电子商务平台下的战略承包与供应商侵占

Yusuke Zennyo
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文研究了供应商通过电子商务平台的入侵策略。当供应商在传统零售商之外通过网络渠道销售商品时,应该选择传统的批发合同或者新兴的代理合同。根据代理合同,供应商可以直接设定其零售价格,而销售收入则根据特许权使用费(也称为佣金率)与平台分成。平台应该通过考虑供应商选择合同的决定来确定其最优特许权使用费。我表明,在诱导供应商选择代理合同的同时,将特许权使用费设定在尽可能高的水平,在代理合同之上,选择批发合同。此外,与供应商不入侵相比,增加在线渠道对入侵供应商有利,而对传统零售商不利。更有趣的是,当实体和在线渠道具有高度可替代性时,所有公司(供应商、零售商和平台)都可以从传统批发协议向代理协议的转变中受益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Strategic Contracting and Supplier Encroachment Through an E-commerce Platform
This paper considers a supplier's encroachment strategy through an e-commerce platform. When the supplier sells goods through an online channel in addition to a traditional retailer, it should either select a conventional wholesale contract or an emerging agency contract. Under the agency contract, the supplier can directly set its retail price while sales revenues are split with the platform according to a royalty rate (also called a commission rate). The platform should determine its optimal royalty rate by considering the supplier's decision on which contract to select. I show that the royalty rate is set at the highest level possible while still inducing the supplier to choose the agency contract, above which, the wholesale contract is chosen. Moreover, compared with when the supplier does not encroach, adding the online channel is beneficial to the encroaching supplier but is detrimental to the traditional retailer. More interestingly, all firms (a supplier, retailer, and platform) can benefit from recent industrial changes from traditional wholesale agreements toward agency agreements when brick-and-mortar and online channels are highly substitutable.
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