (Leukel & Sugumaran 2018). Such diagrams are a form of supply chain process model, which represent the logic of product flow within a supply chain. The modeling grammar for thread diagrams is part of the Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) model, which is the industry-standard for supply chain analysis. This supplement consists of the following parts: (1) Experimental design, (2) testing for order effects, and (3) correlation matrix.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122758773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Supplier Centrality and Auditing Priority in Socially-Responsible Supply Chains","authors":"Jiayu Chen, Anyan Qi, Milind Dawande","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2889889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2889889","url":null,"abstract":"Problem Definition and Academic/Practical Relevance: Most supply networks are characterized by firms that source from multiple suppliers and suppliers that serve multiple firms, thus resulting in suppliers who differ in their degree centrality, i.e., the number of firms they supply to. In such networks, any negative publicity from suppliers' noncompliance of socially-responsible practices – e.g., employment of child labor, unsafe working conditions, and excessive pollution – can significantly damage the reputation of the buying firms. To mitigate this impact, firms preemptively audit suppliers, although resource and time considerations typically restrict the number of suppliers a firm can audit. Therefore, a key question is whether firms should prioritize the auditing of suppliers with low or high centrality, ceteris paribus. To investigate, we consider an assembly network consisting of two firms (buyers) and three suppliers – each firm has one independent supplier who uniquely supplies to that firm and one common supplier who supplies to both.<br> <br>Methodology: Game-Theoretic analysis.<br> <br>Results and Managerial Implications: Downstream competition between the firms drives them away from auditing the supplier with higher centrality; i.e., the common supplier, in equilibrium, despite the fact that auditing this supplier is better for the aggregate profit of the firms. We show that this inefficiency is corrected when the firms cooperate (via a stable coalition) to jointly audit the suppliers and share the auditing cost in a fair manner. We also identify conditions under which joint auditing improves social welfare.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124480849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Supplier Competition and Cost Reduction with Endogenous Information Asymmetry","authors":"Cuihong Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3098877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3098877","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: We consider a buyer sourcing from multiple competing suppliers who exert cost-reduction efforts before procurement contracts are awarded. Academic/practical relevance: The supply chain is subject to the classic hold-up problem—as the lack of a contract commitment hinders suppliers’ incentives to make investment upfront—complicated with supplier competition. Methodology: With deterministic cost-reduction outcomes, suppliers will not exert any effort if this effort is observable, and a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist if the effort is unobservable. We analyze the mixed-strategy equilibrium with unobservable supplier effort, in which suppliers randomize their efforts and the buyer designs an optimal procurement mechanism. Results: We show that the optimal procurement mechanism can be implemented by a conventional single-price reverse auction with a random reserve price. The mixed strategy of supplier effort generates endogenous information asymmetry on supplier costs that provides suppliers with information rent, which sustains their efforts. The endogenous information asymmetry improves effort efficiency (by inducing positive supplier effort), yet introduces trade inefficiency (by causing the possible failure of trade between the parties). Although increasing supplier competition (measured by the number of suppliers) hurts the effort efficiency, it improves trade efficiency. As a result, the buyer is always better off introducing supplier competition by including more than one supplier in the supply base. However, the desired supply base size (number of suppliers) depends on the product revenue: For high-margin goods, the optimal size is achieved with two suppliers, whereas for low-margin goods, a larger supply base is better for the buyer. We show that the result based on deterministic cost reduction can be established as a limit of the case when uncertainty in cost reduction exists and shrinks to null. Managerial implications: Our study helps to understand the impact of supplier competition when supply-chain parties deliberately make their actions unpredictable to avoid being held up. The findings provide managerial guidance on procurement auction and supply base designs.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128949266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Price-Matching Guarantees: An Equilibrium Analysis in Dual-Channel Supply Chain","authors":"Yuansheng Wei, Pei Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3284154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3284154","url":null,"abstract":"Traditionally, competing retailers offer price-matching guarantees (PMGs) whereby they promise their consumers that any lower price offered elsewhere within a specific period will be matched. Recently, a growing number of suppliers have opened their direct sales channel and started to match downstream retailers' prices. In this paper, we investigate the efficacy of PMGs on channel coordination and competition in the dual-channel setting. We find that the interaction of the relative channel power and channel substitutability moderates the effectiveness of PMGs by supply chain entities. More specifically, when the relative channel power of the retail channel over the direct channel is small, unilateral PMGs by the supplier decreases both supply chain entities' profits; when the relative channel power of the retail channel over the direct channel is medium and channel substitutability is not high, unilateral PMGs by the supplier benefits both supply chain entities. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between price competition and revenue allocation. In addition, we investigate the Nash equilibrium outcome when both the supplier and the retailer have the option to offer PMGs. We show that, the retailer weakly prefers not to offer PMGs, the supplier weakly prefers to (not to) offer PMGs when the relative channel power of the retail channel over the direct channel is high (low). Our findings not only complement the PMGs literature, but also provide a new channel coordinating mechanism concerning the channel members' pricing strategies.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133613604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Blockchain and Other Distributed Ledger Technologies in Operations","authors":"V. Babich, G. Hilary","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3232977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3232977","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain is a form of distributed ledger technology (DLT) that has grown in prominence, although its full potential and possible downsides are not yet fully understood, especially with respect to Operations Management (OM). This manuscript contributes to filling in this gap. We identify three research themes in applying Blockchain technology to OM, illustrated through several applications to OM problems. Elsewhere, in a companion article, (Babich and Hilary (2018)), we provide a conceptual framework for the role of Blockchain and other DLT in OM, along with specific examples of research questions, and we demonstrate how research in economics can inform research in OM on Blockchain applications. Finally, we discuss possible future uses for the technology.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121932301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}