PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)最新文献_第3页

Online Appendix for 'Encroachment as an Enhancement or a Hindrance to Nonlinear Pricing' 网上附录“作为加强或阻碍非线性定价的侵占”

PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-03-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2403615

Z. Li, S. Gilbert, Guoming Lai

引用次数: 0

Horizontal Coordinating Contracts in the Semiconductor Industry 半导体产业中的横向协调契约

PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-02-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2397077

Xiaole Wu, P. Kouvelis, Hirofumi Matsuo, Hiroki Sano

{"title":"Horizontal Coordinating Contracts in the Semiconductor Industry","authors":"Xiaole Wu, P. Kouvelis, Hirofumi Matsuo, Hiroki Sano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2397077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2397077","url":null,"abstract":"Integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) and foundries are two types of manufacturers in the semiconductor industry. IDMs integrate both design and manufacturing functions whereas foundries solely focus on manufacturing. Since foundries often have cost advantage over IDMs due to their specialization and economies of scale, IDMs have incentives to source from foundries for the purpose of avoiding excessive capacity investment risk. As the IDM is also a potential capacity source, the IDM and foundry are in a horizontal setting rather than a purely vertical setting. In the absence of sophisticated contracts, the benchmark contract for the IDM and foundry is a wholesale price contract. We define “coordinating” contracts as those that improve both the IDM’s and foundry’s expected profits over the benchmark wholesale price contract and also lead to the maximum system profit. This paper examines if there exist coordinating capacity reservation contracts. It is found that wholesale price contracts in the horizontal setting cannot achieve the maximum system profit due to either double marginalization effect, or “misalignment of capacity-usage-priority”. In contrast, if the IDM’s capacity investment risk is not too low, there always exist coordinating capacity reservation contracts. Furthermore, under coordinating contracts, the IDM’s sourcing structure, either sole sourcing from the foundry or dual sourcing, is contingent on the firms’ cost structures.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"544 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123094805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 27

The Strategic Role of Third-Party Marketplaces in Retailing 第三方市场在零售业中的战略作用

PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-11-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2281276

B. Mantin, H. Krishnan, Tirtha Dhar

{"title":"The Strategic Role of Third-Party Marketplaces in Retailing","authors":"B. Mantin, H. Krishnan, Tirtha Dhar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2281276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2281276","url":null,"abstract":"Retailers are increasingly adopting a dual-format model. In addition to acting as traditional merchants (buying and then reselling goods), these retailers also provide a platform for third-party sellers to access and compete for the same customers. In this paper we investigate the strategic rationale for a retailer to introduce a third-party (3P) marketplace, by addressing the following questions: how does the existence of the 3P marketplace alter the outcome of the bargaining game between a manufacturer and the retailer and how does it affect their profits? Our analysis provides insights into the growing prevalence of 3P marketplaces. We show that by committing to having an active 3P marketplace the retailer creates an \"outside option\" that improves its bargaining position in negotiations with the manufacturer. This can explain the increasing prevalence of such marketplaces. On the other hand, the manufacturer would prefer to eliminate this retailer's outside option and should seek to limit or prevent sales through 3P marketplaces. This is consistent with actions that several manufacturers have taken to limit such sales. Interestingly, if the manufacturer fails to eliminate sales of competing products through the 3P marketplace, then the best strategy for the manufacturer is to allow the retailer to dictate the terms of their contract. This is due to the fact that an all-powerful retailer will rely less on its outside option in generating profit, and therefore it will increase the fees charged to 3P sellers and soften the competition between 3P sellers and the manufacturer. The decrease in competition will lead to an increase in the value of outside option of the manufacturer and improve its profit. Additionally, we find that the presence of a 3P marketplace benefits consumers (due to the introduction of downstream competition), but this benefit diminishes as the retailer is becoming more powerful.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116339603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 188

The Maximum Principle for Global Solutions of Stochastic Stackelberg Differential Games 随机Stackelberg微分对策全局解的极大原理

PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-10-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2413990

A. Bensoussan, Shaokuan Chen, S. Sethi

引用次数: 96

Simulation Conceptual Modelling for SCM Applications: Research Issues and Existing Practice 供应链管理应用的仿真概念建模:研究问题与现有实践

PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-08-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2241383

Miles W. Weaver

引用次数: 0

A Dynamic Inventory Model with the Right of Refusal 具有拒付权的动态库存模型

PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-12-01 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1257

S. Bhaskaran, Karthik Ramachandran, J. Semple

{"title":"A Dynamic Inventory Model with the Right of Refusal","authors":"S. Bhaskaran, Karthik Ramachandran, J. Semple","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.1100.1257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1257","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a dynamic inventory (production) model with general convex order (production) costs and excess demand that can be accepted or refused by the firm. Excess demand that is accepted is backlogged and results in a backlog cost whereas demand that is refused results in a lost sales charge. Endogenizing the sales decision is appropriate in the presence of general convex order costs so that the firm is not forced to backlog a unit whose subsequent satisfaction would reduce total profits. In each period, the firm must determine the optimal order and sales strategy. We show that the optimal policy is characterized by an optimal buy-up-to level that increases with the initial inventory level and an order quantity that decreases with the initial inventory level. More importantly, we show the optimal sales strategy is characterized by a critical threshold, a backlog limit, that dictates when to stop selling. This threshold is independent of the initial inventory level and the amount purchased. We investigate various properties of this new policy. As demand stochastically increases, the amount purchased increases but the amount backlogged decreases, reflecting a shift in the way excess demand is managed. We develop two regularity conditions, one that ensures some backlogs are allowed in each period, and another that ensures the amount backlogged is nondecreasing in the length of the planning horizon. We illustrate the buy-up-to levels in our model are bounded above by buy-up-to levels from the pure lost sales and pure backlogging models. We explore additional extensions using numerical experiments.","PeriodicalId":330843,"journal":{"name":"PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114770997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 20

Coordination Mechanism for the Supply Chain with Leadtime Consideration and Price-Dependent Demand 考虑交货期和价格依赖需求的供应链协调机制

PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-04-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2009.07.002

Haoya Chen, Y. Chen, C. Chiu, T. Choi, S. Sethi

引用次数: 117

Modeling of Supply Chain Risk under Disruptions with Performance Measurement and Robustness Analysis 基于绩效度量和鲁棒性分析的中断下供应链风险建模

PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-07-05 DOI: 10.1007/978-1-84882-634-2_6

Q. Qiang, A. Nagurney, June Dong

引用次数: 52

When is Vendor Managed Inventory Good for the Retailer? Impact of Relative Margins and Substitution Rates 供应商管理库存何时对零售商有利?相对利润率和替代率的影响

PROD: Analytical (Supply) (Topic) Pub Date : 2006-02-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1015571

Santiago Kraiselburd

引用次数: 1