{"title":"Failure of Aircraft Wing Leading Edge Panel","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0006421","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0006421","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Cracks were found on the wing leading edge of a test aircraft made from AZ31B magnesium alloy. Crack lengths were approximately 230 mm (9 in.) long on the left side and approximately 130 mm (5 in.) long on the right side. The cracks ran parallel to the leading edge. The 230-mm (9-in.) crack was received for examination. Visual examination of the submitted panel revealed two cracks. One crack ran through six adjacent fastener holes. Sections of the beveled edges of the holes were missing and corrosion was evident. Visual examination of the fastener holes after separation of the crack showed that the fracture faces were corroded. Optical examination of either side of the middle group of fastener holes showed that the area of suspected crack initiation had suffered excessive corrosion. Examination of the holes on the end of the crack showed fracture characteristics typical of fatigue and/or corrosion fatigue. It was concluded that crack propagation of the fracture in the wing panel occurred by a combination of corrosion and high-cycle fatigue in the end fastener holes. It was recommended that future panels be manufactured of 2024 aluminum.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"1997 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134204064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fatigue Fracture of a Spindle for a Helicopter Blade","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0046222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0046222","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The spindle of a helicopter-rotor blade fractured after 7383 h of flight service. At every overhaul (the spindle that failed was overhauled six times and reworked twice), any spindle that showed wear was reworked by grinding the shank to 0.1 mm (0.004 in.) under the finished diam. The spindle was then shot peened with S170 shot to an Almen intensity of 0.010 to 0.012 A. Following shot peening, the shank was nickel sulfamate plated to 0.05 mm (0.002 in.) over the finished diam, ground to finished size, and cadmium plated. Visual and stereomicroscopic exam showed faint grinding marks and circumferential grooves on the surface near the fillet at the junction of the shank and fork, which should have been peened over and covered with peening dimples. Evidence found supports the conclusions that the spindle failed in fatigue that originated near the junction of the shank and fork. The nonuniformity of the shot-peened effect on the shank and fillet portions of the spindle resulted from incomplete peeing. The fracture was of the low-stress high-cycle type, initiated by stresses well below the gross yield strength and propagated by thousands of load cycles. No recommendations were made.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130148514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stress-Corrosion Cracking of Aircraft Hinge Brackets","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0091674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0091674","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Forged aluminum alloy 2014-T6 hinge brackets in naval aircraft rudder and aileron linkages were found cracked in service. The cracks were in the hinge lugs, adjacent to a bushing made of cadmium-plated 4130 steel. Investigation (visual inspection and 250X micrographs) supported the conclusion that the failure of the hinge brackets occurred by SCC. The corrosion was caused by exposure to a marine environment in the absence of paint in stressed areas due to chipping. The stress resulted from the interference fit of the bushing in the lug hole. Recommendations included inspecting all hinge brackets in service for cracks and for proper maintenance of paint. Also suggested was replacing the aluminum alloy 2015-T6 with alloy 7075-T6, and surface treatment for the 7075-T6 brackets was recommended using sulfuric acid anodizing and dichromate sealing. Finally, it was also recommended that the interference fit of the bushing in the lug hole be discontinued.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124021863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investigation of a Passenger Airline Crash","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001587","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 On 31 Jan 2000, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 airplane crashed off the California coast while en route from Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to San Francisco. Approximately 90% of the aircraft was recovered from a depth of about 700 ft. (213 m). Among the recovered components were parts of the jackscrew assembly, including the jackscrew with an internal torque tube, the gimbal nut, and the upper and lower mechanical stops. The jackscrew was connected to the horizontal stabilizer and controlled its movement. Multiple damage features, indicative of contact with another object, were observed on the upper surface of the lower mechanical stop. Damage to the spline teeth was also observed on the lower mechanical stop. The stripping pattern and offset circumferential marks were consistent with the lower stop being at two or more skewed angles to the splines of the jackscrew during stripping. This investigation is continuing.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"362 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132340719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effects of Decarburization in Aircraft Components","authors":"Jivan B. Shah","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001553","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A connecting rod from a failed engine ruptured in fatigue without evidence of excessive stresses, detonation, overheating, or oil starvation. The origin of the fatigue failure was completely mutilated but decarburization was observed. Significant amounts of decarburization (0.010 to 0.015 in.) were found also in other forgings, such as exhaust rocker arms, main rotor drag brace clevises, bolts of carriage diagonal struts, and spring legs of main landing gears. The failure mode was low-stress, high-cycle fatigue involving tension and bending loads. The main cause was a manufacturing deficiency. The usual way to eliminate decarburization is to machine off the soft skin or employ better quality control when making them. Many aircraft manufacturers employ forged parts with machined surfaces or with shot-peened as-forged surfaces without excessive decarburization.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130409994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fatigue Fracture of a Fuel Line at a Butt Weld","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0047590","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A weld in a fuel-line tube broke after 159 h of engine testing. The 6.4-mm (0.25-in.) OD x 0.7-mm (0.028-in.) wall thickness tube and the end adapters were all of type 347 stainless steel. The butt joints between tube and end adapters were made by automated gas tungsten arc (orbital arc) welding. It was found that the tube had failed in the HAZ. Examination of a plastic replica of the fracture surface in a transmission electron microscope established that the crack origin was at the outer surface of the tube. The crack growth was by fatigue; closely spaced fatigue striations were found near the origin, and more widely spaced striations near the inner surface. The quality of the weld and the chemical composition of the tube both conformed to the specifications. However, the fuel-line assembly had vibrated excessively in service. The fuel-line fracture was caused by fatigue induced by severe vibration in service. Additional tube clamps were provided to damp the critical vibrational stresses. No further fuel-line fractures were encountered.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126343665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Service Propulsion System Fuel Tanks","authors":"","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0091727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c0091727","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 During an acceptance test of the Apollo spacecraft 101 service module prior to delivery, an SPS fuel pressure vessel (SN054) (titanium Ti-6Al-4V, approximately 1.2 m (4 ft) in diam and 3 m (10 ft) long) containing methanol developed cracks adjacent to the welds. The test was stopped. This acceptance test had been run 38 times on similar pressure vessels without problems. The methanol was a safe-fluid replacement for the storable hypergolic fuels (blend of 50% hydrazine and 50% unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine). Investigation (visual inspection and 65X images) showed similarities to stress-corrosion resulting from contamination during misprocessing of the vessels. However, another vessel underwent a more severe testing procedure and failed catastrophically. Further investigation supported the conclusion that the failure cause was SCC of titanium in methanol. Attack is promoted by crazing of the protective oxide film. It was learned that minor changes in the testing procedures could inhibit or accelerate the reaction. Recommendations included replacing the methanol with a suitable alternate fluid. Isopropyl alcohol was chosen after considerable testing. This incident further resulted in the imposition of a control specification (MF0004-018) for all fluids that contact titanium for existing and future space designs.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129339217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Failure of Hose Clamp","authors":"Dick","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A helicopter rapidly lost altitude and struck a tree, causing a fire and severe damage. The hose clamp which was the subject of this investigation was one of two used on a short length of hose between the turbocharger and the carburetion system. The purpose of this examination was to determine whether the hose failed during or before the accident. Fracture in the failed clamp was accompanied by obvious permanent deformation and evidence of local shearing at the ends of the perforation where fracture occurred, and in the adjacent perforation. The first test involved tightening the clamps to failure with a torque wrench. In no case did the band material fracture. In a second attempt to duplicate the failure, a tensile testing machine was used to pull the two fittings apart while the hose was clamped in place. When the testing machine was operated at maximum head travel (approximately 20 in. per min.), one of the hose clamps broke in the same manner as the clamp in question. The manner of failure during the tension test indicated this clamp failed at the time of the crash because of a sudden separation between the turbocharger and the remainder of the aircraft.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123263885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Failure of a Helicopter Rotor","authors":"R. Kieselbach, G. Soyka","doi":"10.1080/135993700750364369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/135993700750364369","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Helicopter rotor blade components that included the horizontal hinge pin, the associated nut, and the locking washer were examined. Visual examination of the submitted parts revealed that the hinge pin, fabricated from 4340 steel, was broken and that the fracture face showed a flat beach mark pattern indicative of a preexisting crack. The threaded area of the pin had an embedded thread that did not appear to come from the pin. A chemical analysis was conducted on the embedded thread and on an associated attachment to determine the origin of the thread. Analysis showed that the thread and nut were 4140 steel. Scanning electron fractographic examination of the fracture initiation site strongly suggested that the fracture progressed by fatigue. It was concluded that the failure of the horizontal hinge pin initiated at areas of localized corrosion pits. The pits in turn initiated fatigue cracks, resulting in a failure mode of corrosion fatigue. It was recommended that all of the horizontal hinge pins be inspected. Those pins determined to be satisfactory for further use should be stripped of cadmium, shot peened, and coated with cadmium to a minimum thickness of 0.0127 mm (0.0005 in.).","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114773844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investigating an Aircraft Disaster","authors":"R. Barer, T. S. Sterling","doi":"10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31399/asm.fach.aero.c9001729","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Applying general techniques of failure analysis, the authors deduced that an in-flight explosion brought down a passenger plane. Other evidence pinpointed the location of the explosive, an important factor in establishing responsibility.","PeriodicalId":326464,"journal":{"name":"ASM Failure Analysis Case Histories: Air and Spacecraft","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115553001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}