Open Mind最新文献

{"title":"Prosodic Cues Support Inferences About the Question's Pedagogical Intent.","authors":"Igor Bascandziev, Patrick Shafto, Elizabeth Bonawitz","doi":"10.1162/opmi_a_00192","DOIUrl":"10.1162/opmi_a_00192","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Questions may be asked with an intent to acquire new information from the recipient (i.e., information-seeking questions) or with the intent to teach (i.e., pedagogical questions). Understanding how the questions' recipients infer the intent of questions is important, because the recipients' inferences have important consequences for reasoning and learning. In the present series of studies, we tested the hypothesis that i) askers use prosodic cues-an ever-present signal-to encode information-seeking and pedagogical intent both in deliberate and spontaneous speech and that ii) adults and children can draw appropriate inferences about the question's intent on the basis of prosody alone. In Experiments 1 and 2, we found that naïve adult listeners and children aged 5 years and above have the capacity to explicitly identify which asker has an intention to teach on the basis of prosody alone. In Experiment 3, we found that parents' spontaneous speech in pedagogical or information-seeking contexts is appropriately recognized by naïve listeners as pedagogical or information-seeking. Thus, the intent of pedagogical and information-seeking questions is acoustically encoded by askers, and it can be appropriately decoded by recipients.</p>","PeriodicalId":32558,"journal":{"name":"Open Mind","volume":"9 ","pages":"340-363"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11864796/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143516872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Approximating Human-Level 3D Visual Inferences With Deep Neural Networks.","authors":"Thomas P O'Connell, Tyler Bonnen, Yoni Friedman, Ayush Tewari, Vincent Sitzmann, Joshua B Tenenbaum, Nancy Kanwisher","doi":"10.1162/opmi_a_00189","DOIUrl":"10.1162/opmi_a_00189","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Humans make rich inferences about the geometry of the visual world. While deep neural networks (DNNs) achieve human-level performance on some psychophysical tasks (e.g., rapid classification of object or scene categories), they often fail in tasks requiring inferences about the underlying shape of objects or scenes. Here, we ask whether and how this gap in 3D shape representation between DNNs and humans can be closed. First, we define the problem space: after generating a stimulus set to evaluate 3D shape inferences using a match-to-sample task, we confirm that standard DNNs are unable to reach human performance. Next, we construct a set of candidate 3D-aware DNNs including 3D neural field (Light Field Network), autoencoder, and convolutional architectures. We investigate the role of the learning objective and dataset by training single-view (the model only sees one viewpoint of an object per training trial) and multi-view (the model is trained to associate multiple viewpoints of each object per training trial) versions of each architecture. When the same object categories appear in the model training and match-to-sample test sets, multi-view DNNs approach human-level performance for 3D shape matching, highlighting the importance of a learning objective that enforces a common representation across viewpoints of the same object. Furthermore, the 3D Light Field Network was the model most similar to humans across all tests, suggesting that building in 3D inductive biases increases human-model alignment. Finally, we explore the generalization performance of multi-view DNNs to out-of-distribution object categories not seen during training. Overall, our work shows that multi-view learning objectives for DNNs are necessary but not sufficient to make similar 3D shape inferences as humans and reveals limitations in capturing human-like shape inferences that may be inherent to DNN modeling approaches. We provide a methodology for understanding human 3D shape perception within a deep learning framework and highlight out-of-domain generalization as the next challenge for learning human-like 3D representations with DNNs.</p>","PeriodicalId":32558,"journal":{"name":"Open Mind","volume":"9 ","pages":"305-324"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11864798/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143516871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Double Standard of Ownership.","authors":"Zofia Washington, Ori Friedman","doi":"10.1162/opmi_a_00190","DOIUrl":"10.1162/opmi_a_00190","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Owners are often blamed when their property causes harm but might not receive corresponding praise when their property does good. This suggests a double standard of ownership, wherein owning property poses risks for moral blame that are not balanced with equal opportunities for credit. We investigated this possibility in three preregistered experiments on 746 US residents. Participants read vignettes where agentic property (e.g., animals, robots) produced bad or good outcomes, and judged whether owners and the property were morally responsible. With bad outcomes, participants assigned owners more blame than property (Experiments 1 and 2) or similar blame (Experiment 3). But with good outcomes, participants consistently assigned owners much less praise relative to their property. The first two experiments also examined if the double standard arises in two other relationships between authorities and subordinates; participants showed the double standard when assessing moral responsibility for parents and children, but not for employers and employees. Together, these findings point to a novel asymmetry in how owners are assigned responsibility.</p>","PeriodicalId":32558,"journal":{"name":"Open Mind","volume":"9 ","pages":"325-339"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11864797/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143516873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pragmatics as Social Inference About Intentional Action.","authors":"Manuel Bohn, Michael C Frank","doi":"10.1162/opmi_a_00191","DOIUrl":"10.1162/opmi_a_00191","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Pragmatic inferences are based on assumptions about how speakers communicate: speakers are taken to be cooperative and rational; they consider alternatives and make intentional choices to produce maximally informative utterances. In principle, this analysis applies to linguistic but also non-linguistic communicative actions, but this prediction is typically only tested in children and not in more systematic implicature contexts. We test key implications of this view across six online experiments with American English speaking adults (total <i>N</i> = 231). Experiments 1A and 1B showed that participants made pragmatic inferences based on different types of communicative actions, some being non-linguistic. In Experiment 2, pragmatic inferences were found to be conditional on the speaker's epistemic states. Finally, Experiments 3A to 3C showed that pragmatic inferences were more likely to be made when the communicative action was produced intentionally. Taken together, these results strengthen the view that pragmatics includes social inference about cooperative communication over intentional actions, even non-linguistic actions.</p>","PeriodicalId":32558,"journal":{"name":"Open Mind","volume":"9 ","pages":"290-304"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11850021/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143493951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Investigating Sensitivity to Shared Information and Personal Experience in Children's Use of Majority Information.","authors":"Rebekah A Gelpí, Kay Otsubo, Amy Whalen, Daphna Buchsbaum","doi":"10.1162/opmi_a_00182","DOIUrl":"10.1162/opmi_a_00182","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Children and adults alike rely on others to learn about the world, but also need to be able to determine the strength of both their own evidence as well as the evidence that other people provide, particularly when different sources of information disagree. For example, if two informants agree on a belief but share the same evidence, their testimony is statistically dependent on each other, and may be weaker evidence for that belief than two informants who draw on different pieces of evidence to support that belief. Across three experiments (total <i>N</i> = 492), we examine how 4- and 5-year-old children evaluate statistical dependency on a task where they must determine which of two jars that toys were drawn from. A majority of informants, whose testimony could draw from the same evidence or different evidence, always endorsed one jar. Then, children were presented with a dissenting informant or their own personal data that was consistent with the other jar. Children showed no sensitivity to statistical dependency, choosing the majority with equal probability regardless of the independence of their testimony, but also systematically overweighted their own personal data, endorsing the jar consistent with their own evidence more often than would be predicted by an optimal Bayesian model. In contrast, children made choices consistent with this model on a similar task in which the data was presented to children without testimony. Our findings suggest that young children treat majorities as broadly informative, but that the challenges of inferring others' experiences may lead them to rely on concrete, visible evidence when it is available.</p>","PeriodicalId":32558,"journal":{"name":"Open Mind","volume":"9 ","pages":"240-265"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11850023/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143493941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Combination and Differentiation Theories of Categorization: A Comparison Using Participants' Categorization Descriptions.","authors":"Sujith Thomas, Aditya Kapoor, Narayanan Srinivasan","doi":"10.1162/opmi_a_00187","DOIUrl":"10.1162/opmi_a_00187","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Differentiation and Combination theories make different predictions about the order in which information is processed during categorization. Differentiation theory posits that holistic processing of a stimulus occurs before individual features are processed. According to Differentiation theory, overall similarity-based categorization is faster and less effortful compared to unidimensional categorization. In contrast, Combination theory posits that individual features are processed first and that information regarding these features must be combined during multidimensional categorization. According to Combination theory, overall similarity-based categorization is more effortful and takes more time compared to unidimensional categorization. In this study, we trained participants to learn artificial categories using classification learning and observation learning procedures. We used participants' categorization descriptions to determine the number of stimuli dimensions used for categorization. Our results from the first three experiments show that participants who used more dimensions took more time to categorize the transfer stimuli, consistent with Combination theory. In Experiment 4, we tested the hypothesis that using more dimensions takes more time solely due to multiple eye fixations and saccades. In our study, we used visual stimuli with features that do not overlap in space. Our results show that while performing a multidimensional task, participants need more time to recall the feature-category associations learned during the experiment, making the task more effortful, as predicted by Combination theory. Further studies are needed to determine whether Combination theory applies to other types of stimuli, particularly those with spatially non-separable features.</p>","PeriodicalId":32558,"journal":{"name":"Open Mind","volume":"9 ","pages":"266-289"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11850022/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143493787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Young Children's Understanding of Helping as Increasing Another Agent's Utility.","authors":"Laura Schlingloff-Nemecz, Barbara Pomiechowska, Denis Tatone, Barbu Revencu, Dorottya Mészégető, Gergely Csibra","doi":"10.1162/opmi_a_00183","DOIUrl":"10.1162/opmi_a_00183","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Instrumental helping is one of the paradigmatic \"prosocial\" behaviors featured in developmental research on sociomoral reasoning, but not much is known about how children recognize instances of helping behaviors or understand the term 'help'. Here, we examined whether young children represent helping as a second-order goal and take it to mean increasing the utility of another agent. In Study 1, we tested whether 12-month-old infants would expect an agent who previously helped to perform an action that reduced the Helpee's action cost. We found that while infants expected agents to act individually efficiently (Experiment 1C), they did not expect the agent to choose the action that maximally reduced the Helpee's cost compared to an action that reduced the cost less (Experiment 1A) or not at all (Experiment 1B). In Study 2, we examined whether three-year-old preschoolers (1) maximize a Helpee's cost reduction when prompted to help in a first-person task, and (2) identify in a third-party context which of two agents, performing superficially similar behaviors with varying effects on the Helpee's action options, actually helped. Contrary to our predictions, preschoolers did not help in a way that maximally reduced the Helpee's cost in (1). In (2), however, they indicated that the agent who reduced the Helpee's action cost was the one who helped. Taken together, these results support the proposal that, at least by preschool age, children possess a second-order utility-based concept of helping, but that they may not exhibit efficiency when choosing their own helping actions.</p>","PeriodicalId":32558,"journal":{"name":"Open Mind","volume":"9 ","pages":"169-188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11793198/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143190816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Use of Statistical and Acoustic Cues for Speech Segmentation in French-Learning 7-Month-Old Infants and French-Speaking Adults.","authors":"Mireia Marimon, Elena Berdasco-Muñoz, Barbara Höhle, Thierry Nazzi","doi":"10.1162/opmi_a_00184","DOIUrl":"10.1162/opmi_a_00184","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Young infants can segment continuous speech with acoustic as well as statistical cues. Understanding how these cues interact can be informative about how infants solve the segmentation problem. This study investigates the use of acoustic and statistical cues by both adult French speakers and 6-to-7-month-old French-learning infants. Both groups were familiarized with a naturally recorded string, alternating either in duration (long-short) or in intensity (soft-loud). In addition, statistical cues were present in both strings, signaling different word boundaries than the acoustic cues. The adults were tested in a recognition task and the infants with the Head-turn Preference Procedure. Results show that the French-speaking adults segmented the strings by responding to the acoustic cues in both familiarization conditions, following the predictions of the Iambic-Trochaic Law. In contrast, the French-learning infants displayed segmentation based on TPs in the Intensity condition only. These findings collectively contribute to our understanding of how the use of acoustic and statistical cues to decode linguistic input changes between infancy and adulthood and differs across languages.</p>","PeriodicalId":32558,"journal":{"name":"Open Mind","volume":"9 ","pages":"189-209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11793197/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143190812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Learning in Interactive Decision-Making: The Interplay Between Cognitive Abilities and the Strategic Environment.","authors":"Joshua Zonca, Lilia Del Mauro, Aldo Rustichini, Luca Polonio, Carlo Reverberi","doi":"10.1162/opmi_a_00186","DOIUrl":"10.1162/opmi_a_00186","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A remarkable feature of human intelligence is the ability to optimize our decisions based on the potential actions of others. This ability, i.e., strategic sophistication, is crucial in strategic interactions, where we need to predict others' actions (first-order beliefs), anticipate others' beliefs about our own possible actions (second-order beliefs), and optimize decisions based on such beliefs. While behavioral research has highlighted systematic departures from theoretically optimal behavior in strategic interactions, little is known about the possibility of enhancing strategic sophistication. In particular, no studies investigated whether and how the interaction between exogenous factors (i.e., the learning environment) and endogenous factors (i.e., individual cognitive abilities) shapes learning in strategic settings. In a novel mouse-tracking study, we manipulate the learning environment and test its interaction with individual cognitive abilities in determining context-specific and transfer of learning in interactive games. Choice and process data reveal that the interplay between individual cognitive abilities and the learning environment does modulate participants' learning. The learning environment determines <i>what</i> is learned and <i>whether</i> acquired knowledge is applied in similar contexts and transferred to novel settings. Moreover, learning success in different strategic environments depends on individual cognitive abilities. In particular, higher levels of cognitive reflection are necessary to learn sophisticated strategic behavior (i.e., forming second-order beliefs) and transfer acquired knowledge to more complex strategic environments after receiving relevant feedback. However, higher cognitive reflection levels are insufficient to prevent the misapplication of procedures learned in a specific environment to other strategic contexts with substantial structural differences. Our results provide novel insights into the factors that promote or hamper learning in interactive decision-making.</p>","PeriodicalId":32558,"journal":{"name":"Open Mind","volume":"9 ","pages":"210-239"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11793201/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143190809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the Perception of Moral Standing to Blame.","authors":"Isaias Ghezae, Fan Yang, Hongbo Yu","doi":"10.1162/opmi_a_00185","DOIUrl":"10.1162/opmi_a_00185","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Is everyone equally justified in blaming another's moral transgression? Across five studies (four pre-registered; total <i>N</i> = 1,316 American participants), we investigated the perception of <i>moral standing to blame</i>-the appropriateness and legitimacy for someone to blame a moral wrongdoing. We propose and provide evidence for a moral commitment hypothesis-a blamer is perceived to have low moral standing to blame a moral transgressor if the blamer demonstrates weak commitment to that moral rule. As hypothesized, we found that when blamers did not have the chance or relevant experience to demonstrate good commitment to a moral rule, participants generally believed that they had high moral standing to blame. However, when a blamer demonstrated bad commitment to a moral rule in their past behaviors, participants consistently granted the blamer low moral standing to blame. Low moral standing to blame was generally associated with perceiving the blame to be less effective and less likely to be accepted. Moreover, indirectly demonstrating moral commitment, such as acknowledging one's past wrongdoing and feeling/expressing guilt, modestly restored moral standing to blame. Our studies demonstrate moral commitment as a key mechanism for determining moral standing to blame and emphasize the importance of considering a blamer's moral standing as a crucial factor in fully understanding the psychology of blame.</p>","PeriodicalId":32558,"journal":{"name":"Open Mind","volume":"9 ","pages":"138-168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11774539/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143060692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}